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Essential life-needs are commonly supplied to end-users by complex and 
heterogeneous technological systems that have many potential failure-points and 
hence contribute vulnerability. The vulnerabilities under consideration in this study 
are those arising from the length and complexity of the technological system used 
to bring these life-needs to the end-user. Public awareness of dependence is 
evidenced at the corporate and national level by the expenditure of time and effort 
on infrastructure hardening, and at the individual level by a range of self-sufficiency 
and personal preparedness movements. Although the awareness of such 
dependence is commonly described using a term such as vulnerability, this term is 
imprecisely defined, and a lack of quantifiable measures hampers assessment of 
the absolute and relative value of methods that are designed to decrease 
vulnerability.  
Published studies of infrastructure systems, supply chains, power 
distribution systems, communications and other networks have shown concern for 
system owners but little specific concern for the vulnerability of the end-user. Studies 
using network theory have considered homogeneous networks but these are not 
applicable to the heterogeneous technological systems that supply individuals. Risk 
analyses are highly dependent upon expert identifications of hazards and 
probabilities, and do not address situations in which there are intentional threats or 
long time-frames.  
A review of published material indicated a need to consider the vulnerability 
of individual urban-dwelling end-users, and particularly apartment-dwellers, to the 
essential services that are available only via technological systems. The research 
question "For goods or services delivered to end-users, what measure of 
vulnerability can be attributed to the technological systems that are currently used, 
and what reductions can be obtained by changes to the technological approach or 
configuration” was formulated to consider this need. A review of issues associated 
with the assessment of vulnerability also demonstrated the significance of the 
configuration of a technological system and a need to assess the contribution to 
vulnerability that is caused by heterogeneous technological systems. The number 
and the type of weaknesses in a technological system are shown to be a calculable 
property of the configuration of that technological system, and the metric of the 
number and type of weaknesses is well described by the term "exposure". The 
exposure metric is not dependent on the completeness of a brainstorming exercise 
to identify hazards, does not require any assessment of hazard probability and is 
 
 
shown to be a valid measure of the contribution of the technological system to the 
end-user's vulnerability with respect to that specific system.  
The research question is addressed by describing example cases in which 
services are delivered to a representative end-user. A number of possible examples 
were considered and six were chosen to represent a broad variety of goods and 
services, and a variety of technological systems used in the supply process. The 
exposure of the selected technological systems was examined. The investigations 
identified specific contributions to vulnerability and evaluated the effectiveness of 
possible approaches to reduce these vulnerabilities.  
Measurement of the exposure of the examples and the hypothesised 
changes to the examples showed that this approach was capable of identifying 
contributors to vulnerability and of quantifying the reductions offered by hypothetical 
changes. Issues that were examined as hypothetical changes to the technological 
systems included the development of open-standards for the specification of 
intermediate products (allowing alternative providers), the introduction of highly 
decentralised options for services that are currently highly centralised and the 
application of re-purposable components. Analysis showed that application of the 
exposure metric generated insights and options that were not identified by risk 
analysis approaches; hence, this metric contributes to both practice and the 
academic field.  
Hypothesised changes to the examples were assessed in terms of both 
effectiveness and nature. These changes were shown to offer significant reductions 
in vulnerability, achieved in some cases by reducing dependence on large and 
centralised systems and achieved in other cases by ensuring alternative sources for 
intermediate streams. Specific technological gaps, including the lack of power 
storage technology, were identified.  
This study has demonstrated the contribution of technological systems to 
users' vulnerability. The study has also quantified this contribution to vulnerability for 
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1.1 The research field 
Many life-needs that are essential to urban dwellers are supplied by complex 
technological systems. These systems have many weaknesses, which are potential 
failure-points and each of which is exposed to hazards. Risk management 
practitioners attempt to identify risks, but may fail either because a weakness is not 
identified or because a malicious and hence non-random hazard targets that 
weakness. The number of individual or combinatorial weaknesses in a technological 
system is shown to be a definable property of that technological system and a metric 
of the exposure, and thus a measure of the vulnerability contributed by that system. 
By studying both the number and the nature of individual or combinatorial 
weaknesses, for a number of real and modified technological systems, this study 
identified more secure approaches to supplying the representative end-users with 
goods and services that are essential to their lifestyle and livelihood. 
The research must build upon a theoretical base and make a contribution to a 
theoretical field. A number of interdisciplinary theories address aspects of complex 
systems that assume multiple interacting and interrelated parts; these include general 
systems theory, sociotechnical theory, complexity theory, catastrophe theory and 
chaos theory. The scope of application of these theories will be examined, to 
determine the field to which this thesis contributes. 
Sociotechnical theory is associated with organisational development and 
deals specifically with the interactions between employees and technology in their 
workplaces. It has origins in the Tavistock Institute in London, as reported by Long 
(2013). Sociotechnical theory emphasises the concept of "joint optimisation" as 
described by Cooper and Foster (1971) and proposes approaches to the design of 
task combinations and organisation structures in which the relationships between 
social, psychological and technical elements lead to both productivity and employee 
well-being. Task analysis, job rotation and process design are techniques that are 
commonly used, and typical results include increasing the responsible autonomy of 
teams, as proposed by Hackman and Oldham (1980), and the adoption of whole task 
concepts (i.e. job enlargement for employee groups, in order to generate a perception 





technology is capable of producing the goods or services for which it is designed, and 
consider people in their roles as operators of the technology. The current research 
considers people, who are the end-users, in their role as consumers rather than 
operators of technology, and considers the technology features that contribute to the 
secure operation of the technology, rather than assuming the capability of the 
technology. Hence, this research neither significantly derives from nor contributes to 
Sociotechnical Theory.  
Chaos theory studies the dynamic response of systems in which the 
configuration and response functions are known and static, but are highly sensitive to 
the initial conditions as proposed by Alligood et al. (1997). Whereas chaos theory 
implicitly assumes that the outcome of a system is deterministic and continuous, 
catastrophe theory, e.g. as described by Igorevich (1992) and by Shil'nikov et al. 
(1999), applies mathematical analyses to systems in which the response functions to 
one or more variables are known, and thereby predicts the condition types and values 
at which the system dynamic response is unstable. The principles of catastrophe 
theory are used in some publications that are related to resilience, and authors such 
as Starossek and Haberland (2010) speak of "disproportionate collapse" in the 
context of civil engineering structures. Both chaos theory and catastrophe theory 
assume a known system configuration, with known response functions that are 
continuous within defined value ranges. It could be argued that representing a 
complex technological system with Boolean algebra is simply an example of a very 
specific and time-invariant response function and hence is an expression of 
catastrophe theory; however, both chaos theory and catastrophe theory are observed 
to be primarily concerned with dynamic responses and continuous response limits of 
a particular system rather than comparisons of the number and nature of technological 
weaknesses of a range of systems.  
General systems theory was originally proposed by von Bertalanffy (1968, p. 
32), who noted that "... there exist models, principles, and laws that apply to 
generalised systems or their subclasses, irrespective of their particular kind, the 
nature of their component elements, and the relationships … between them. It seems 
legitimate to ask for a theory, not of systems of a more or less special kind, but of 
universal principles applying to systems in general”. Although end-user vulnerability 





which is commonly categorised (Edson et al., 2016, p. 8) into three major domains, 
viz. philosophy, science and technology, is broader than necessary; for the purposes 
of the current research, it is necessary to consider only "systems engineering". 
Several definitions of "system" are found within the "systems engineering” field; the 
technological systems that supply goods and services to end-users are "systems" 
within the definitions presented by IEEE Std 1220-1998 "A set or arrangement of 
elements and processes that are related and whose behaviour satisfies 
customer/operational needs and provides for life cycle sustainment of the products." 
and ISO/IEC 15288:2008 Systems and Software Engineering – System Life Cycle 
Processes "A combination of interacting elements organised to achieve one or more 
stated purposes". NASA's Systems Engineering Handbook (1995) states that 
"System engineering is a robust approach to the design, creation, and operation of 
systems … the approach consists of identification and quantification of system goals, 
creation of alternative system design concepts … selection and implementation of the 
best design”. A similar definition is offered by Schlager (1956). Hitchins (2008) states 
that "Systems engineering (SE) is an interdisciplinary field of engineering, that 
focuses on the development and organization of complex systems. It is the art and 
science of creating whole solutions to complex problems”.  
In the context of the current research, the system goals are the delivery of 
defined services at defined service levels to an end-user; however, as the focus is on 
the vulnerability contributed by the complex technological systems to those system 
goals, the research can be considered to apply primarily to the development of 
engineering systems theory. The research develops approaches to the quantification 
and description of technological vulnerabilities, as these affect end-users; as such, it 
contributes to and extends a specific aspect of engineering systems theory and risk 
management practices.  
The research has application to several related fields as follows. As the supply 
of goods and services that are essential to the selected group of end-users commonly 
involves critical infrastructure, the research contributes to the infrastructure research 
field, but is distinct because it is not focused on the security of the critical infrastructure 
per se. The supply of goods to the defined end-users generally also involves supply 
chains, however although this research has applications to theories of supply chain 





complete technological system rather than the final supply chain security and 
profitability. A subset of the supply chain research field is the “network” field which 
includes computer networks and water supply networks. This research has 
applications to the network research field, but is distinct because it does not restrict 
consideration to networks that transmit only a single product. 
1.2 The research topic 
1.2.1 Related research topics 
For the selected end-user group, i.e. high-density-housing urban dwellers, 
goods and services that are essential for their lives are delivered by complex 
technological systems. Researchers including Gheorghe and Vamanu (2004), Kumar 
et al. (2010), Khatri and Vairavamoorthy (2011) and Timashev and Tyrsin (2011), and 
publications such as AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 and BS OHSAS 18001:2007, 
contribute to the large foundational base devoted to assessing the failure probabilities 
of specific technological systems, that are exposed to hazards for which historical 
measures of statistical probability exist or for which practitioners may assess 
probabilities based upon their experience. Authors including Chopade and Bikdash 
(2011), Gómez et al. (2011), Afgan and Veziroglu (2012) and publications including 
ISO GUIDE 73:2009 (Risk Management) propose definitions of “vulnerability” as a 
concept that correlates the state of a nominated technological system either 
statistically or in a "snapshot" with the probability of the occurrence of some hazard, 
to generate a more sophisticated assessment of the probability of failure. There is 
variation in the level of sophistication of the published approaches, from simple 
assessments of overall system loading by authors such as Günneç and Salman 
(2011) to more sophisticated correlations such as those proposed by Haimes (2006). 
Within this body of literature, the configuration and the components of the 
technological system are generally not described in detail, and are assumed to be 
static. The lack of definition of the system configuration and its correlation with 
outcomes makes it difficult to identify the major technological contributors to end-user 
insecurity, and makes it unlikely that these useful works will allow the effects of 





The literature that includes significant comment on "resilience", e.g. by Nair et 
al. (2010), Shua et al. (2011) and Afgan and Veziroglu (2012), generally considers a 
nominated system’s time-domain response to a disturbance and implicitly assumes 
that the hazard level will not cause the system to fail. In the context of these 
publications, a disturbance is considered to be the occurrence of a hazard at a given 
level. A variation on this definition of “resilience” is provided by authors such as Strigini 
(2012), who seek to assess the hazard level or process state at which breakage 
occurs, and categorise that level as the “maximum tolerable disturbance”. 
Considerations of “resilience” under these definitions must assume a particular and 
complete technical system. The necessity of considering multiple components, each 
having complex response functions, can be expected to result in significant 
computational modelling. A further variation is proposed by Muñoz and Dunbar 
(2015), who consider the system properties linked to the capability of a supply chain 
to recover as an important contributor to its resilience.  
The vulnerabilities of computer or communication networks have been studied 
by a large number of authors including Tu (2000), Doyle et al. (2005), Strigini et al. 
(2007), Misra et al. (2010), Liu and Zhang (2011), Idika and Bhargava (2012) and 
Lowis and Accorsi (2011), power distribution systems have been studied by Baldick 
et al. (2009), Buldyrev et al. (2010) and others, and water distribution networks have 
been studied by authors including Werbeloff and Brown (2011) and Yazdani and 
Jeffrey (2012). All these are examples of homogeneous systems that transmit a single 
product through a network. Such systems have been extensively studied using graph 
theory, which implicitly assumes that the same product or service is transmitted along 
all edges. This assumption is quite fundamental and is demonstrated by a simple 
illustration, as follows. Consider a graphical representation that shows node A linked 
to node B, which links to node C, and that also shows a link from node A to node C. 
An analysis that considers the effect of removing node B, or removing the link B‒C, 
will be meaningless if A‒C carries electrical power whereas A‒B‒C carries potable 
water. This limitation is particularly relevant for the current research because the 
systems under study are heterogeneous. As might be expected, some authors 
propose approaches that impinge upon broader topics: both Lewis et al. (2016) and 
Ray et al. (2016) and Ouffoué et al. (2017) consider systems that they characterise 





characteristics of the nodes (equipment type and characteristics) rather than the 
definition of what flows between the nodes.  In each of the cases described by these 
authors, that which flows between each node is essentially identical (digital 
information). 
Authors including Van Blaricum et al. (2005) and Chopade and Bikdash (2011) 
recognise the significance, to the “vulnerability” of infrastructures, of interconnections 
between different infrastructures, e.g. water and power; however, the analysis of real 
infrastructural systems by modelling all interdependencies has generally been 
considered to be impractical, although Haimes and Jiang (2001) have presented a 
high level approach. Proposed simplification options have included overlaying 
interacting homogeneous systems based on geography, such as the GIS database 
approach proposed by Van Blaricum et al. (2005). The interactions of several overlaid 
systems are assessed by modelling a geographically localised disaster, assumed to 
cause failure of each homogeneous system node within range of the disaster. Other 
options have included making various simplifications of the configuration and reliance 
upon expert assessment of the probabilities of a hazard, as proposed by Yazdani et 
al. (2011), and a coincidental weakness or the adoption of a system-of-systems 
approach, as proposed by Gheorghe and Vamanu (2008). Although publications 
dealing with “risk” and “vulnerability”, for example those by Gheorghe and Vamanu 
(2004) and Khatri and Vairavamoorthy (2011), and publications including AS/NZS ISO 
31000:2009, require assessments of the probability that a hazard will occur, they 
seldom define a time-horizon during which the risk probability is assessed, and almost 
always require expert assessment of probability.  
Authors such as LePoire and Glenn (2007) show awareness of intelligently 
misguided, intentional or directed hazards, and Wang et al (2015, p1674) note the 
distinctive nature of intentional hazards and the "... significant uncertainties due to 
behaviors of different rationality", but it is proposed that the distinction between 
intentional hazards and random hazards has not been fully appreciated, and it has 
not been appreciated that the consequence of this distinction is that a guided hazard 
must be treated as having a probability of occurrence p = 1.0 in a consideration of 
“risk”, because effort and intelligence will be used to target the hazard at an accessible 





way as randomly occurring hazards with a statistical probability, but must be 
considered as “attacks”, as noted by Nair et al. (2010) and others.  
1.2.2 Refinement of the research topic 
“Vulnerability”, “risk” and “exposure” are key terms in this thesis; they occur 
throughout the reviewed literature and appear very commonly throughout this thesis. 
As a precursor to clarification of the research field, it is important to note that these 
terms are in common use, but with broad definitions such as those proposed in ISO 
GUIDE 73:2009. Furthermore, within specific fields, e.g. the definition of “risk” in the 
insurance field, some of these terms have acquired more tightly defined meanings. 
Some authors including Haimes (2006, 2011) have proposed somewhat tighter 
definitions but other authors, including Afgan and Veziroglu (2012) and Wang et al. 
(2012), have proposed variations or alternative definitions. A definition is essential if 
any measure of vulnerability is to be developed.  
The clarification of the research opportunity noted that published material has 
not adequately considered how end-user supply security is affected by the 
configuration of the heterogeneous technological systems used. The clarification of 
the research opportunity also failed to reveal a metric that adequately quantifies the 
vulnerability of such technological systems. As every hazard must necessarily be 
linked to a weakness in a technological system, and because the probability of a 
hazard occurring must tend towards p = 1.0 with time, or be treated as having p = 1.0 
in the case of directed hazards, the number of weaknesses in a technological system 
is a critical factor in determining the contribution of a particular technological system 
to the end-user’s vulnerability. This issue has been noted by Mishkovski et al. (2011) 
in the literature related to computer networks, but has not been explored for 
heterogeneous systems that are typical of those that deliver goods and services that 
are essential for the lifestyle of the identified group of end-users. Specifically, a more 
rigorous and quantitative approach to characterising the technological vulnerability of 
end-users makes it possible to quantitatively compare systems and to quantitatively 
compare alterative proposals for modifications to a system. The approach needs to 
be demonstrated by applying a range of examples of technological systems to the 
delivery of selected goods or services to an urban end-user, and quantifying those 





level. Chapter 4 of this thesis progressively develops and justifies the concept of the 
vulnerability and exposure of a technological system, and defines this as the number 
of critical weaknesses in that technological system. A theoretical basis is developed, 
an approach for implementation is proposed and evidence to demonstrate that the 
proposed approach does offer answers to the research questions is presented.  
Having developed a theoretical basis for evaluating the contribution of 
technological systems to end-user vulnerability, a methodology for selecting 
examples of technological systems that supply goods or services to end-users, and 
for applying this theoretical basis to these example studies, is developed. Each 
technological system that is studied is described in sufficient detail to demonstrate 
how the current system supplies a specific product or service to end-users.  
A measure of the technological vulnerability is calculated for each of these 
examples, thus effectively modelling the working of the example system. This 
measure, which is labelled as the system “exposure”, measures the number of n-
component/stream failures that will cause failure of the system’s designed output, and 
the {E1, E2... En} exposure metric is shown to offer a valid measure of the vulnerability 
that the technological system imposes on the end-user. When operating within design 
parameters, technological systems produce outputs as long as inputs are available. 
For real systems, operation within design parameters cannot continue indefinitely and 
maintenance, i.e. replacement of generally pre-identified and commonly substitutable 
components, is required periodically. Over more extended timeframes, technological 
systems can also reach the point where they are inherently incapable of performing 
their function due to a need for maintenance, and eventually will also reach a point 
where redesign or replacement is required. These three time-frame scenarios are 
distinct and have separate implications for the end-user’s vulnerability. The relevant 
time-frame is defined for each example studied in this work.  
The analysis then considers alternative technological scenarios, including 
alternative configurations and components, for each of the examples, and examines 
the effect of each change. Based on the hypotheses developed, several alternative 
technological configuration scenarios are examined within each study example, and 
allow testing of hypothetical approaches for exposure reduction. Each example study 
and each related scenario therefore generate a measure of the technological system’s 





determined for each of the example studies, and conclusions on the relative 
vulnerability of end-users to the current technological systems. Each example study 
and each related scenario also allow an analysis of the specific processes and inputs 
that contribute to the exposure. 
The technological configuration issues that have contributed to the calculated 
metrics of exposure are compared between each of the example study results, 
allowing the development of hypotheses for the general reduction of vulnerability. It is 
expected that the exposure of many technological systems could be significantly 
reduced by a small number of techniques, including open specification of intermediate 
products that would allow many alternative suppliers of these, decentralisation and 
localised generation of intermediate products, and some specific technologies that 
have inherently short supply chains. As several types of technological system are 
proposed as the basis of the example cases, the effect on the end-user "exposure" of 
generic approaches to reducing "exposure" can be tested. 
1.2.3 Research question 
The process of developing the research question is shown in Figure 1 and is 
presented in detail later in this thesis. As a result of the process illustrated in Figure 
1, the research question of this thesis is: 
For goods or services delivered to end-users, what measure of vulnerability 
can be attributed to the technological systems that are currently used, and 








Figure 1: Development of research question. 
This research question can be broken down into two parts, identified as RQ(a) 
and RQ(b). 
RQ(a): For goods or services delivered to end-users, what measure of 
vulnerability can be attributed to the technological systems that are 
currently used?  
RQ(b): For goods or services delivered to end-users, what reductions in 
vulnerability can be obtained by changes to the technological approach 
or configuration?  
1.3 Illustration of the research field  
Two examples are described simply to provide an introductory and high-level 
illustration of the field of interest of this thesis, and also an illustration of the types of 
conclusions that are expected. Aspects of these illustrative examples are examined 
in the thesis. 
1.3.1 Illustrative examples of the research field 
An initial review of the technological systems used to dispense petrol to an 
end-user at a petrol station, showed that simple financial transactions were required 
at several levels – purchase of delivered goods, purchase of power, payment of 
wages and the purchase of wholesale goods, and hence were a significant subsystem 
requiring consideration. At present, such transactions commonly require Electronic 





datagrams, local routers, interbank communications and centralised bank transaction 
verification. Alternative approaches, including the use of gold coins, “bitcoin”, e-wallet, 
cash or cheque media, would each involve significantly different technological 
systems for usage, and would have significantly different numbers of points of 
exposure. 
The Longnow Foundation’s (020161) “Rosetta” project has created an 
extremely durable data-storage disk containing high-density information that can be 
read using a microscope. In contrast to this approach, media attention has been 
drawn to the real danger that long technology chains using proprietary specifications 
for intermediate products will result in information, which is the “service” provided by 
this example, becoming unavailable to the end-user. This phenomenon has been 
noted as a potential cause of a “digital dark-age”, in which much information becomes 
effectively unavailable.  
For both the financial transaction, and the information retrieval examples, it is 
proposed that quantifying the number and the nature of the exposure points in the 
base case will reduce both user vulnerability and system exposure, and it will be very 
useful to consider alternative technological approaches for delivering the same goods 
and demonstrating the changes to the number and nature of the exposure points. The 
value of such review is dependent on a consistent approach, and on adequately 
addressing the practical difficulties:  these issues are considered in section 4.5.4 of 
the thesis.  Having taken a consistent approach, and addressed the practical 
difficulties as proposed, it is considered that a review of even two examples suggests 
that it may be possible to identify some generalised approaches to reducing 
technological contribution to end-user exposure.  
1.3.2 Illustrative example of the research nature 
In the course of refining the research scope, a pilot study was carried out. This 
study attempted to quantify a measure of exposure for a specific example case, viz. 
the supply of petrol to a patron of a petrol station in New Zealand. A simple approach 
was used to codify the processes and streams involved, and to identify and quantify 
                                               
1 For an organisation whose projects include the design of a “10,000 year-clock”, the date 





the level of exposure. Although a more detailed and rigorous approach is used in the 
analysis of the example cases, the pilot study indicated that the proposed approach 
is practical and can generate valid metrics. The research examines this and all other 
example studies in depth and proposes and examines variations on elements, to 
evaluate the effects of hypothesised changes; such variations were not proposed or 
examined in the course of the pilot study. 
1.4 Significance of the work 
1.4.1 Significance of the research field 
Infrastructure exists in order to deliver goods and services; however, it is 
argued that the focus should be on end-user security rather than on critical 
infrastructural security per se. The level of research and expenditure aimed at 
improving the security of critical infrastructure is ample evidence of the importance of 
delivering goods and services to end-users. Many nations expend significant monies 
on infrastructural security; specific governmental functions are commonly dedicated 
to this. This is evidence of the significance attached to the functioning of critical 
infrastructure. Proceeding from this observation to establishing the significance of this 
research requires only the establishment of a distinction between the focus of critical 
infrastructure and the focus of this research. The observation that the critical 
infrastructure field does not specifically examine implications for end-users provides 
this proof. The special 2013 section of IEEE Technology in Society Magazine, devoted 
to risk, has highlighted the issue and, by acceptance of a guest editorial by Robertson 
and Michael (2013), has provided further indication of public interest in the research 
topic. It may be noted that major journals, including Elsevier’s Technology in Society, 
IEEE’s Technology and Society, the Journal of Science, Technology and Human 
Values” and others, are devoted to researching the influence of technology on society 
generally. It can reasonably be proposed that the existence of these journals indicates 
a level of interest in the research topic. 
1.4.2 Value of the research outcomes 
To establish the value of the research requires a confirmation that the research 
offers some incremental and definable value and hence contribution to the field. The 





specified technological system that is intended to deliver goods or services to a 
specific category of end-user. Such a reproducible metric allows the ranking of 
technological systems according to their level of exposure, and allows options for a 
reduction in exposure to be assessed. Both of these capabilities contribute to 
economic value. The research demonstrates utility that is not available from current 
techniques, and the experience gained identifies aspects for future refinement. 
1.4.3 Application of the research results  
The reduction of the vulnerability of an end-user by reducing the exposure of 
a technological system supplying essential goods or services is inherently valuable to 
each user. An approach that refines the sources of vulnerability and allows a public 
body (that is ultimately responsible to end-users for the efficient delivery of services) 
to assess the relative value that can be achieved by alternative approaches is 
valuable for prioritising financial and human resource usage. 
1.4.4 Original contribution of the work 
This thesis analyses material that is not adequately covered in the literature, 
and demonstrates two specific gaps: 
(a) The existence of an approach for quantifying the technological vulnerability 
that a heterogeneous technological system incurs for users dependent on 
goods or services that the technological system produces. 
(b) The need for an emphasis on end-user(s), rather than on either a corporate 
supply chain or a national infrastructure. 
The development and application of an exposure metric for heterogeneous 
systems addresses these gaps and is a contribution to the systems engineering field. 
Specific and general conclusions regarding approaches to the reduction in 
vulnerability for end-users demonstrate a valuable application within the systems 
engineering field.  
1.5 Scope of the work 
Following development of the research questions, the research initially 
develops and validates a method for quantifying technological vulnerability. The work 





goods or services are delivered. These exemplar systems are described and are 
shown to be representative of common systems for the delivery of the selected 
services. The vulnerabilities presented by these exemplar systems are analysed, and 
hypothetical improvements are also analysed. From these analyses, detailed and also 
generalisable conclusions are derived. 
The research seeks to identify the extent to which end-users’ security is 
“exposed” by current technologies for the delivery of goods and services; such 
weaknesses are defined as those that are inherent in the configuration and 
specification of the technological systems, and not those that are the dynamic 
response of those systems to random inputs, which relate to the modelling of dynamic 
responses. The research therefore does not propose to include dynamic modelling; 
the theoretical basis for the research includes a more detailed justification of this 
concept.  
1.6 Conclusion 
The Population Reference Bureau (2009) reports that about 50% of the world's 
population currently live in cities, compared with an estimated 14% in 1900 and a 
projected 75% by about 2050. Efficient technological systems for the production and 
distribution of goods and services have not only enabled city living, but have also 
created dependence upon those systems for the continued lifestyle of these city 
dwellers. This issue has been widely recognised, but significant aspects have not yet 
been fully studied. This work examines the extent of vulnerabilities that are incurred 
by typical urban dwellers by examining a range of typical technological systems. The 
research considers existing approaches and identifies a specific field requiring study. 
Following a study of typical examples, some general conclusions emerge and provide 
insight into approaches to reducing the vulnerability of individuals. Initial decisions to 
focus on individual urban-dwelling end-users, technological systems and static 






2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
2.1 Introduction 
The literature review is designed to establish the published underpinning of 
the proposed field of study. As the field of study is initial broadly defined and interfaces 
with other fields of study, the literature review considers published material that is 
peripheral to as well as central to the field of study. The analysis of the literature allows 
clarification of the scope of the study and confirms its unique contribution. As 
developed in Chapter 1, the research field and the research topic emphasise 
technological vulnerability and the end-user.  
The research topic and research field also propose to assess options for 
decreasing end-user vulnerability; to meet this criterion, the evaluation of vulnerability 
must be robust and defensible, and sufficiently precise to allow alternative 
technological paths to be evaluated. Specifically, the technological characteristics, 
configuration or other distinguishing features of any technological system must 
contribute to a measure of end-user vulnerability in such a way that changes to these 
inputs are reflected in the numerical value that is generated – and hence, assuming 
sufficient precision, allow the exposure of one technological system to be compared 
with that of another, or variants to be compared with the original. Guan et al. (2011, 
p. 151) note this issue, commenting that “... the ability to determine whether or not 
risk reduction is achieved when modifications are made is important”. Werbeloff and 
Brown (2011) speak of the Australian water system principle of “security through 
diversity”. The proposed research may conclude that a diversity of supply options is 
a key to decreased vulnerability – but the proposed research will come to this 
conclusion by a researched process, rather than adopting it as an initial philosophy.  
2.2 Background to review of previous work 
Four broad groupings of persons who experience some vulnerability to 
technological failures are identified: individual, community, nations and corporates. 
The significances of technological failures for each of these groupings are significantly 
different. At a national level, “developed countries” have interconnected networks for 
the delivery of power, communications, transport and also sewage and water 





currently dependent on those technological functions. Media attention shows that 
nations are aware that breakdown of their major infrastructure would be harmful – and 
that this threat is perceived to increase as systems become larger and more 
interconnected. Corporates generate profit by using technological functions and 
existing services and supply chains. They are always aware of risks to their profit and 
revenue streams, and use their resources to maximise profit. In contrast, individuals 
and small communities have a wide range of needs. Currently, most individuals, 
particularly in developed countries, depend upon a range of long “supply chains” and 
many technological processes for their basic needs. Unlike corporates or nations, 
individuals and communities generally have limited deployable resources or 
alternative sources of supply. The regular emergence of “survivalist” movements, the 
commonly observed interest in cottage skills and the regular emergence of concerns 
(whether well founded or not) about the technological breakdown of “society”, as 
noted by authors such as Tainter (2003), are all considered to be responses to a 
sense of personal insecurity arising from a dependence on matters beyond the 
individual’s abilities or resources to control. 
The literature review establishes the existing foundational basis of published 
material on the topic and refines the scope of the proposed study. The literature 
review seeks to clarify an original and valuable contribution, and to establish the 
foundations upon which the contribution can build. In order to do this, both the 
underpinning and the new aspects of the proposed field of research must be 
described. The proposed field of study has several distinctive aspects, and the 
literature review establishes the underpinning for each. These aspects are as follows. 
(a) The study explores the vulnerability of the end-user, rather than the profit of a 
corporate entity operating a supply chain or of an infrastructure owner. 
(b) The study seeks to “quantify” its outcome; terms that are quantifiable and 
approaches to quantifying vulnerability are important. 
(c) Many networks are homogeneous, e.g. a communications network comprises 
only optical fibres or coaxial cables, and transmits only a single service, such 
as data packets. In complete contrast, the goods and services upon which the 
end-user relies incorporate processes that take inputs and create new outputs, 
and hence are not homogeneous. Within this work, such networks are 





(d) The requirement to evaluate the ways in which technology contributes to 
vulnerabilities implies the identification of generic features that contribute to 
the vulnerability of existing systems, and is not constrained to increasing the 
resilience of specific systems. 
(e) Whereas natural disasters and major environmental failures may trigger 
technological failures, the identified field of study addresses “technological 
systems”, regardless of geographical proximity, in contrast to “disaster 
survival” or “disaster management”, which relate to multiple systems within a 
defined geography.  
2.3 Methodology for identification and review of the seminal literature 
A list of terms, and regular expressions derived from them, was derived from 
the description of the research field and formed the basis of a search strategy. The 
literature survey commenced with keyword searches of major academic databases, 
e.g. Scopus. Synonym searches were used because many variations of keyword 
definitions were found and, in many cases, terms were found to be poorly defined. 
The initial search produced a large number of papers and their value to the proposed 
field was assessed. From that group of publications, a more closely targeted group 
was identified; key authors were also identified. Finally, the papers were categorised 
and the references from seminal works were reviewed where relevant. The review 
was considered to be fit for purpose when key references from newly identified papers 
were primarily to publications already identified.  
2.4 Definition of terms used in the literature 
Terminology such as risk, hazard, vulnerability and resilience is in common 
use, but is linked to a range of definitions. As the clarification of terminology, for the 
purposes of this research, became a central topic of the thesis, understanding the 
published definitions was a significant aspect of the literature review. The relevant 
terms, and their published descriptions and definitions, are summarised as follows.  
2.4.1 Hazard 
The UN’s “Total Disaster Risk Management Approach” (Guzman (n.d.) 





that has the potential for causing injury to life or damage to property or the 
environment”. Similar definitions are stated elsewhere by authors such as Scawthorn 
et al. (1999). In contrast, ISO GUIDE 73:2009 “Risk Management — Vocabulary” 
defines Hazard (3.5.1.4) as a "source of potential harm". The use of the word 
“potential” implies that there is not an unavoidable causality between “hazard” and 
“harm”. That definition implicitly allows the concept of either a de minimus for the level 
of hazard, or the existence of as-yet-undefined parameters that result in a “hazard” 
causing, or not-causing, a “harm”. If the published definitions of “hazard” do not 
establish an immediate and causal relationship between hazard and harm, then it is 
important, within this thesis, to determine why, and to define the logical “gap” – i.e. 
what aspect must be additionally defined to establish the immediate and causal 
relationship between hazard and harm. Researchers such as Wang et al. (2012) note 
that different “hazards” may fall within different time-frames, although their paper 
considers only “long term” and “focussed” categories.  
A number of relationships between hazard and harm are presented in the 
literature; clearer definition of these relationships is central to the topic of this thesis 
and will be developed in following sections. Several published relationships can be 
listed. 
 A statistical probability that a hazard causes a harm, e.g. Russian roulette.  
 A dependence on the extent to which the hazard can be prevented or 
mitigated. It can be noted that acute appendicitis is very unlikely to be fatal if 
even basic medical or surgical facilities are available.  
 A dependence on the level of the hazard – carries the implication that, below 
a given level of hazard, mitigation is guaranteed; otherwise mitigation is 
impossible. 
 A case where a “hazard” will always and inevitably cause a harm, e.g. by the 
exploitation of a software flaw. 
2.4.2 Harm 
Haimes (2011) considers that “harm” is synonymous with damage and, by 
extension, hurt, disaster or loss. Haimes (2011) therefore considers that “harm” is the 
inevitable, actual result of a hazard that is outside a tolerable limit. Some publications 





publications have considered harm in terms of networks such as water supply 
systems, electricity distribution systems or communications networks. Günneç and 
Salman (2011, p. 502) note that:  
“Connectivity is defined as the probability that nodes of a network remain connected, 
whereas network performance targets the functionality of a network. Connectivity 
measures include (i) Two-terminal reliability (the probability of a path existing between 
two specific nodes), (ii) All-terminal reliability (the probability that every node is 
connected with every other node), and (iii) K-terminal reliability (the probability that 
every pair of nodes in a specified node subset K is connected), as described in Konak 
& Smith (2006)”.  
These researchers effectively equate “harm” to the network with loss of 
connectivity, and hence these definitions of connectivity do serve to refine the concept 
of “harm” to a network. Yazdani and Jeffrey (2012) note, in the context of water 
distribution systems, that many real networks have few input nodes and many output 
nodes. 
2.4.3 Risk 
The published literature includes a variety of definitions of “risk”, and the 
variety is notable, considering the common usage of the term. Aven and Guikema 
(2015, p. 2162) state that risk is defined by considering a set of scenarios, and for 
each the probability of that scenario, and the consequences of that scenario. Similarly, 
BS OHSAS 18001:2007 states that "... [r]isk is a combination of the likelihood of an 
occurrence of a hazardous event or exposure(s) and the severity of injury or ill health 
that can be caused by the event or exposure(s)”. These definitions are commonly 
used by risk practitioners, combining probability with the magnitude of the 
consequences.  
AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 “Risk Management ‒ Principles and Guidelines”, 
defines risk as the “effect of uncertainty on objectives”. In this definition, uncertainties 
include events that may or may not occur, and uncertainties caused by ambiguity or 
a lack of information. “Objectives” is plural, and “uncertainty” encompasses all 
possible factors, across all possible circumstances, i.e. the definition is extremely 
broad. Similarly, ISO GUIDE 73:2009 “Risk Management — Vocabulary” defines risk 
as the "effect of uncertainty on objectives" and also (section 3.6.1.3) as a "structured 





causes and consequences" A risk source (section 3.5.1.2) is an "element which alone 
or in combination has the intrinsic potential to give rise to risk". An event (section 
3.5.1.3) is the "occurrence or change of a particular set of circumstances". A hazard 
(section 3.5.1.4) is a  
"source of potential harm - NOTE Hazard can be a risk source (3.5.1.2). Likelihood 
(3.6.1.1) is defined as the "chance of something happening” - NOTE 1 In risk 
management terminology, the word “likelihood” is used to refer to the chance of 
something happening, whether defined, measured or determined objectively or 
subjectively, qualitatively or quantitatively, and described using general terms or 
mathematically (such as a probability (3.6.1.4) or a frequency (3.6.1.5) over a given 
time period".  
Exposure (section 3.6.1.2) is defined as the "extent to which an organization 
and/or stakeholder (3.2.1.1) is subject to an event” Consequence (section 3.6.1.3) is 
defined as the "outcome of an event (3.5.1.3) affecting objectives". Probability (section 
3.6.1.4) is defined as the "measure of the chance of occurrence expressed as a 
number between 0 and 1, where 0 is impossibility and 1 is absolute certainty”. For 
insight into the origins of the term, the Oxford English Dictionary cites the earliest use 
of the word in English (with the spelling as risque) as from 1621, and with the spelling 
as risk from 1655. It defines risk as: “(Exposure to) the possibility of loss, injury, or 
other adverse or unwelcome circumstance; a chance or situation involving such a 
possibility”. It is noted that this definition emphasises probability, rather than certainty 
of “harm”.  
Khatri and Vairavamoorthy (2011) conclude that risk can be described in the 
form of Equation 1. 
 
Equation 1 
This definition is similar to the OHSAS definition, but adds the concept of 
“vulnerability”. Kumar et al. (2010, p. 3717) study supply chains. They state that "[r]isk 
in supply chains can be defined as the potential deviations from the initial overall 
objective that, consequently, trigger the decrease of value-added activities at different 





"the risk of a disruptive event equals the probability of the event’s occurring, times the 
measure of event consequences powered to a subjective consequence perception 
exponent... Webster’s Dictionary (e.g. the Landoll, Ashland, Ohio, USA edition, 1993) 
retains, in the entry for “risk”, the instrumental ingredients of the formula. Indeed, 
according to that source, there are: ’... Risk (noun) – A chance of suffering or 
encountering harm or loss”.  
Timashev and Tyrsin (2011) develop the concept of system entropy as a more 
complete definition of the risk of failure. This definition is applied to a pipeline, with 
several known defects, any of which could cause failure within a given time interval if 
(over)pressure is known. This definition is useful and, in principle, could be extended 
to other systems, but the cases in which it is practical to gather such data are limited. 
Practitioners in the insurance industry identify an object that is the subject of potential 
harm as “the insured risk”; although this definition has very limited acceptance outside 
the insurance industry, it serves to illustrate the breadth of definition that exists.  
There are two primary distinctions within the published definitions of risk. The 
first relates to the “vulnerability" aspect. Some researchers recognise three factors ‒ 
the probability of a hazard, the vulnerability to that hazard and the magnitude of the 
consequence; other authors recognise only two factors, viz. the probability of a hazard 
and the magnitude of the consequence. This difference is simply a question of 
granularity of definition. The "two factor" group implicitly defines the "event" as one 
that exceeds the resilience of the system, and so inevitably results in the 
consequential harm. The second difference relates to the difference of focus between 
consequences and causes. The definition offered by Gheorghe and Vamanu (2004) 
considers the effect of one, well-defined event on the consequences; in contrast, 
definitions such as those in the Oxford English Dictionary and AS/NZS ISO 
31000:2009 implicitly consider the cumulative probabilities of all of those hazards, 
which individually would be associated with the quoted consequence.  
Based on the above definitions, four parameters are commonly assumed to 
contribute to “risk”: defined harm, defined hazard, time-frame (implicit) and 
“vulnerability”. It is useful to examine each of these parameters individually. Defined 
hazard must include a metric; most quantitatively defined “hazards” exist continuously 
at some nominal level, and their significance can be assessed only if a metric is 
quoted. However, qualitatively, defined hazards can be assigned a Boolean level (1 





if a set of known environmental parameters is defined; it could then be proposed that, 
if a large number ('n') of parallel universes existed, each having precisely that same 
set of known parameters, and if a given hazard occurred in 'y' of them during an 




If the assumption is made that hazards occur randomly, then a treatment that 
models stochastic hazard events and corresponding mitigation measures could be 
applied as described by Dimitrova et al. (2015). Assumptions of randomness are 
problematic, however: If the probability of catastrophic failure of aircraft structures in 
the era when the British “Comet” went into service had been considered, a statistical 
measure might have been developed. Once the phenomenon of metal fatigue was 
clearly understood and the knowledge applied, a statistical probability of catastrophic 
failure remained, but the shape of the probability curve was changed. Effectively, one 
of the previously unknown factors had become known, and was hence removed from 
the definition of that “risk” – but, as many unknown factors remained, a “risk” could 
still be computed. The concept of “risk” actually sidesteps the issue of whether 
hazards are inherently deterministic, but with factors as-yet-undiscovered, or whether 
hazards are inherently probabilistic in the sense used in the quantum mechanics field. 
For the purposes of this work, “risk” can be defined adequately in terms of a 
probabilistic function of properties that are not defined. For that subset of cases in 
which simple parameters can be measured across a very large number of superficially 
identical objects, e.g. failure rates of light bulbs, it might be claimed that historical 
records can legitimately be used to predict the future probability profile – although, 
even for this stereotypical case, whether environmental variables such as global 
warming will affect the relationship between historical record and future risk might be 
questioned. For the vast majority of cases, this approach is at best impractical and, 
commonly, it is actually meaningless. After many space-shuttle launches, the 
Challenger was destroyed when a solid rocket casing joint failed. Computing the 
probability of failure, immediately after the loss of the Challenger, based on historical 





temperatures that caused the failure of the solid rocket seals. After many more 
launches, another shuttle was lost because of a heat-shield breach; computing the 
failure probability after that event may have been slightly more accurate because no 
effective method for identifying or fixing future heat-shield breaches was found. The 
key issue is that, once known factors are eliminated, engineers very seldom have 
enough historical data to predict risk with other than a very wide margin. The 
difficulties of assigning probabilities to rate events is well-known, and in the first issue 
of the Risk Analysis journal, Weinberg (1981, p. 5) speaks of large and rare failures, 
and notes that "in neither instance is it practical to build enough nuclear reactors or 
DC-l0’s to observe the failure rate".  
Vulnerability to a defined hazard effectively represents some assessment of 
the causality linking a defined hazard to a defined harm. Conceptually, this could be 
expressed as a probability, or as a trigger or maximum tolerable level for the hazard. 
The vulnerability to a defined hazard will also be dependent on the precise state and 
configuration of the current system. It must also be observed that the same defined 
harm may be linked to more than one defined hazard. This is a significant issue and 
one that must be addressed later. It may further be observed that a time-frame must 
be defined, in order to assess the probability of a given hazard occurring; with no time-
frame, it can be assumed that every hazard will exceed the tolerance level at some 
time. This issue is particularly significant to the scope of this thesis. Finally, the initial 
system state would need to be defined since for a particular hazard, over the same 
time-frame, if the effect of a defined level of hazard is to be assessed. This can be 
illustrated by considering a power line that is operating at 99% of its rated capacity; a 
“hazard” comprising a 2% demand spike will cause a “trip” and hence a harm, 
whereas the same demand spike would cause no harm to the power line if it had been 
loaded at only 90% of capacity. Using the same example, it can be noted that other 
hazards may be unaffected by the loading of the power line, and hence would have 
different vulnerability levels. 
Korombel and Tworek (2011) have researched (p 51) the "assessment of 
investment project risks in business practice" and conclude that risk management 
should combine qualitative and quantitative information, yet conclude by describing a 





The extent and breadth of the risk assessment and analysis field make a 
simple summation difficult. It is reasonable to note that although techniques such as 
Dephi method (Hallowell 2010) can be used to improve qualitative assessments of  
risk, even seminal authors such as Aven (2012, p. 1655) note that the risk field lacks 
clarity on many concepts and principles. In a later paper, Hansson and Aven (2014) 
review the process of risk assessment and while noting the development of the field, 
continue to note the difficulties of both qualitative assessments and broad consensus. 
2.4.4 Reliability-related terms  
A number of commonly used terms measure system performance. These 
measures are commonly reported historically, e.g. a power station’s availability is 
commonly reported in an annual report. These are well-accepted terms, are often 
defined carefully and have contractual significance. Such terms include “Reliability”, 
“Mean time between failures (MTBF)”, “Mean time to failure (MTTF)” and “Mean time 
to repair (MTTR)”, generally as proposed by Wang and Doucette (2016). MTTR is 
commonly stated in simple terms of the time taken to repair the component or system, 
or to restore functionality following the observation of a failure. Predictions of future 
performance may be attempted on the basis of historical observations of availability 
and the MTBF, but are imprecise because the conditions under which the historical 
values were observed are unlikely to be repeated exactly. These are system 
performance metrics, and are included for completeness despite the limited 
applicability to end-user vulnerability.  
Reliability: Yazdani et al. (2011, p. 1574) state "The reliability of a water 
distribution system is usually defined as the probability of non-failure over a given 
period of time”. This definition assumes some particular system, under some 
particular operating conditions. In engineering systems, reliability is often expressed 
as the MTBF or the Mean time to repair (MTTR), which is the average, over a large 
sample of an identical and defined component or system operating under similar 
conditions, time to failure. Not only are the definitions of probability different, but the 
assumptions are also distinct. The MTBF is the result of observing a population of 
identical systems under similar operating conditions, whereas Yazdani et al. (2011) 





Design redundancy: Yazdani and Jeffery (2012) propose a concept of design 
redundancy in terms of the presence of independent paths available in the case where 
main supply paths fail. For a single component, a second identical component 
installed in parallel offers a redundant capacity. There are some specific cases, e.g. 
pipeline isolation valves, where components installed in series are used sacrificially 
to provide redundancy.  
Engineering systems are sometimes specified to contain “N‒1” or “N‒2” 
redundancy; these terms are commonly assumed to mean that there is no single 
failure (N‒1) or no two individual failures (N‒2) that can cause a system failure. It 
might also be observed that these criteria are almost impossible to achieve in practice; 
few power stations will have a second control room, a second cooling water outfall or 
a duplicate high voltage switchyard. Assessing the effectiveness of redundancy is 
also difficult; two valves installed in parallel may be exposed to overpressure or 
corrosion from the same source – and so the existence of a “redundant” valve does 
not guarantee that the failure rate is halved. External alternative sources represent a 
practical approach to decreasing the inevitability of a particular “harm”; as an example, 
if a process depends on hydrogen generated by an electrolysis plant, a connection 
enabling supply from compressed hydrogen bottles will clearly mean that a hydrolyser 
failure does not necessarily cause a system failure. 
Availability: In the context of engineering systems, e.g. a power station, 
“availability” is often contractually guaranteed in terms of (MTBF ‒ MTTR)/MTBF. 
Availability is generally considered to represent the proportion of time for which a 
system is available, assuming normal scheduled maintenance. 
2.4.5 Vulnerability 
Published definitions of “vulnerability” include that of Wang et al. (2012, p. 
3328), who state that “vulnerability is seen as a global system property that expresses 
the extent of adverse effects caused by the occurrence of a specific hazardous event”. 
This definition defines vulnerability as a ratio of the harm to the hazard, and can 
therefore be distinguished from the maximum tolerable disturbance concept, which 
does not assess the significance of the “harm” arising when tolerable disturbance 
levels are exceeded. Afgan and Veziroglu (2012) define vulnerability, simply and 





Management — Vocabulary” defines vulnerability in Section 3.6.1.6 as "... intrinsic 
properties of something resulting in susceptibility to a risk source (3.5.1.2) that can 
lead to an event with a consequence”. Chopade and Bikdash (2011) describe the 
vulnerability of an infrastructural system in terms of the probability that a disturbance 
causes some stated minimum consequence within a defined interval of time. This is 
very close to the "maximum tolerable disturbance" definition of vulnerability, although 
with reference to probability. In this context, Chopade and Bikdash (2011) do note 
that, for a power system, the consequence would be described in terms of loss of 
capacity (MW) or of power delivered (MWh). This is very specifically a network-
oriented approach; if the normal charge for 1 MWh of power was applied, a dollar 
value could be quantified. If the power outage caused death because an individual’s 
heart‒lung machine failed, this would simply not be registered. These authors present 
consequences as an aggregation of the loss: probability product.  
Gómez et al. (2011, p. 215) offer definitions for vulnerability, illustrating both 
the number of issues to be considered and the lack of a single accepted and clear 
definition. They suggest that "... vulnerability is a concept tightly related to a hazardous 
event (i.e. there is not vulnerability if there is not a threatening event)”. These authors 
consider that a complete approach to vulnerability will need to model all attack vectors 
and will generate attack graphs. These authors also discuss (p.  216) the possibility 
that Bayesian approaches, which use risk analysis and the concept of survivability, 
i.e. the system performs when the hazard is within a given level, may be useful. The 
third approach discussed by these authors uses graph theory metrics as measures of 
vulnerability. Adger (2006, p. 269) quotes "The central idea of the often-cited IPCC 
definition (McCarthy et al., 2001) is that vulnerability is degree to which a system is 
susceptible to and is unable to cope with adverse effects". Papers related to computer 
systems, e.g. Lowis and Accorsi (2011), commonly equate “vulnerability” with the 
existence of a software design flaw that can be exploited by a malicious person. A 
subtle distinction should be drawn here: for a pipeline with various faults, and 
corrosion rates that have probabilistic functions – as noted by Timashev and Tyrsin 
(2011) – failure at a particular time has only a probabilistic function. In contrast, a 
software weakness, such as a stack overflow opportunity, will cause the “harm” every 





Vairavamoorthy (2011) represent an urban water system using a system-of-systems 
approach. They propose a relationship as expressed in Equation 3:  
 
Equation 3 
Using a relationship as expressed in Equation 3, they establish the 
"vulnerability" quantity by reference to the configuration established in the "system-of-
systems representation". Actual values seem to be derived using a modified “Delphi 
approach” rather than as a quantitative value derived from the configuration and 
components of the system. According to Khatri and Vairavamoorthy (2011), resilience 
describes the ability of a system to recover from failure to some state that is 
acceptable (without specifically defining acceptable). These authors effectively 
propose an average-unplanned-outage duration as “gamma”. They also provide a 
formula for system vulnerability that closely equates to an "average availability” figure, 
and is of the form expressed in Equation 4: 
 
Equation 4 
Werbeloff and Brown (2011, p. 2362) state that: 
“The concept of 'vulnerability' is a dynamic concept and as such is difficult to define … 
Underpinning these varied understandings of vulnerability, is recognition of the need 
to maximise resilience, and thereby decrease vulnerability, in the face of increasing 
variability in or disturbances to natural resources. For this research, vulnerability is 
understood to mean 'the degree to which a system is susceptible to and is unable to 
adapt in advance and in response to shocks and adverse effects from social and 
environmental change”.  
There is no attempt to quantify either the “degree” that is quoted or vulnerability per 
se; the definition equates vulnerability with the converse of resilience, introduces 
concepts of adaptability (as contributors to resilience) and uses the word “susceptible” 
in a sense that is almost synonymous with the definition offered for vulnerability. 
Akgun et al. (2010, p. 3561) state that  
"... [v]ulnerability can be defined as a ‘‘weakness in the system defended” in a most 





harmed. Although a comprehensive list of vulnerability definitions can be found in Ezell 
(2007)”. 
These authors also state (Section 2, p. 3562) "... vulnerability highlights the notion of 
susceptibility to a scenario, whereas risk focuses on the severity of consequences 
within the context of a scenario”.  
Starossek and Haberland (2010), in the context of engineering structures, 
suggest that vulnerability should be considered as the opposite (antonym) of 
robustness and should be linked to the concept of damage tolerance. They particularly 
examine the situation in which an initial event triggers a progressive and catastrophic 
failure. Gheorghe and Vamanu (2004, p. 614) quote a dictionary definition as 
“Vulnerable (adjective) – Open to physical injury or attack; (hence) vulnerability”. 
Baldick et al. (2009, p. 1) offer the following definition: a "... vulnerable system is 
defined … as a system that operates with a reduced level of security that renders it 
vulnerable to the cumulative effects of a series of moderate disturbances”. These 
authors include reference to "N‒1” and “N‒2" redundancy approaches. They also 
state (p.1) that: 
“At present, there is not a commonly accepted vulnerability index or assessment 
method for power systems. If a power system loses a significant portion of its ability 
to carry the power flows due to cascading line outages, it is considered a vulnerable 
configuration”.  
Piwowar et al. (2009, p. 1873) present a useful discussion and propose a very 
simple index of system vulnerability, as expressed in Equation 5: 
 
Equation 5 
They also take a "lookup table" approach to threat magnitude, noting (on p. 1877) 
that:  
“Our methodology can be very useful to prevent or mitigate the effects of a potential 
attack. It has been created to answer the amazing increase of international threats. It 
takes into account several parameters to be as exhaustive and efficient as possible”.  
This paper presents a thorough approach for evaluating a specific system but it is 
neither generalised nor theoretically based. It is essentially an extension of simple risk 





“In a network representation of a food web, nodes represent species and links 
represent who eats whom in the ecosystem (Proulx et al., 2005). This kind of 
representation permits to analyse the similarities and differences between complex 
systems of very different nature, ranging from technological to biological and social 
systems (Strogatz, 2001; Albert and Barabasi, 2002) ... [m]ost food webs have less-
skewed uniform or exponential DDs (Dunne et al., 2002a)2. However, they also display 
high fragility to intentional removal of the most connected nodes”.  
This paper illustrates an interesting distinction, stating on p. 297 that:  
“We start by defining informally the concept of network expansibility. A food web 
having ‘‘good expansion’’ properties is the one that cannot be divided in at least two 
isolated ‘‘large’’ parts by disconnecting a ‘‘small’’ number of nodes or links (Sarnak, 
2004; Gkantsidis et al., 2006). These nodes or links, which make the function of 
bridges between these parts, are known as bottlenecks. Consequently, a ‘‘Good 
Expansion Network’’ (GEN) is a network without bottlenecks”.  
The paper includes a useful discussion of the correlation between degree distribution 
(DD) and bottlenecks, and Good Expansion Networks (GENs). Agarwal et al. (2001, 
p. 142) state that the objective of their paper is “... to present the basis of this new 
general theory of vulnerability which is applicable to all systems that can be 
represented as a graph e.g., traffic networks, pipe flows, electrical circuits etc.” The 
researchers also state that "A system is vulnerable if any damage from any action or 
source produces consequences that are disproportionately large in comparison with 
that damage”. They quite reasonably note that a system may be vulnerable under one 
type of "attack" but not under another and continue (p. 150): 
“Vulnerability is defined as the susceptibility of a system to disproportionate 
consequences in the event of damage or failure and is measured using a vulnerability 
index. This is the ratio of the consequences to the relative damage demand. Thus the 
higher the vulnerability index the more vulnerable a system. Because both 
consequences and relative damage demand are non-dimensional numbers the 
vulnerability index can be used to compare the quality of the form of two … different 
systems”.  
Not only is it difficult to quantify a ratio of damage to hazard but also, for the 
common case where a harm (inaccessibility of some goods or services) is nominated 
in advance, an index value based on the smallest disturbance that will cause failure 
                                               





is an inadequate description of the total vulnerability induced by the system. It is moot 
whether a system having hundreds of weaknesses that can fail with a moderate level 
of hazard causes more vulnerability than a system having a single weakness that 
would fail with a low level of hazard. Einarsson and Rausand (1998, p. 535) state that: 
“The vulnerability concept has yet not been given a generally accepted definition for 
technological applications. In some of the references cited above, vulnerability is 
considered to be similar to the risk concept, although with a somewhat broader 
interpretation. The threats referred to are often external to the system, and may 
involve deliberate actions. In this paper, we will use the term vulnerability to describe 
the properties of an industrial system that may weaken its ability to survive and 
perform its mission in the presence of threats”.  
Similarly, Baldick et al. (2009, p. 1) consider electrical power systems, and propose a 
definition in which a vulnerable system is defined as a system that operates with a “… 
reduced level of security that renders it vulnerable to the cumulative effects of a series 
of moderate disturbances”. These researchers also note the possibility of "N‒1 and 
N‒2" design redundancy approaches.  
Martin (1996, p. 2‒3) takes a significantly different view from that of previously 
quoted researchers, stating that: 
“... [t]he system's vulnerability can be defined as the chance that a specified change 
in the environment leads to disruption of the usual purposes of the system … A 
technological system can be said to be resilient in the face of a particular threat if it is 
capable of maintaining its purposes when the threat is realized… vulnerabilities are 
defined in relation to particular threats”.  
The first part of Martin’s statement considers the probability that a hazard will cause 
some defined harm, while the second part of the statement appears to consider a 
maximum tolerable disturbance for a nominated theat. 
Aven and Guikema (2015, p. 2169) state that “…vulnerability can be viewed as risk 
conditional on the threat or the attack, and various vulnerability metrics can be 
defined, such as the expected loss given a specific attack.” 
A Complete Guide to the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) as 
noted by Mell et al (2007 section 1.7), provides the following definitions.  
““Vulnerability”: a bug, flaw, weakness, or exposure of an application, system, device, 





the likelihood or frequency of a harmful event occurring. “Risk”: the relative impact that 
an exploited vulnerability would have to a user’s environment”.  
The authors of this document use the term vulnerability to mean design weakness 
and it can be reasonably assumed that, every single time the CVSS-defined 
vulnerability is exploited, the harm will result. With that observation, the term threat 
does not mean defined hazard, but rather hazard probability, and if, for example, a 
hacker were to exploit a vulnerability a hundred times per minute, presumably the 
frequency of a harmful event occurring would need to accommodate this situation. 
Several categories of definition can be identified from these published extracts, and 




The ratio of “harm” to “hazard” is a common definition, used by 
authors such as Agarwal et al. (2001. p. 142), Starossek and 
Haberland (2010) and Wang et al. (2012). 
Resilience  Some authors (Starossek and Haberland, 2010; Werbeloff and 
Brown, 2011; Afgan and Veziroglu, 2012) define “vulnerability” very 
simply as the opposite of “resilience”. Specific metrics for resilience 
include (a) the time for a system to return to a “normal” state 
following a disturbance or (b) an integral of the “disturbance effect” 




Maximum tolerable disturbance is noted as a measure of 
vulnerability by authors such as Starossek and Haberland (2010) 
and Gómez et al. (2011). This definition relates to the capability of 
the “system” to adjust its performance to accommodate the 
“disturbance”, e.g. a chemical processing plant may change its 
operating conditions to accommodate changing properties of the 
feedstock. This definition also relates to the spare capacity of the 
system (an electric grid operating substantially below its rated 
capacity may be able to “absorb” the disturbance caused by a line 
failure – whereas a grid that is operating at rated capacity cannot). 
System 
property 
Vulnerability is considered as a system property, recognising 
multiple threats, by authors including Piwowar et al. (2009, p. 1873). 





simple index of system vulnerability: W = ∑[weighting*vuln(y)]. 
Baldick et al. (2009, p. 1) offer the definition a "... vulnerable system 
is defined in [1] as a system that operates with a reduced level of 
security that renders it vulnerable to the cumulative effects of a 





Susceptibility of consequence to risk is stated in ISO 73, Chopade 
and Bikdash (2011) and Martin (1996). Martin (1996, p. 2) states 
that a system’s vulnerability can be defined as “... the chance 
(probability) that a specified change in the environment leads to 
disruption of the usual purposes of the system”. This category of 
definition assumes that there is a probability (0 ≤ p ≤ 1.0) that an 
event will cause a harm. This definition takes no account of the 




A specific known weakness, for which a system has zero tolerance. 
If the probability that a particular event will cause a specific harm is 
1.0 (i.e. is certain), then the system can be said to have zero 
tolerance to that event. Merriam Webster's Dictionary (n.d.) 
presents two definitions of "vulnerable": (a) "easily hurt or harmed 
physically, mentally, or emotionally" and (b) "open to attack, harm, 
or damage". In both cases, the adjective implies a normal 
application to a noun (person), and both definitions distinguish a 
person who has few or poor defences against harmful attack, or 
whose defences can be overcome without a requirement for a 
powerful attack.  
Table 1: Published definitions of terms 
Adger (2006, p. 277) includes a significant comment in the paper’s conclusion, 
stating that "I have reviewed divergent methods and epistemologies in vulnerability 
research. The diversity and apparent lack of convergence over time are, in many 
ways, a reflection of the divergent objectives of the research and the phenomena 
being explained … this diversity, I argue is a strength and sign of vitality, not a 





Whether diversity can be equated with strength is moot, but Adger’s identification of 
diversity of terminology is considered a valid summation. 
2.4.6 Exposure 
The term “exposure” is used in ISO GUIDE 73:2009 “Risk Management — 
Vocabulary”, and is defined (3.6.1.2) as the "... extent to which an organization and/or 
stakeholder … is subject to an event”. This “definition” could more accurately be 
considered as a description, because no enumeration or quantification is associated 
with the term “extent”. The lack of any quantification or categorisation of “extent” 
leaves the opportunity for such a definition to be proposed.  
2.4.7 Resilience 
“Resilience” is yet another term that is commonly used, yet for which an adequate 
definition is non-trivial. It is also a term that, according to many authors, lacks a well-
established definition. A number of definitions are offered by authors, including 
Yazdani and Jeffrey (2012) quoting Bruneau et al. (2003), who defined resilient 
systems as those with the properties of (1) reduced failure probabilities, (2) reduced 
failure consequences and (3) reduced time to recovery. Such systems are 
characterised by the four infrastructural qualities of robustness, redundancy, 
resourcefulness and rapidity and incorporate the notions of risk (probability of failure 
and its consequences), reliability, recovery, and system tolerance both pre- and post-
failure. System vulnerability is consequently regarded as the antonym of resilience. 
The “resilience engineering” sub-discipline of engineering has attempted to capture a 
definition of “resilience”: Hollnagel (2011), quoted by Duffey (2012), defines resilience 
for an organisation in terms of the ability to respond to upsets by maintaining or 
regaining some nominal state. Khatri and Vairavamoorthy (2011) and Afgan and 
Veziroglu (2012) each describe resilience in a very similar way but without Hollnagel’s 
focus on organisations. These authors effectively propose an average-unplanned-
outage duration as “gamma”, which is to be minimised. They also propose a formula 
for system vulnerability in the form of Equation 6 which equates to an "average 







Shua et al. (2011, p. 264) state that:  
“At present, researches on measuring method of supply chain resilience are limited, 
and quantitative studies are scarce, which is not enough to provide accurate 
theoretical basis for practical applications.” and (p. 265) that “From the definition, we 
noted that resilience could be measured in two ways: the time needed for achieving a 
normal state; the gap between the normal state and the original state … Therefore, 
we define resilience as the rapidly recovery ability to an equilibrium after the supply 
chain is attacked by a disturbance and we use the recovery time to measure…this".  
These researchers propose modelling each element in a supply chain using a 
proportional-differential response sub-model. Each element would therefore have a 
time-dependent response and a rate-of-change-dependent response. This means 
that the response of the supply chain, in terms of return-to-equilibrium, can be 
calculated from the interconnected response of the elements. Their primary 
conclusion (p. 268) is that:  
“Therefore, this model is useful for engineering management. It makes clear that 
increasing safety inventory, improving the efficiency of reserve capacity and 
strengthening the abilities of coordination within the cost margins could enhance 
supply chain elasticity”.  
Nair et al. (2010, bottom of Col2, p. 54) state that no satisfactory definition of 
vulnerability has been established, and (p. 54, 55) that "... resilience has been defined 
in terms of the number of failures that a computer network can sustain while remaining 
connected”. In this paper, the resilience measure (p. 55) is stated as "... the resilience 
definition adopted here for an IM component … can be expressed as the post-
disruption fraction of demand that can be satisfied using specific resources while 
maintaining a prescribed level of service". These authors use a graph theory notation, 
but define capacity and other constraints for each link (p. 56). The risks to each link 
are assumed to be known probabilistically. They consider four specific attack 
scenarios and a network consisting of five components each with less than five 
constraints. This allows a resilience index to be computed for each of several levels 
of budget-for-repair, allowing economic evaluations to be made. Afgan and Veziroglu 





definition implies that “resilience” is related to the scope or quantum of a "hazard" that 
does not result in “harm”, i.e. the hazard level is below some defined "maximum 
tolerable disturbance". They also propose that, if a system parameter is 
instantaneously “perturbed”, and a given time is required for the system parameter to 
return to “normal”, then the resilience of the system for that parameter can be defined 
in terms of the area under the “response‒time” curve. The resilience of the system as 
a whole is established by a sum of normalised resiliencies to individual parameters. 
Despite most researchers’ assertions that a definition is not generally accepted, there 
is a general acceptance of one key point: resilience refers to the path by which a 
system returns to “normal” following the occurrence of a “hazard”. This distinguishes 
the definition of “resilience” by establishing that it refers to levels of hazard that do not 
exceed the capacity of a system to either absorb, or adjust to, the presented hazard.  
The published definitions therefore fall into three broad categories. 
(a) Definitions similar to that adopted by Nair et al. (2010, p. 55), i.e. "... the 
resilience definition adopted here for an IM component [alpha] can be 
expressed as the post-disruption fraction of demand that can be satisfied using 
specific resources while maintaining a prescribed level of service" or p. 54‒
55) "resilience has been defined in terms of the number of failures (or the level 
of disturbance) that a computer network can sustain while remaining 
connected", are unique to these researchers.  
(b) Definitions similar to that adopted by Afgan and Veziroglu (2012), who propose 
that, if a system parameter is instantaneously “perturbed”, and a given time is 
required for the system parameter to return to “normal”, then the resilience of 
the system for that parameter can be defined in terms of the area under the 
parameter‒time curve. The definition proposed by Shua et al. (2011, p. 264), 
i.e. "... [f]rom the definition, we noted that resilience could be measured... the 
time needed for achieving a normal state”, is a less sophisticated approach.  
(c) Definitions such as that developed by Strigini (2012), establish the concept of 
“maximum tolerable disturbance”. The concept asserts that, for a hazard 
below the “maximum tolerable disturbance”, the system will eventually return 
to its original state and hence only transient “harm” will be caused. In contrast, 







Several types of definition of robustness have been proposed. Within the 
biological field, Kartascheff et al. (2009) equate community robustness with the 
fraction of species that survive after a defined event. This definition is oriented more 
closely towards the collective end-users, and hence has value. It is perhaps 
unfortunate that, in more technical fields, “robustness” is more commonly interpreted 
‒ e.g. by Derrible and Kennedy (2010) – as descriptive of a network that has a high 
“maximum tolerable disturbance” value. According to Chopade and Bikdash (2011, p. 
1): 
“Robustness signifies that the system will retain its function and resources largely 
unchanged or nearly unchanged when exposed to perturbations. Resilience implies 
that the system can adapt to regain a stable acceptable level of performance after 
perturbations but the new state may be significantly different [5]… ”  
Their reference in [5] is to Holmgren (2006). Starossek and Haberland (2010, p. 3) 
state that, in "... [s]umming up these definitions, robustness refers to the ability of a 
structure not to respond disproportionately to either abnormal events or initial 
damage”. 
Leong and Doyle (2016) propose p1511 that "A robust system is equivalent to 
a setup where a person can balance a stick easily because uncertainties inherited in 
the human sensorimotor system affect the stick balancing task minimally. A fragile 
system implies otherwise. ".  They offer a detailed mathematical treatment of stick-
balancing problem, but the paper concludes by noting the trade-off between 
robustness and efficiency and that delays (mathematically) actually tend to increase 
robustness.  These authors also refer to "heterogeneous" by which they infer the 
eyeball, brain, nerve system, musculature combination, i.e. a relatively narrow 
context.   
 
2.4.9 Survivability 
Published references include those by Einarsson and Rausand (1998, p. 535), 
who state "A system is said to survive an accident (or some other disturbance) if it is 





position as it had prior to the accident”. Levitin and Lisnianski (2001) state (abstract) 
that  
“... vulnerable systems, which can have difference states corresponding to different 
combinations of available elements composing the system... Both the impact of 
external factors (attack) and internal causes (failures) affect system survivability, 
which is determined as probability of meeting a given demand”.  
A very similar approach is proposed by Korczak et al. (2005). Sajdak and Karni (2006) 
propose that it is necessary to define assailant capabilities for each type of threat. 
They state that to do this fully is infeasible, and therefore suggest that an integrated 
probabilistic approach is required. Sheldon et al. (2004, p. 293) state that "... 
[s]urvivability of a system can be expressed as a combination of reliability, availability, 
security, and human safety”. Other researchers have considered discuss anti-
malware approaches to increasing the “survivability” of a wireless information 
network. Jiang and Xue (2011) address a similar issue, using similar terminology. 
Richards et al. (2008) define survivability in terms of the capability of a system to 
minimise (without quantification) the effect upon the delivery of some value of a 
defined disturbance. These authors propose a highly descriptive, framework 
approach, as opposed to an approach using and generating well-defined numerical 
values. Zhao and Xu (2009) consider the survivability of scale-free networks, and note 
the effectiveness of establishing new links between low-degree nodes in this regard. 
Gómez et al. (2011, p. 216) argue that Bayesian approaches use risk analysis and 
the concept of survivability – i.e. the system can be expected to perform at design 
level, while a hazard is within a given range of levels. Wang et al. (2011) state (in their 
abstract) that "... [n]etwork security assessment is critical to the survivability and 
reliability of distributed systems”. Finally, Li et al. (2012) state that network topology 
is a promising approach to improving network survivability.  
Serageldin and Krings (2015) acknowledge the potential for malicious acts, and the 
potential for these to affect "survivability".  No definition of "resilience" is provided, but 
"resilient", "survivability" and "fault tolerant" terminology is used almost 
interchangeably. 
These published definitions and descriptions fall into two categories, i.e. those 
in which a homogeneous system, such as a wireless network, may or may not 





discussions of “maximum tolerable disturbance” in the context of “vulnerability”, and 
it is therefore argued that the “vulnerability” definition could be used in these cases, 
and those in which there is a complex system, e.g. a warship, that is subject to multiple 
“hazards” and may have varying levels of serviceability. The concept of serviceability 
also needs careful definition: if a ship sinks, it has clearly not survived; if the ship’s 
guns and engines are functioning, but its radar is not operational, an enemy aircraft 
can approach with impunity, so that the medium-term survivability is problematic at 
best. 
2.4.10 Critical reflections on published definitions 
Several common themes have appeared in the reviewed works. 
 For many of the terms, published definitions are not agreed upon. 
 Many of the definitions offered lack precision. Specifically, it can be noted that 
the scope of the harm is not always identified – and failure to define the “harm” 
precisely leads to ambiguity when other risk, hazard and vulnerability issues 
are considered. In the context of this study, it is particularly important to 
distinguish whether a specified “harm” is to the profit of a network-owner, or to 
the end-user of network services.  
 Many of the offered definitions are not precisely scoped. It is notable that time-
frames are seldom defined, but these actually have a practical significance. 
Over a sufficiently long time-frame, the probability of almost any event tends 
towards 1.0. 
 Many definitions note that, when high-level failures, i.e. harms, are 
considered, multiple hazards must be considered and each hazard will be 
associated with specific probabilities, maximum tolerable disturbance levels 
and other factors. Despite noting the need to consider these factors, there is 
both lack of precision and lack of agreement on the relationship of terms. 
 Few authors quantify the definitions offered. 
The lack of precision of definitions, the lack of agreement on definitions and 
the lack of quantification of relationships between relevant factors present difficulties. 






2.5 Application fields that are studied in the literature 
Many related fields are very well covered in the literature: disaster 
preparedness, engineering risk and some aspects of infrastructure robustness are 
obvious examples. These fields overlap; however, each also has unique aspects.  
Several “dimensions” have therefore been distilled from the reviewed literature, and 
are summarised in the following table. 
Dimension Aspects 
Harm object • Society, humanity or ethnic group 
• Region or city, or small community 
• Specific supply chain, commonly a commercial venture 
• Homogeneous network, e.g. a computer, water or power 
supply network 
• An individual 
Danger (hazard) • Natural disaster, e.g. volcanic eruption or an earthquake, 
characterised by localised multi-system failures  
• General failure of a specific, homogeneous system, e.g. 
communications, internet or finance systems 
• Specific hazard to a specific system, e.g. broken fibre-
optic cable, malware on computer system, structural 
member or equipment item failure 
Time-frame • Immediate, i.e. typically immediate to a few hours; affects 
non-storable consumables, e.g. electricity  
• Short term, typically a few days; a period during which 
stores can be consumed 
• A “beyond-storage” time-frame in which reasonable 
storage is exhausted, and failure occurs unless there is 
a functional supply chain 
• “Maintenance” time-frame, typically months or years; the 
time in which failure becomes common without 
maintenance 
• “Replacement” time-frame, often years; after which the 
equipment has reached the end of its working life 
Table 2: Application fields in the literature 
The initial literature survey revealed that certain application fields have been 






Distinguishing what issues and aspects genuinely have “societal” significance 
is no trivial exercise. Tainter (2003) has attempted to distil the issues that have truly 
been causal in historical collapses of particular societies: his conclusion, in essence, 
is that historical societies have collapsed when the burden of maintaining the society 
has exceeded the benefit to its members. Tainter also states that his analysis is not 
valid for current “society”, primarily because of the high level of interconnectedness 
and interdependence of our current society. Diamond (2005) concludes that societies 
fail when a critical component of their environment, e.g. forestation, soil or water 
source, is damaged beyond regeneration. Earlier authors such as Adam Smith (1723‒
1790), as explained by Hayek (1976) and Toynbee (1934) have pointed out that such 
ubiquitous concepts as perpetual growth are inherently impossible. Numerous 
publications, e.g. Carreño et al. (2007), consider the consequences of geographically 
localised natural disasters. Posner (2004) attempts to consider some of the society-
wide catastrophe scenarios from a risk and cost-of-mitigation approach. The literature 
review revealed publications that analyse failures of historical societies; however, 
although these suggest “vulnerabilities”, the literature review did not reveal any 
publications that claim, with any adequately reasoned basis, to assess the 
requirements for the survival of today’s society.  
2.5.2 Ecosystems 
The vulnerability of ecosystems has been studied by several authors who 
generally consider a geographically defined area holding a variety of species, each of 
which has evolved to the point where its viable options for food and survival are 
limited. For example, Kartascheff et al. (2009) study ecosystem stability, but their 
paper is of limited applicability because it defines stability in terms of the number of 
species and their connectedness within an ecosystem. The paper does consider the 
adaptation of a web, in terms of foraging adaptation, and defines the robustness of 
entire communities (in terms of the fraction of species that survive after population 
dynamics). The paper also identifies four types of food web model, i.e. random, 
cascade, niche and nested hierarchy. Briske et al. (2010) study the vulnerability 
characteristics of ecosystems and, although offering few quantitative approaches, 





defined as boundaries in time and space in non-equilibrial systems that separate 
alternative stable states (i.e., dynamic regimes) organised around unique attractors 
or equilibrium points”. 
2.5.3 Infrastructure 
Researchers, including Gómez et al. (2011), assert the importance of current 
infrastructure to society. As national infrastructures are clearly associated with 
technological contributions to end-user vulnerability, these must receive careful 
consideration. However, it is significant that works previously cited do not specifically: 
(a) justify the “essential” nature of the infrastructures identified; 
(b) propose a clear definition that allows “infrastructure” to be identified and 
distinguished from systems that are “not infrastructure”; 
(c) include, in considerations of vulnerability, the option of supplying end-user 
services in a different manner; 
(d) consider the possibility of a disruptive technology, e.g. a major breakthrough 
in energy storage and solar cell technology, which would make power 
transmission grids irrelevant. 
Published papers that examine infrastructural vulnerability include those by Li 
et al. (2012) who, in the context of homogeneous systems, consider that network 
functionality is commonly measured by average path length and connectivity. 
Chopade and Bikdash (2011) initially focus on the vulnerability of SCADA systems; 
however, their second major topic is the vulnerability of critical infrastructures, which 
they identify as including power supplies, communications, transportation, water 
supplies and buildings. Although this paper focuses on a somewhat narrow scope of 
interdependencies, it does attempt to analyse the techniques that might be applied to 
the modelling of interdependencies. Haimes and Jiang (2001) and Eusgeld et al. 
(2011) address the issue of infrastructural interdependence, Eusgeld et al specifically 
studying the interdependencies between the communications infrastructure of 
SCADA systems and the electrical power distribution infrastructure. Gómez et al. 
(2011) open their paper with the following statement: 
“Socioeconomic development and sustainability highly depend on the construction 





resiliency of infrastructure networks are vital to the economy, security and wellbeing 
of any country”.  
Yazdani and Jeffrey (2011, p. 2) state that "Examples of infrastructure 
networks include urban roads, rail network, power grid, gas pipeline networks, water 
distribution networks, and supply chains”. Although not specifically quoted as 
examples of “infrastructure”, the authors note (p. 10‒11) "... western Australian gas 
pipelines and... the sewer system”. Akgun et al. (2010, p. 3561) add “airports” to the 
list of critical infrastructures, and describe infrastructures as 
“Critical facilities are the systems that have a high impact to the psychology, health 
and welfare of the population, and are essential to the operations of the economy and 
government such as airport, dam, governmental facility, harbor, nuclear power plant 
and oil plant”.  
Oliva et al. (2010, p. 76) identify "Infrastructures such as energy grids, 
transportation networks and telecommunications systems are critical to the welfare, 
economy and security of every developed country”. Gheorghe and Vamanu (2008, p. 
1) state that:  
“Infrastructures like energy and water supply networks, transportation systems, 
telecommunications and, more recently, the IT realm are so vital, ubiquitous and 
interlaced with the fabric of the societal dynamics and life that their sudden 
unavailability, denial of service, or impairment may severely affect the security, welfare 
and social health of an entire nation”.  
Moore et al. (2007, abstract) state that: 
“The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Directorate of Information Analysis & 
Infrastructure Protection (IAIP), Protective Services Division (PSD), contracted the 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers Innovative Technologies Institute, LLC 
(ASME ITI, LLC) to develop guidance on Risk Analysis and Management for Critical 
Asset Protection (RAMCAP)" and "Underlying the need for a technical vulnerability 
process was the realization that the potential for infrastructure protection initiatives far 
exceeds the resources available”. 
Nazarova (2006, p. 567) identifies the following:  
“Economic, social, ecological, transportation, and other complex systems cover 
practically all spheres of real life. Many of them, such as telephone, telegraph, 
Internet, water pipelines, and fuel and power complex are geographically distributed 
systems. The level of development of the country’s economy, and in extreme 





Gheorghe and Vamanu (2004) note a list of infrastructures including 
transportation infrastructures, communication systems, electricity transmission 
systems, banking systems, water delivery infrastructure and process industries.  
If it were possible to obtain power via solar cells, batteries and an inverter with 
reliability and costs lower than via power station and transmission lines, then 
individuals would do so. Similarly, if it were possible for individuals to safely treat 
sewage less expensively than via centralised treatment plants, then citizens would 
exert considerable pressure to gain permission to do so. Current infrastructural 
system design has evolved under the twin pressures of adequate performance and 
citizen pressure to minimise cost. Therefore, infrastructural systems do have several 
characteristics. Firstly, large infrastructures will inevitably resist change (possess 
inertia), and either actively or passively discourage alternative technical approaches 
to the supply of needs. Secondly, the studies of infrastructural vulnerability tend to 
emphasise the complete infrastructure as a unit – yet a power supply grid that splits 
temporarily into sections, each of which has one generator, or a water grid that splits 
into sections, each with one reservoir, causes little concern to the end-user. Some 
authors do acknowledge this issue; for example, Werbeloff and Brown (2011) speak 
of the “Security through Diversity” (STD) implementation strategy that is being 
adopted for water supply in parts of Australia. Finally, it may be noted that, as an 
infrastructure grows, so does the cost of both maintaining the infrastructure and 
protecting it against both intentional and unintentional attack. This is effectively the 
scenario examined by Tainter (2003) and, if unchecked, could lead to a service in 
which costs exceed value. The interdependence of infrastructures is widely 
acknowledged, e.g. by Haimes and Jiang (2001), but approaches for quantifying the 
interdependencies and adequately addressing them are not well developed.  
2.5.4 Supply chains 
Studies of supply chains are generally focused on the interests of a corporate 
owner, and hence extend neither to raw materials or processing steps nor to the end-
user. Significant publications relating to supply chain robustness and/or vulnerability 
include Chen and Lin (2012) who consider (Section II(A)) that complex supply chain 
networks can be represented in graph theory notation, as a set of vertices 





apply a simulation algorithm that systematically "breaks" nodes, starting with highest-
degree nodes (p. 593), and recalculates nominated graph properties after each 
iteration, equating these graph properties with supply chain vulnerability. Specifically, 
this paper asserts (p. 594) that  
“... under the restriction of a certain connectivity, the biggest remove scale of nodes 
or edges which a complex supply chain network can bear is called the invulnerability 
degree or stability degree of the network”. 
Kumar et al. (2010, p. 3717) study supply chains and appear to equate risk 
with harm, stating that  
"Risk in supply chains can be defined as the potential deviations from the initial overall 
objective that, consequently, trigger the decrease of value-added activities at different 
levels”. They also state (p. 3719) that "This paper addresses such issues by 
identifying and measuring various risks present at every level in a supply chain and 
decides the optimal policy with minimum risk factors and overall cost".  
They develop a generic mathematical model for a four-tiered supply chain approach, 
i.e. suppliers, plants, warehouses and markets, and notation to allow the identification 
of routes between one tier and the next below. Further, they note (p. 3727) that  
"This hypothetical supply chain can be structured as a multiobjective mixed integer 
programming (MOMIP) model. In this paper, the objective is to minimise the total cost, 
TC, of the supply chain operation which includes supplier cost, production cost, 
warehouse associated cost and market cost”.  
Estrada (2007, p. 296) make a definitional simplification allowing a network 
analysis of a food web. They state:  
"In a network representation of a food web, nodes represent species and links 
represent who eats whom in the ecosystem (Proulx et al., 2005). This kind of 
representation permits to analyse the similarities and differences between complex 
systems of very different nature, ranging from technological to biological and social 
systems (Strogatz, 2001; Albert and Barabasi, 2002 ... ".  
Similarly, Ludema (2006) provides an overview of supply chain terminology, quotes 
graph theory and also identifies supply chains as "nearly decomposable systems". 
The scope of the supply chain literature varies considerably: Kumar et al. 
(2010) consider a generic manufacturing, warehousing and transport operation. As 
previously noted, the defining quotation within their paper (p. 3727) is:  
"This hypothetical supply chain can be structured as a multiobjective mixed integer 





TC, of the supply chain operation which includes supplier cost, production cost, 
warehouse associated cost and market cost”.  
In other words, for a closely defined subset of possible “supply chains”, they 
demonstrate an analytical approach to maximising profit to the chain-owner, for 
operations between some defined raw materials supplied to their warehouses and 
some product available in a retail outlet. In contrast, Chen and Lin (2012) use a graph 
theory approach similar to that used for homogeneous networks such as computer 
communication networks. Their paper does not draw upon any actual measured data 
or representations of real supply chains; it is effectively a theoretical exercise in the 
application of graph theory. 
2.5.5 Computer and communication networks 
As Forester and Morrison (1990, p. 462) state "As society becomes more 
dependent on computer and communications technologies, we also become more 
vulnerable to computer and communications breakdowns”. Authors who have 
published significant works in the field of computer and communications networks 
include Idika and Bhargava (2012, p. 75), who state that  
“… a security metric (or a combination of security metrics) is a quantitative measure 
of how much of an identifiable security-relevant attribute an entity (e.g., a network) 
possesses. In this work, we focus on improving three previously proposed attack 
graph-based security metrics: the Shortest Path metric, the Number of Paths metric, 
and the Mean of Path Lengths metric”.  
Liu and Zhang (2011) examine a range of vulnerability reporting approaches, and 
propose a composite scoring system to address perceived weaknesses of these 
approaches. Tu (2000) has a single aim: to establish that the internet is, in fact, a 
"scale-free" network, using the definitions of Barabási and Bonabeau (2003). Strigini 
et al. (2007) comment extensively on the vulnerability and resilience of computer 
networks, but without advocating specific approaches. In a seminal work, Doyle et al. 
(2005) note the well-reported characteristics of scale-free (SF) networks, and 
conclude disappointingly (p. 6) that  
“It is certainly appealing that SF network models can avoid all Internet-specific 
structures, such as protocol stacks, technological or economic constraints, and user 





yields results that collapse when tested with real data or when examined by domain 
experts”.  
These analyses of “computer networks” have several characteristics. Firstly, 
homogeneous networks are assumed, i.e. only one commodity flows through every 
connection of the network, and there is basically one type of “node”. Secondly, there 
is implicitly an ability to re-route traffic on an ad-hoc basis. It is noted that, whereas 
these characteristics allow interesting options for academic study, they are limited to 
narrow and tightly defined fields.  
2.5.6 Power supply grids 
As with computer networks, power supply grids offer scope for analysis, and 
for optimisation as well as the examination of vulnerabilities. Although few authors 
make note of the fact, they are actually not homogeneous because a grid would 
commonly include more than one voltage level. Power grids are also distinct in their 
operational characteristics: whereas a water supply is still “useful” if the flow is minimal 
and a computer network is still “usable” if the dataflow reduces to a very slow baud-
rate, neither the power users nor the grid operators or the grid protection systems will 
tolerate frequency excursions of more than about 1 Hz or voltage excursions of more 
than a few percent from nominal values.  
Researchers who have published significant analyses of the vulnerabilities, 
risks and resilience issues of power supply grids include Buldyrev et al. (2010, p. 
1025), who start by noting the problem of cascading failure across networks. They 
state that 
“We present exact analytical solutions for the critical fraction of nodes that, on 
removal, will lead to a failure cascade and to a complete fragmentation of two 
interdependent networks. Surprisingly, a broader degree distribution increases the 
vulnerability of interdependent networks to random failure, which is opposite to how a 
single network behaves”.  
This paper cites a real-world situation "... power network and an Internet 
network (a supervisory control and data acquisition system) that were implicated in 
the blackout that affected much of Italy on 28 September 2003”. The approach taken 
in this paper (p. 1025) is 
“To model interdependent networks, we consider for simplicity, and without loss of 





of node Ai (i51, 2, …, N), in network A, depends on the ability of node Bi, in network 
B, to supply a critical resource, and vice versa”.  
Baldick et al. (2009, p. 1) state that a "... vulnerable system is defined in [1] as 
a system that operates with a “reduced level of security that renders it vulnerable to 
the cumulative effects of a series of moderate disturbances”. The paper also makes 
reference to "N‒1 and N‒2" design redundancy approaches. They also state (Col2, 
p. 1) that 
"At present, there is not a commonly accepted vulnerability index or assessment 
method for power systems. If a power system loses a significant portion of its ability 
to carry the power flows due to cascading line outages, it is considered a vulnerable 
configuration”.  
These researchers state (p. 2) that the "... TRELSS (Transmission Reliability 
Evaluation of Large-Scale Systems) … is an industrial tool used to identify cascading 
failure problems", and state (p. 4) that "... [t]he combinatorial growth in the number of 
ways cascading failures can occur make them very difficult to analyze, and … develop 
a continuous-time Markov chain model of a dependability system that explicitly tackles 
this problem”. A graph theory approach to modelling a power grid system is proposed, 
and these authors note the difficulties of this approach, stating (p. 5) that 
“A cascading failure model based on small-world networks was proposed in … and 
can be used to identify the vulnerable lines. The model assumes that a node will fail if 
a given fraction γ of its neighbors have failed. Starting with initial failures on a few 
isolated nodes, the process will become cascading when these initial failures lead to 
subsequent failures due to exceeding of the fraction γ”.  
The assumption of adjacent node failure is valuable, reflecting real world experience. 
The researchers however conclude (p. 7) that a clear solution has not been found, 
and state that 
“Since power system cascading is diverse, complicated, and computationally 
intractable, there is no single model, tool or approach that can address all aspects of 
cascading or answer all the questions about managing the risk of cascading failures”.  
The  
2.5.7 Water supply networks 
Water supply networks are functionally different in several respects from 





and the supply network may still be considered to be “functional” even if the quality of 
supply decreases and the flow is reduced to a tiny fraction of the design flow; the 
“design specifications” for the system are much less stringent. As with power supply 
grids, water distribution “networks” tend to have few supply points and many smaller 
off-take points. Water supply systems have been studied by many researchers, 
including Yazdani and Jeffrey (2012), who model water distribution systems as 
weighted, directed graphs, concluding that  
"... the demand adjusted entropic degree provides a measurement of node centrality 
refined and suited to the analysis of spatially organized infrastructure networks with 
limited connectivity. In the absence of hubs and highly connected nodes, which are 
responsible for a great percentage of network connectivity and regarded as the points 
of vulnerability to targeted attacks in scale-free networks”.  
This paper considers two well-documented real water distribution systems, and 
concludes that critical nodes can, at least theoretically, be identified, commenting that 
less sophisticated graph analysis techniques did not succeed in identifying more 
critical nodes because they lacked the more sophisticated approach to edge 
weighting and the weighting of the significance of specific nodes. Werbeloff and 
Brown (2011) comment specifically on the cities of Melbourne and Perth, in the light 
of severe stresses on water supplies, and Australia’s national decision to adopt a 
“security through diversity” policy for increasing the security of urban water supplies. 
According to these researchers (p. 2362): 
“It is increasingly recognised that traditional urban water systems are ill-equipped to 
effectively address these complex and interrelated challenges (Vlachos & Braga 2001; 
Brown et al. 2009), leaving cities vulnerable to the effects of variable water conditions”. 
This is a discussion paper, presenting a broad range of options under headings of 
"threshold capacity", "coping capacity (damage restriction during an emergency)", 
"recovery capacity" (damage reaction after an emergency) and "adaptive capacity" 
(envisioning proactive planning). Yazdani and Jeffrey (2011) note that there are 
fundamental differences between infrastructure networks, stating that geographical 
constraints on systems such as water distribution networks impose severe restrictions 
on network layouts, and require different analyses from systems without geographical 
constraints. They also note (p. 4) that a proper representation of a water distribution 
network would need to include pipe loss factors, pump capacities etc., but this is too 





graphs and "... statistical properties of network topology and applications of graph 
theory to identify the structural patterns and building blocks of the networks”. Four 
real-world water distribution systems are studied; the authors note the usefulness of 
the graph metric, stating (p. 6) that 
"... central-point dominance … which, in the analysis of flow networks, may be used 
to indicate how network flow is controlled by centrally located point(s), or to quantify 
the degree of concentration of the network layout around a center. Central-point 
dominance is calculated by taking the mean over the betweenness centrality values 
of all nodes indexed by the maximum value of betweenness (achieved at the most 
central-point)”.  
These researchers describe “link-per-node ratio”, “central-point-dominance” and 
“clustering coefficient” values, which they claim is an indicator of path redundancy, 
but later say (p. 7) that it is not a good measure. They also propose (p. 7) the use of 
a “meshedness coefficient” as a better measure of redundancy. They additionally 
state (p. 10) that  
"One of the most important objectives in the operation of WDNs is to maintain the path 
connectivity between the source(s) and the consumers (network nodes) and make 
such path connectivity as short and efficient as possible. Therefore, instead of 
assessing the efficiency based on the connectivity between all pairs of nodes, it is 
more appropriate to measure the efficiency based on the connectivity between a root 
node such as a reservoir and other nodes in the network”.  
One such measurement is reported as the network’s route factor and is proposed as 
the average of the individual route factors for each water source (to a defined point). 
This is a remarkably simplistic approach to the issue. The paper comments on the 
value of graph theory metrics, noting that it is possible to establish a threshold for the 
random removal of nodes, for a specified degree distribution, and is related to the loss 
of a network’s large-scale connectivity. They recognise (p. 12) that the actual 
functional requirement of the network is the provision of water, and that supply nodes, 
i.e. reservoirs, are most important even if these do not appear as highly connected. 
They state (p. 12) that 
“To this end, the structural vulnerability and robustness of a WDN may be investigated 
by quantifying the level of optimal-connectivity of network design, by identifying critical 
locations and the most influential components followed by studying their failure 





WDNs is by detecting the cut-sets, i.e., the sets of components whose removal results 
in disconnection”. 
However, they also note that, for sparse networks such as most water distribution 
networks, the measurements (route factors) generally equate to “1” and there is a 
need for some other (undefined) measurement to apply to structural vulnerability and 
fault tolerance. The paper’s conclusion states that 
"Network robustness and structural vulnerability were investigated by using 
techniques to identify the influential components and critical locations (e.g., 
articulation points and bridges) and quantifying the network’s well-connectedness with 
respect to the existence of such locations, in the absence of degree-based hubs and 
given the sparse structure of networks. Descriptive measurements, including those 
derived from the spectral analysis of network connectivity and Laplacian matrices, 
quantified the level of structural network tolerance against failures and removal of 
components and enabled a basic comparison between different network designs”. 
The scope of the study by Yazdani et al. (2011, p. 1577) is Kumasi, in Ghana, which 
has a population of over 1.5 million people with rapidly growing water consumption 
industries. Specifically, these authors state the scope of their work as  
"We created four hypothetical network expansion options, starting from a tree-like 
expansion with no loops, gradually moving toward more looped structures which are 
deemed better-conceived networks with greater redundancy. Subsequently, we 
performed the calculations for various resilience metrics and compared the results 
with those from the unexpanded network to assess how robust the expansion options 
are and how they contribute to enhancing or degrading the overall system robustness 
and its ability to deliver service”.  
These researchers note the effects of oversimplification in their concluding statements 
(Col 2, p. 1577) that  
"The proposed methodology may therefore be regarded as a relatively quick-to-
implement precursor to more detailed trade-off analyses... However, it should be 
borne in mind that purely topological measurements may only partially describe the 
network structure and fail to entirely characterize its properties... This shows that 
oversimplification of water distribution systems into abstract graph models is 
extremely useful but far from sufficient for a comprehensive assessment of system 
resilience and its robustness against perturbations and hazards …”  
It is significant that water supply and power supply systems are both recognised as 





approaches conclude their research with warnings of the limitations of that approach 
and the dangers of oversimplification. 
2.5.8 Transport systems 
Transport systems have much in common with water distribution systems; 
both are geographically constrained and are considered to be “functional” even if 
capacity is severely reduced. However, they have a key difference, which also 
distinguishes them from computer systems: the transport medium is capable of re-
routing – this is a function not of the “nodes” but uniquely of the actual medium 
(vehicles) using the network. Derrible and Kennedy (2010, p. 3679) study transport 
systems, emphasising 
“In this paper, robustness deals more specifically with alternative paths offered to 
transit users and likelihood of accidents/failures. Performing such an analysis is all the 
more important considering it fits in the broader context of resilience (i.e. how cities 
can respond to major disruptions)... On a larger scale, by looking at 22 transit systems 
(bus and tramway) in Poland, Sienkiewicz and Holyst [41] found that some systems 
appeared to show a scale-free behaviour, with scaling factors ranging from 2.4 to 4.1; 
most systems also appeared to be small-worlds”.  
The paper also notes (p. 3683) that "As a result, we prefer to use another 
indicator... degree of connectivity... Mathematically, it is essentially identical to the 
clustering coefficient defined above”. They continue on to define a robustness metric 
(p. 3684), noting that a "... particularly adequate robustness indicator is the concept 
of associativity that was introduced by Newman”. This paper is significant because it 
studies a large number of real transport networks, but its only contribution is to 
illustrate how these real-world networks correlate with theoretical scale-free/small 
world networks. Nair et al. (2010) consider a large “InterModal” transport system, i.e. 
a large port complex, which is categorised as a “transport system”, but is actually a 
diverse production system in the port of Swinoujscie in Poland. These researchers 
comment (bottom of Col2, p. 54) that no satisfactory definition of vulnerability has 
been established. The paper references many other authors' attempts to measure 
resilience and suggests (p. 55) that  
"... the resilience definition adopted here for an IM component [alpha] can be 
expressed as the post-disruption fraction of demand that can be satisfied using 





The same paper uses a graph theory notation, but defines (p. 56) capacity and 
other constraints for each link. The risks to each link are assumed to be known 
probabilistically. The paper proposes the calculation of a resilience index for each of 
several levels of budget-for-repair, allowing economic decision making. 
2.5.9 Analyses of interdisciplinary fields 
Several papers address a number of fields. These papers include Werbeloff 
and Brown (2011, p. 2362), who comment that  
"It is increasingly recognised that traditional urban water systems are ill-equipped to 
effectively address these complex and interrelated challenges (Vlachos & Braga 2001; 
Brown et al. 2009), leaving cities vulnerable to the effects of variable water conditions”. 
Akgun et al. (2010) propose a “…fuzzy integrated vulnerability assessment model 
(FIVAM)” that is based on fuzzy set theory and a multiple attribute rating technique. 
They also propose “…fuzzy cognitive maps (FCM) methodology…” and the use of 
group decision making. They propose that these can be applied to any major 
infrastructure. Robertson (2010) starts by noting the hierarchy of needs as proposed 
by Maslow (1943) and correlating these with the current technological approaches 
used for their supply. Crutchfield (2009) discusses the issues of technological fragility 
without addressing specific details ‒ and certainly without offering any metrics or 
approaches for improvement. Gheorghe and Vamanu (2008) present a very broad-
scoped paper, which treats the whole world as "system of systems" and adopts the 
approach of identifying a large number of "indicators", for which public data are 
available, and using an algorithmic approach to combining these to show "surfaces", 
whose shape can be interpreted to indicate vulnerability. LePoire and Glenn (2007) 
present a qualitative analysis of the effects of technological advances both to aid and 
to counter the threat of terrorism. Svendsen and Wolthusen (2007) use a modelling 
approach built on graph-theory principles and present a more sophisticated model of 
interdependent infrastructures, including the representation of flows and the storage 
of components at nodes. However, their conclusion includes the statement that they  
“... have presented an abstract model of critical infrastructures which aims to capture 
essential properties of different infrastructure types while retaining an overall 
computational complexity which makes it amenable for large-scale analyses. This 





modeling of interactions and interdependencies which such domain models cannot 
capture”.  
Homer-Dixon (2006) notes that his three examples illustrate that society’s fate is 
always uncertain, and that devastation can happen at any time (regardless of the 
strength of the society), caused by a variety of complex factors. Van Blaricum et al. 
(2005, p. 226) state that  
"One promising tool for conducting the analyses described above is being developed 
by the U. S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center (ERDC). "Fort Future" 
is an integrated suite of planning and simulation tools. One part of Fort Future is called 
the Virtual Installation, or "VI". The VI is a GIS-based computable model of a 
community. It includes buildings, utilities, and the transportation network and it can be 
overlaid onto aerial photos for context”. 
Three aspects of this paper are of particular interest: (1) it acknowledges the 
interconnectedness of the utilities; (2) it is built around the use of a single (opaque) 
computer simulation package; (3) despite reliance on that package, it does recognise 
that running simulations with different types of redundancy and backup etc. will allow 
the user to investigate the effect on multiple interconnected utilities. The main 
assumption by Gheorghe and Vamanu (2004, p. 616) is that  
“... operational definition of vulnerability adopts the emergent, consensual 
understanding of vulnerability as a system’s virtual openness to lose its design 
functions, and/or structural integrity, and/or identity under the combined interplay of 
two sets of factors: U. Risk-featuring factors; and V. Management response-featuring 
factors”.  
In this paper, U and V are identified as membership functions of fuzzy sets and the 
authors go on to note (p. 616) that "... an operable system may thereby appear as: • 
Stable, and thereby featuring a low vulnerability; • Critically unstable/vulnerable; or • 
Unstable, and thereby featuring a high vulnerability”. This is effectively a 
representation of a complex system by using a large set of "indicators", each of which 
is represented in fuzzy set notation. They conclude (p. 626) that  
"Generic QVA models may be developed that, however, may not be universally 
applicable ... That implies, inter alia, a sound choice of the U- and V-type physical 
indicators, supported by a clear identification of the chief underlying concerns about 
the targeted system’s safety. • It is submitted that, from the safety standpoint, 





and when, the issue of making the vulnerability countermeasures cost-effective would 
come into consideration.”  
Rinaldi et al. (2001, p. 11) discuss a useful case study, and while they quote 
interdependency, the description is arguable more closely related to the issue of 
single points of failure for multiple systems. The case study is described as 
“In the case of the Galaxy 4 failure, the loss of a single telecommunications satellite 
led to an outage of nearly 90% of all pagers nationwide … From an interdependency 
perspective, it also disrupted a variety of banking and financial services, such as credit 
card purchases and automated teller machine transactions, and threatened key 
segments of the vital human services network by disrupting communications with 
doctors and emergency workers”.  
Their definition (p. 3) is noteworthy: "This additional complexity exhibited by a system 
as a whole, beyond the simple sum of its parts, is called emergent behaviour and is a 
hallmark of...” complex systems. The paper defines several types of interdependence 
between infrastructural systems, which need to be acknowledged. The paper also 
notes (p. 19) the concept of coupling order ‒ of interdependence. The authors of the 
paper propose viewing connected infrastructures using an “agent” approach (p. 20) 
and they suggest (p. 16) that "... a comprehensive analysis of interdependencies is a 
daunting challenge. Today’s modelling and simulation tools are only beginning to 
address many of the issues outlined above: the “science” of infrastructure 
interdependencies is relatively immature”. The paper also presents several 
conclusions, including the six dimensions of interdependency, i.e. type of failure, 
infrastructural characteristics, state of operation, types of interdependencies, 
environment and coupling and responsive behaviour.  
2.6 Published analytical techniques, related to technological vulnerability  
2.6.1 Analysis and classification of published techniques 
Amongst the literature relevant to the thesis topic, several analytical 
techniques were identified. This section describes these techniques. This section 
attempts to use a terminology that is uniform across the various named techniques. It 
also attempts to define the techniques in terms of the inputs that are used in principle 
or in practice, the outputs generated and the potential applicability to the field of study. 





attempt to optimise resources expended against additional reliability to obtain reduced 
vulnerability of systems such as supply chains, power distribution networks and water 
distribution systems. These analyses also overlap with the operational analysis field 
and related optimisation techniques.  
2.6.2 Risk-based techniques 
Risk-based techniques are characterised by the use of probability factors, 
sometimes by a combination of a hazard-probability factor, a vulnerability-probability 
factors and a potential harm. Classical risk analysis has been useful to the 
engineering community, although it could be argued that this is due more to the 
enforced discipline of completing a risk-register than to the rigour of the analytical 
approach. In the context of computer networks, Idika and Bhargava (2012, p. 75) state 
that "... a security metric (or a combination of security metrics) is a quantitative 
measure of how much of an identifiable security-relevant attribute an entity e.g., a 
network possesses”. Moore et al. (2007, abstract) state that:  
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), contracted the American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers Innovative Technologies Institute, LLC (ASME ITI, LLC) to 
develop guidance on Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection 
(RAMCAP) … a process is needed to identify the priorities for allocating these limited 
resources. This process should be based on guidance that defines consistent, 
objective, and integrated application of risk analysis methods”.  
Einarsson and Rausand (1998, p. 535-536) state that "... risk is the “opposite” 
of safety”. Some approaches to improving the estimation of probability have been 
proposed. Timashev and Tyrsin (2011) develop the concept of system entropy, as a 
more complete definition of the risk of failure: this definition is applied to a pipeline, 
with several known defects, any of which could cause failure within a given time 
interval if overpressure is known. The definition is useful and, in principle, could be 
extended to other systems, but the cases for which it is practical to gather such data 
are limited. Taking a quite different approach, Khatri and Vairavamoorthy (2011) 
quote “Dempster‒Shafer theory”, which is a qualitative research technique that is also 
intended to improve the assessment of probability. Newton et al. (2006) consider 
Bayesian belief networks, for a similar purpose.  
In summary, risk analysis is a topic upon which a huge amount has been 





are considered to span the seminal literature and be generally representative. The 
specific issues that limit the applicability of risk analysis to the research topic can be 
enumerated as follows. 
(a) The term “risk” is generally used in the sense of a “defined harm”. This is 
distinctly different from the colloquial use of the term, which is more commonly 
associated with simple probability, e.g. “a high risk activity”. 
(b) Various approaches, e.g. Dempster‒Shafer belief systems and Bayesian 
probability calculations have been proposed to improve the consensus of 
expert opinions of probability. 
(c) Approaches such as “system entropy” can, assuming the availability of very 
detailed data, improve assessments of risk probability. 
(d) Definitions show a curious lack of precision in the degree to which they link 
defined harm, strictly and only, to a defined hazard. Most risk definitions in 
principle relate a “harm” only to a single specified hazard – yet “risk matrices” 
commonly list major “harms” and a limited set of hazards that cannot even 
remotely encompass the range of hazards that link to the defined risk. 
(e) Time-frames are seldom if ever defined, making the assessment of hazard 
probability somewhat subjective. 
(f) Although a “scoring matrix” rather than a numerical multiplication is used, the 
approach does tend to obscure the difference between large-harm events with 
low probability and low-harm events with comparatively high probability.  
(g) Although the use of the term “vulnerability” acknowledges, semantically, that, 
in many practical cases, the existence of a hazard does not inevitably lead to 
the defined harm, the term generally is poorly defined and obscures a large 
and very complex topic. 
2.6.3 Accumulated scoring approaches 
A number of authors have noted that, for many practical “harm” events, there 
is a large range of types or categories of “hazard”; lacking any uniformity, these 
authors have attempted to consider each disparate type of hazard separately, and 
then to merge or separately represent the resulting metrics. Similarly for 





definitions of the term and various levels of precision of the terminology, and have 
developed a metric of the general form of Equation 7.  
 
Equation 7 
where each “S” score is obtained from a lookup table that uses textual definitions of 
various degrees of some attribute and assigns a numerical score to each ‒ or group-
consensus approach. As an example, Liu and Zhang (2011) analyse several 
computer-vulnerability reporting systems and propose a composite scoring system. 
The “scoring” approach is very common and coarse definitions (e.g. “High” “Medium” 
and “Low”) are used in matrix representations of risk and consequence, in many risk 
management systems, e.g. AS/NZS 4360:2004. MacKenzie (2014) considers various 
types of indices, including numerical, colour-codes and letters, and recommends that 
risk indices should be numerical and mapped from specific risk values. The 
researcher also proposes that decisionmakers should consider developing measures 
that are derived from several such values. 
Several researchers have recognised the difficulties of quantifying networks 
that are heterogeneous and that have factors that are not readily codified with graph 
theory notations, and have attempted to address these issues by developing numbers 
of separate indices and then combining these indices into a single value. Examples 
of this approach are included in the work of Zhang et al. (2009), who propose 
integrating the use of several types of index, including the capability of supplying 
power safely, static voltage security, topological vulnerability, transient security and 
risk indices. Afgan and Veziroglu (2012) envisage a set of "quality indicators". A 
"disturbance" moves one of these from its static value and the system recovers, i.e. 
returns to the static value over a time interval. The authors integrate the disturbances 
over time, then apply a weighting factor to each of these integrals using a separate 
weighting factor for each integral and then add the sum of the (weighting*integral) 
values to derive a "resilience index" for the system. Wang et al. (2012) assert that no 
single approach to the vulnerability of interdependent infrastructures, and hence a 
framework of analysis, is required. They consider several graph-theory-base network 
metrics as possible design criteria, consider long-term vulnerability and specific 





Khatri and Vairavamoorthy (2011) offer what is effectively an accumulated scoring 
approach, because they use a consensus approach to developing vulnerability 
indices, and values for fuzzy set inputs. Gheorghe and Vamanu (2008, p. 3) state that 
"A virtual example of vulnerability analysis, using an indicator-based diagnosis, for the 
case of New Zealand is being presented, by way of an illustration” and "... whereas 
for risk one does have a formula, that says that, the risk of a disruptive event equals 
the probability of the event’s occurring, times the measure of event consequences 
powered to a subjective consequence perception exponent”. In contrast, there is no 
similar formulation for vulnerability. These researchers conclude (p. 8) that  
"The exercise reported in this paper should be considered an investigation window 
into the complex topics of vulnerability assessment... model adopted to understand 
and quantitatively estimate the vulnerability of complex interdependent ‘system of 
systems’”.  
Moore et al. (2007) and Gheorghe and Vamanu (2004) also describe accumulated 
scoring approaches. Accumulated scoring approaches have a common defining 
characteristic: they identify a set of factors, then develop, by consensus or lookup 
table or other approach, numerical values that may be precise or fuzzy for each of 
these factors and then arithmetically manipulate the numerical values to develop a 
single indicator value. The strength of this approach is that almost any list of “factors” 
can be addressed and the weakness is that each of the “factors” actually has 
dimensions, but the factors are treated as dimensionless when they are combined. 
Two specific problems can arise from this weakness: firstly, the factors may be 
interdependent; secondly, the numerical treatment can obscure underlying issues; for 
example, one system may score high on one factor and low on another factor whereas 
another system may have opposite scores for the same factors, generating the same 
combined index. 
2.6.4 FMEA and related approaches 
“Failure modes and effects analysis” (FMEA), USDoD (1980) considers a well-
defined and generally simple engineering system, tabulating for each individual 
component the consequences of failure (categorised as “fail open”, “fail closed” or “fail 
fixed”). The FMEA approach will generally show just how many “hazards” can 





2.6.5 Networks and graph theory 
A significant number of publications, e.g. Chopade and Bikdash (2011) and 
Yazdani and Jeffrey (2012), apply the basic notations of graph theory in their 
analyses; this approach therefore warrants a close examination. A network is 
represented as a collection of nodes that are connected by “edges”. These can be 
represented as a two-dimensional matrix of nodes, with the matrix values 
representing the connections between each node. It is also quite possible to represent 
a graph as a simple table in which each tuple corresponds to a “connection” or “edge”, 
and records the start and end vertex and the edge details. Having represented a 
network either as a table or as a matrix, various analyses can be applied. Scale-free 
or “small world” networks can be distinguished, as explained by Barabási and 
Bonabeau (2003) and others. “Connectedness” or various other metrics such as 
spectral gap, algebraic connectivity, clustering coefficient, meshedness coefficient 
and degree distribution can be calculated, as described by Yazdani and Jeffrey 
(2012). Those researchers use these approaches to describe the topological 
characteristics of a network and propose that the meshedness coefficient and the 
algebraic connectivity coefficient are particularly significant. The effect on the path 
between two vertices can be calculated, if a specific vertex or a set of vertices is 
removed. The effect on the path between two specified vertices can also be assessed, 
if one or more nodes are removed. Many analyses of this type have referenced the 
seminal work of Barabási and Bonabeau (2003), who showed that a “scale-free” 
network is robust against random node attacks but is vulnerable, in terms of network 
performance, to attacks on specific, highly connected nodes. A network, as 
considered in this paper, is always homogeneous. Although this conclusion has not 
been disputed, other authors such as Yazdani and Jeffrey (2012, p. 3) state that "The 
algebraic connectivity of a graph is a non-negative number whose magnitude 
represents structural robustness against efforts to decouple parts of the network”. 
These authors then move from an examination of the difficulty of assigning adequately 
representative values to edge weights, to the use of the “entropic degree... a 
quantitative measure of node importance by which network nodes may be ranked 
according to their centrality and failure induced impact on network performance”. 
These authors consider that their key finding is that the “demand-adjusted entropic 





infrastructure networks that are geographically constrained. Yazdani and Jeffrey 
(2012a) also develop several mathematical descriptors of water supply networks, and 
attempt to correlate these with measures of "robustness". Graphical representations 
allow these researchers to do several things, i.e. to apply rules and algorithms to 
adjacent vertices or nodes, to model the concept that proximity increases the 
probability of consequent failure, to statically or dynamically reassign either signed or 
unsigned weightings to the edges, modelling their “capacity”, and to analyse the 
number and location of vertices that must be removed before specified sections of the 
network become isolated. Graphical representation also allows the number and 
location of “edges” that must be removed before specified sections of the network 
become isolated – or before the path capacity between them degrades to some 
nominated level. By hypothesising changes to the network, it is possible to investigate 
the effect, on any of the above assessments, of adding redundant edges at various 
points of the network. Li et al. (2012), for example, focus completely on the efficiency 
of methods for adding various targeted links to a "network" in order to achieve 
specified "network parameters” or to develop metrics of how heavily loaded a network 
or network segment is, compared with its rated maximum load. This offers a proxy for 
“vulnerability”, if that definition of “vulnerability” is adopted, and is the same concept 
as that mentioned by Günneç and Salman (2011), although primarily by quoting 
Jenelius et al. (2006), who argue that “… vulnerability appears when the network is 
under pressure with full capacity, and a small amount of further stress may cause a 
major damage that may cascade through the system”.  
Papers of particular note in this field include Shen et al. (2011), who present 
one of the most comprehensive theoretical analyses of the “vulnerability” of power law 
graphs: they do not attempt to use real-world examples, but their use of pairwise 
connectivity does perhaps make the otherwise very abstract paper valuable to this 
analysis. Yazdani and Jeffrey (2011, p. 4), commenting on urban water systems, note 
that, to properly represent a water distribution network, it would be necessary to 
include pipe loss factors, pump capacities etc., and, as the authors consider that this 
is too hard, they propose a simplified approach, treating networks as undirected 
graphs and using statistical properties of network topology and graph theory to identify 
the structural properties of the networks. Yazdani et al. (2011) use a graph theory 





includes (p. 1577) a table of the graph properties that are commonly used in this and 
other works. As well as presenting results, this paper notes the limitations of the graph 
theory approach, commenting (p. 1574) that  
"A comprehensive assessment of WDN resilience would entail an analysis and 
modeling of system performance or failure data … the data needed to support such 
an analysis are typically non-existent ... proposed methodology may therefore be 
regarded as a relatively quick-to-implement precursor to more detailed trade-off 
analyses”.  
Buldyrev et al. (2010) apply graphical representations to two interlinked networks (a 
power grid and a SCADA system). These researchers start by stating the problem of 
cascading failure across networks, and state (p. 1025) that  
"We present exact analytical solutions for the critical fraction of nodes that, on 
removal, will lead to a failure cascade and to a complete fragmentation of two 
interdependent networks. Surprisingly, a broader degree distribution increases the 
vulnerability of interdependent networks to random failure, which is opposite to how a 
single network behaves”.  
These authors use real-world data from a power network and an internet 
network. Their approach (p. 1025) is  
"To model interdependent networks, we consider for simplicity, and without loss of 
generality, two networks, A and B, with the same number of nodes, N. The functioning 
of node Ai (i1, 2, …, N), in network A, depends on the ability of node Bi, in network B, 
to supply a critical resource, and vice versa”.  
This is somewhat interesting, because the authors start by removing a set of 
nodes from one network, then effectively use the 1:1 correspondence between the 
nodes of one network and those of the other to derive a set of nodes to be removed 
from the connected network. They state (p. 1028) that "After this work was completed, 
we learned of the independent work of E. Leicht and R. de Souza, also addressing 
the challenges of interacting networks”. Derrible and Kennedy (2010) consider 
transport networks, and specifically an examination of actual rail networks, and state 
(p. 3679) that "On a larger scale, by looking at 22 transit systems (bus and tramway) 
in Poland, Sienkiewicz and Holyst [41] found that some systems appeared to show a 
scale-free behavior, with scaling factors ranging from 2.4 to 4.1; most systems also 





"As a result, we prefer to use another indicator, which is common in the graph theory 
literature and was first introduced to transportation by Garrison and Marble [20]. It is 
referred to as degree of connectivity and is extensively used in network research by 
the transportation community. Mathematically, it is essentially identical to the 
clustering coefficient defined above…”  
Baldick et al. (2009, p. 4) consider electrical power systems. They state that  
"The combinatorial growth in the number of ways cascading failures can occur make 
them very difficult to analyze, and [37] develop a continuous-time Markov chain model 
of a dependability system that explicitly tackles this problem”.  
A graph theory approach to modelling a power grid system is proposed, and the 
authors state (p. 5) that  
"A cascading failure model based on small-world networks was proposed … and can 
be used to identify the vulnerable lines. The model assumes that a node will fail if a 
given fraction γ of its neighbours have failed … the process will become cascading 
when these initial failures lead to subsequent failures due to exceeding of the fraction 
γ” 
The authors conclude (p. 7) that "Since power system cascading is diverse, 
complicated, and computationally intractable, there is no single model, tool or 
approach that can address all aspects of cascading or answer all the questions about 
managing the risk of cascading failures”. Estrada (2007, p. 296) states that  
"In a network representation of a food web, nodes represent species and links 
represent who eats whom in the ecosystem … This kind of representation permits to 
analyse the similarities and differences between complex systems of very different 
nature … food webs have less-skewed uniform or exponential DDs (Dunne et al., 
2002a). However, they also display high fragility to intentional removal of the most 
connected nodes.” 
This paper proposes (p. 297) an interesting distinction between a network that can be 
readily split and one that cannot. The concept of a good expansion network is 
described as  
"We start by defining informally the concept of network expansibility. A food web 
having ‘‘good expansion’’ properties is the one that cannot be divided in at least two 
isolated ‘‘large’’ parts by disconnecting a ‘‘small’’ number of nodes or links (Sarnak, 
2004; Gkantsidis et al., 2006). These nodes or links, which make the function of 
bridges between these parts, are known as bottlenecks. Consequently, a ‘‘Good 





Wu et al. (2007, p. 2665) state their scope as "... the World Wide Web [2], 
metabolic networks [3], electric power grids [4] and many others”. This paper quotes 
(p. 2665) Albert et al. (2000) as the seminal work on network classification, and the 
paper is built around the issue of whether the "attacker" has enough information to 
"target" the most vulnerable nodes and hence the issue of whether, when 
progressively removing nodes and observing network performance the least, most or 
intermediate important nodes are removed first. Dekker and Colbert (2004) note, as 
have other researchers that scale-free networks are resistant to random attacks, but 
not to targeted attacks, and that some infrastructure networks, e.g. telecom networks, 
are not "scale-free". Gheorghe and Vamanu (2004) state in the abstract of their paper 
that:  
"Quantitative Vulnerability Assessment (QVA) oriented standpoint. Complexity 
induced vulnerability continues a line of work initiated under the joint Alliance for 
Global Sustainability (AGS)-ETHZ project VAMCIS (Vulnerability Assessment and 
Management of Critical Infrastructures)”. 
This work is aimed at critical infrastructures, and these researchers equate 
complex systems with graphical representations in which nodes (knots) represent 
components or people etc. and links (edges) represent interactions. The researchers 
describe (p. 78) "Connectivity as penetrability" and state (p. 79) "... higher connectivity 
rhymes with a higher vulnerability”. The paper states (p. 79) that "... the higher the 
vulnerability relevance of the knots involved in the exchange path of any knot of origin, 
including the relevance of the knot of origin itself, the higher the vulnerability induced 
in the overall system by the respective knot of origin. Assumption 3: the higher the 
cumulated vulnerability relevance of the system’s knots, the higher the system 
vulnerability itself”. The paper places a large reliance on DOMINO (decision support 
system software). The conclusions are not supported by any data, and this paper 
seems to primarily demonstrate the capabilities of the decision support software. No 
specific infrastructure is examined, and no specific conclusions are proposed or 
supported. Holme et al. (2002) present a purely theoretical approach, similar to many 
others, considering graph theory properties and effects upon vulnerability. Edge and 
node attacks are investigated, and the paper states (p. 056109-12) that  
"None of the network models shows a behavior very similar to the real-world networks: 





free degree distribution…fails to describe successfully the scientific collaboration 
network”.  
Agarwal et al. (2001, p. 142) state that  
"The objective of this paper is to present the basis of this new general theory of 
vulnerability which is applicable to all systems that can be represented as a graph 
e.g., traffic networks, pipe flows, electrical circuits etc.”  
They develop (p. 147- 148) an approach that they term "clustering", which they 
claim to be a process by which the structural vulnerability concepts can be embodied 
into a graphical representation. Albert et al. (2000) have published a seminal work on 
scale-free networks, concluding that "... we demonstrate that error tolerance is not 
shared by all redundant systems: it is displayed only by a class of inhomogeneously 
wired networks, called scale-free networks”. Tu (2000) has one single aim, i.e. 
establishing that the internet is, in fact, a "scale-free" network. Misra et al. (2010, p. 
560) state that  
"When high dimensional systems perform critical tasks, the task is shared by and 
dynamically allocated among the components. The ability to distribute function 
dynamically enables robust and self-stabilizing function in a highly variable 
environment, but breaks down when collective loads are excessive”.  
These researchers’ conclusion (p. 560) is that  
"We have developed a neuromorphic information processing pipeline that can 
characterize the vulnerability of complex systems. The process consists of extracting 
a dynamic measure of network activity and … succeeded in identifying extreme events 
that are distinct from high demand but otherwise effective system activity”.  
This conclusion uses the term vulnerability, but the approach and measure is more 
closely related to other authors’ description of resilience. 
The specific aspects of graph theory that affect its potential applicability to this 
research can be enumerated as follows. 
(a) The “nature” of the edges is assumed to be identical – hence a graphical 
representation of a transport system assumes that all edges are “roads” and 
the representation of a water supply system assumes that all edges are pipes 
carrying water. It is proposed that such systems be characterised as 
“homogeneous”. 
(b) Many authors note that, for large networks, complete solutions are 





et al. (2011), not only acknowledge this issue but also propose approaches to 
make the problems more computationally tractable. These particular authors 
map a real network on to a “fictitious” network with hierarchical clusters – but 
they retain the same simplistic definitions of the underlying network, which is 
a road network, in which the probability of link failure is linearly proportional to 
the length of the road. 
(c) “Nodes” or vertices are likewise assumed to have no function other than to 
aggregate, accept, redistribute or dispense whatever flows along the edges.  
(d) The topology of the network is considered to be fixed; this presupposes that it 
is not possible for an operator to re-route edges in response to a “harm”. 
(e) Whereas significant numbers of publications, such as Gómez et al. (2011), 
use real-world network data as test data, many authors acknowledge that the 
accuracy of the representation is problematic – specifically that there are 
factors affecting actual network performance that are not captured by the 
graph theory representation. Yazdani et al. (2011, p. 1581) state that  
"However, it should be borne in mind that purely topological measurements 
may only partially describe the network structure and fail to entirely 
characterize its properties … oversimplification of water distribution systems 
into abstract graph models is extremely useful but far from sufficient”. 
(f) Chopade and Bikdash (2011) consider the use of graph theory metrics for 
SCADA systems. The paper does not actually produce an approach or a 
metric that addresses interconnectedness ‒ it basically applies graph theory 
to each of two networks individually, and generates graph theory results for 
each. The conclusion states: 
"In this paper we used graph-theoretic vulnerability analysis to study the 
performance of networks … affected by the removal of vertices and edges … 
analyzed the effects of vulnerability on the structure of the networks. The 
major drawback with the generic graph analysis is that the performance 
measures are not related to the practical decision-situation … careful to note 
that the analysis of error and attack tolerance is perhaps too imprecise to 
enable a realistic study”.  
(g) The definitions of nodes and edges are not necessarily simple: Guan et al. 
(2011) note an approach for SCADA systems using a directed graphical 





edges represent expected time-to-compromise for different attacker skill 
levels. These authors also develop (using a set theory approach) a 
“reachability set”. Mishkovski et al. (2011) make a very important distinction 
within the application of graph theory to networks by distinguishing between 
an approach that considers the capability of individual paths, and thus 
distinguishes between a case where an edge failure causes flow to be 
redistributed, and an approach where a failure actually causes a cascading 
failure because of a sequential overload of paths.  
2.6.6 Hierarchical systems 
Several authors consider treating systems as fundamentally hierarchical (tree) 
structures. In particular, Eusgeld et al. (2011) state that there is no universally 
accepted definition of the term ‘‘system-of-systems’’ but consider that this phrase 
should be applied to distributed and possibly independently operating systems that 
evolve with time. These authors consider the topic of interdependencies between 
critical infrastructures and reference the work of Rinaldi et al. (2001). These 
researchers assert that the high level architecture (HLA) approach with an underlying 
agent based modelling (ABM) approach is the best approach for modelling the 
interactions between the SCADA system and the power generation system under 
consideration. The model allows them to evaluate a small number of specific types of 
“hazard”, and to detect some unrecognised vulnerabilities. This paper presents 
preliminary conclusions: the researchers acknowledge that their model is still under 
development, that their results are preliminary and that their model is highly targeted 
at a specific case. The paper demonstrates that detailed modelling of a specific 
system can uncover vulnerabilities, but the authors acknowledge that such a detailed 
modelling approach cannot necessarily be extended to every case in which systems 
interact.  
2.6.7 Cellular automata and agent-based systems 
Zio et al. (2007, p. 196) note that "The network security with respect to the 
hazard is evaluated by combining the modeling and computational powers of Cellular 
Automata (CA) [2] and Monte Carlo (MC) simulation [3]”. The authors identify (p. 197) 





"CA are mathematical models of dynamic systems. The dynamics of CA unfolds at 
discrete time steps on a discrete lattice of cells L, typically assumed homogeneous 
(all cells bear the same properties) [2]”. 
This appears to be useful for the specific cases investigated ‒ which are 
limited to homogeneous networks, in which finite delays to "infection" are caused by 
the network "edges". However, the usefulness is limited by the inherent "OR" 
assumption, i.e. that a node passes "infection" to all connected nodes, as soon as it 
is "infected" by any one of its connected nodes.  
Oliva et al. (2010, p. 76) state that  
"Infrastructures such as energy grids, transportation networks and 
telecommunications systems are critical to the welfare, economy and security of every 
developed country …" The paper acknowledges the difficulty of adequate modelling. 
The paper quotes Agent Based Modelling and Simulation (ABMS). In the discussion, 
(p. 80), the authors state that "Although the IIM framework is compact, elegant and 
capable of modeling cascading effects, the high level of abstraction does not support 
accurate analyses of the real nature of dependencies”. 
2.6.8 Other approaches and theories 
A number of other theories and approaches are reported. The following 
approaches have been applied to fields similar to that of this thesis, and so are 
examined. 
Normal accident theory: Perrow (1984) has proposed the phrase "normal 
accidents", and has asserted that it is only necessary for a system to be complex, 
tightly coupled and capable of generating a large harm in order for such a harm to 
become inevitable. He proposes that individual errors and faults are inevitable and 
that, sooner or later, a particular error will cascade within a tightly coupled system to 
generate a catastrophe. Perrow (1984) basically asserts the initial premise for this 
thesis but, where he simply asserts inevitability, this thesis characterises and 
quantifies the exposure of a technological system and thereby illustrates how the 
imputed vulnerability can be effectively reduced.  
Chaos theory: “Chaos theory” considers systems in which minor variations to 
input conditions may cause very large changes to outputs. Examples include weather 
patterns and vertical pendulums. The theory is commonly associated with the 





triggers a cascade of effects leading to the downfall of a remote kingdom. The original 
work in this field was by Lorenz (1963). Catastrophe theory has similarities to chaos 
theory, dealing with the behaviour of systems that exhibit sudden changes in 
behaviour, e.g. because of structural failure. As the current work concentrates on 
characterising the relative vulnerability of technological systems to well-defined 
changes of behaviour, these fields appear to have limited application to this work.  
Complexity theory: Complexity theory has similarities to chaos theory, and 
was historically derived from systems theory thinking, is primarily applied to 
organisations and deals with systems of highly adaptive components. As such, it is of 
limited application to the topic of this work. Exemplar publications include that by 
Manfred (2010).  
“Truck hit factor”: This measure, which has been given a number of names, 
including “bus/truck factor” and “bus factor”, has been used in the software 
development field to measure the number of software development team members 
who could become unexpectedly unavailable, without jeopardising a project. Although 
the context is a homogeneous system comprising only individual team members, the 
metric assumes that any team member can take the role of any other team member 
and so the factor is slightly different from the graph theory factor, which established 
that a number of broken links were required to isolate system input from system 
output. 
Cognitive mapping: Murungweni et al. (2011) propose the use of “fuzzy 
cognitive mapping” and apply it to the rural livelihoods and work in the Great Limpopo 
Transfrontier Conservation area, which is in South Africa. Their objective is to assess 
the vulnerability of the population to the various hazards faced. This is a qualitative 
approach, in which stakeholders and focus groups define a set of state variables and 
then the interactions, represented by directed and weighted arrows, between these 
state variables. The effects of a small number of scenarios, e.g. drought, are also 
represented by weighted directed arrows that are linked to relevant state variables. 
The authors effectively consider that, if an arrow carries a heavy weighting (focus 
group derived), then the target is highly vulnerable to the “source” of the arrow, which 
they assume is the hazard. Akgun et al. (2010, p. 3561) state that “Vulnerability can 
be defined as a ‘‘weakness in the system defended” in a most common and simplest 





"Vulnerability assessment problem can be recognized as a group decision-making 
(GDM) problem under multiple criteria. Therefore, there is a value in considering fuzzy 
set theory and GDM methods for critical facility vulnerability assessment …”  
This is an example of an accumulated scoring approach, in which a single 
assessment is achieved by using a scoring system for disparate elements, and then 
the “scores” (initial vulnerability values) are aggregated numerically. Newton et al. 
(2006) use a Bayesian belief network to predict the impacts of commercialising non-
timber forest products on livelihoods. Murungweni et al. (2011) state that  
“… BBNs and FCMs have the ability to combine quantitative and quantitative 
information and have some similarity in the way they use a transparent, graphical 
representation of the functioning of the system, which can supplement existing, less 
transparent frameworks that analyse vulnerability (e.g., Fraser 2007, Ericksen 2008)”. 
2.7 A taxonomy of published techniques 
Several orthogonal dimensions can be identified within these analysis 
approaches, and will help the classification of the techniques described above. These 
are proposed as follows. 
Title Classification feature 
Time-frame It is possible to consider techniques whose applicability is limited 
to the short term, e.g. supply chain disruptions, to the medium 




Techniques can be classified according to whether they are 
relevant to a localised geographical area (managing the effects of 
natural disasters is a large field of study), or whether they have 




Techniques can be classified according to whether they deal with 
a single, homogeneous “service” flowing in a network or diverse 
“services” or “flows”, or whether the technique envisages the 
creation of intermediate product streams. A system that considers 
a single product or service can be characterised as 
“homogeneous” and, in contrast, a technological system that 
involves a range of goods and services can be characterised as 
“heterogeneous” or “inhomogeneous”. 
Accuracy of 
definition 
A technique can be characterised by the accuracy of the definition 







A technique can be classified by the approach used for the 
identification and classification of harms and hazards, and 
specifically by noting whether hazards are identified by 
brainstorming approaches, or by some analytical approach. 
Result type A technique can be characterised according to whether it 
develops quantitative, semi-quantitative or qualitative results – 
and whether the results can be used to test whether a proposed 
change offers any, or a defined level of, improvement in 
vulnerability. 
Input data A technique can be characterised according to whether the 
analysis is based on real data or on an expert opinion of 
probabilities. 
Table 3: Classification of published techniques 
 
 
Table 4 lists the common techniques presented in the literature, and compares 

















































































































































































Risk analysis I N N I B B EC N C S 
Risk + Vulnerability I N N I B B EC N C S 
System vulnerability I N ?? I D B EC N C S 
Resilience I N Y D D B D N Q D 
Accumulated scoring vulnerability I N N I B B EC N C S 
Network model H Y N S D B B Y Q S 
AB modelling I Y Y S D D D N C S 
FMEA or FTA I Y Y I D D B N C S 










System type I for heterogeneous system, H for homogeneous system 
System configuration N for not explicitly defined, D for defined 
System state defined N for not defined, D for defined in detail, B for general system state (e.g. 
bulk loading) defined 
Time-frame identified N for not defined, I for implicitly identified as “life of project”, D for defined, 
S for snapshot (i.e. instantaneous) 
Harm identification method B for brainstormed value, D for derived value 
Hazard identification method B for brainstormed, D for derived from configuration 
Hazard characterisation B for Boolean, with assumption that it is above tolerable limit, D for defined 
quantitatively, EC for expert classification, P for predefined, D for derived 
Output type Q for quantitative, C for categorised 
Evaluation of system response S for static, D for dynamic (time-domain response) 
Table 4: Taxonomy of techniques related to risk and vulnerability 
2.8 Conclusions from review of published material 
2.8.1 Summary of published material 
Several key points, relevant to the clarification of the field of research, can 
then be distilled from the survey of publications. 
(a) The resilience-related techniques generate time-domain responses from a 
specific system rather than considering what “breaks” the system. 
(b) The risk and accumulated scoring-related techniques do not explicitly 
characterise the underlying technological system. 
(c) There is widespread recognition that complex and interconnected systems 
tend to generate vulnerabilities. 
(d) The literature also clearly, and perhaps obviously, identifies that a hazard 
exists only if it is linked to a “weakness”. 
(e) The graph theory approaches are relevant to homogeneous systems only. 
(f) The FMEA and similar approaches are relevant but need adaptation to 
characterise the underlying system. 
(g) No quantitative measure of exposure (which is colloquially associated with 






2.8.2 Analysis of gaps in the literature 
Published studies have considered a number of systems, including water 
distribution systems, power distribution systems, communications systems and a 
range of supply chains. The effects of a failure upon an individual end-user are 
considered to be significantly different from the effects of a failure upon a system 
operator and there is a need for an examination that focuses on an individual end-
user. Published studies that develop quantitative measures other than expert-
assigned scores have related to homogeneous systems, i.e. systems in which a single 
type of goods or services is transported. The definition of scope established in the 
introduction has been clarified to focus upon the end-user’s dependence on complex 
heterogeneous technological systems. The literature includes many approaches to 
the assessment of vulnerability. Most published assessments relate to systems, and 
it can be noted that the focus on individual end-users allows a clearer definition of the 
fail criteria for the technological system to be evaluated. Published studies have 
revealed techniques that provide quantitative analyses of homogeneous systems but 
not practical quantitative measures that can be applied to heterogeneous systems, 
despite the observation that most technological systems supplying goods or services 
to individuals are in fact heterogeneous. Analyses of heterogeneous systems have 
generally not considered the specific configuration and the numbers of weaknesses 
in a system, despite a widespread awareness that systems with more weaknesses 
result in a user who is more vulnerable to that system. Many reviewed publications 
have relied on expert opinions of the level of risk, yet have not addressed the case 
where hazards are intelligently guided and whose occurrence is not random. Dynamic 
studies of complex heterogeneous systems could be made for defined initial states, if 
complete response functions for all components were available. Although certainly of 
interest, published material has concluded that techniques to allow adequately 
complete studies of this type are impractical because of the lack of availability of input 
information and computational effort. Whereas high levels of vulnerability are 
intuitively and generally attributed to long supply chains and complex systems with 






2.8.3 Summary; development of research question 
In summary, an opportunity has been identified for the development of an 
approach that will evaluate the vulnerability, incurred by a typical end-user, to a 
heterogeneous technological system that supplies goods or services. The research 
question originates from the observation that the identified group of end-users is 
dependent for its continued mode of life upon the supply of goods and services that 
are in turn dependent upon long chains of processes and intermediate products. 
These long chains will probably expose the end-users to a deficit of security in the 
continuation of their lifestyle. The configuration of these chains, and their length, 
clearly contribute to the end-user's vulnerability, yet the effect of the length and the 
configuration of these technological chains has not been adequately explored. The 
research question proposes to explore this issue and to derive conclusions regarding 
the exposure of present technological systems, and conclusions regarding means of 
decreasing end-user vulnerability.  
Chapters 1 and 2 have, by an iterative process, clarified the field of research 
and reviewed the current state of knowledge in that field. These chapters have also 
clarified a specific topic that is not adequately addressed in the literature, and have 
demonstrated that a contribution to this topic would be of significant interest.  
2.8.4 Research question 
Deriving from this process, the research question is established as: 
For goods or services delivered to end-users, what measure of vulnerability 
can be attributed to the technological systems that are currently used, and 
what reductions can be obtained by changes to the technological approach or 
configuration?  
This research question can be considered in two parts, identified as RQ(a) 
and RQ(b). 
RQ(a): For goods or services delivered to end-users, what measure of 
vulnerability can be attributed to the technological systems that are 
currently used?  
RQ(b): For goods or services delivered to end-users, what reductions of 
vulnerability can be obtained by changes to the technological approach 










3. METHODOLOGY  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter develops a methodology for answering the research questions, 
and for generating the contribution to the topic. The requirement for a quantitative 
assessment of the vulnerability presented by a technological system makes it 
essential to specify a method that has an established theoretical basis, to generate a 
measure of vulnerability. The investigation of contributions of technological systems 
to end-user vulnerability requires applied research in order to carry out an exploratory, 
formulative and descriptive analysis of the topic. By applying a quantitative measure 
of vulnerability, the research will gain familiarity with the extent of current 
vulnerabilities and will develop new insights into approaches for reducing these 
vulnerabilities.  
3.2 Research phases 
The methodology establishes five phases for the research. These are 
described below.  
Phase 1 develops and justifies a theoretical basis for the analysis of the 
exposure of an arbitrary technological system; a method of application of the 
theoretical basis is also generated. The development of this theoretical basis 
is a contribution to the research field. 
Phase 2 describes how the selected goods or services, which are to be the 
subject of the initial analysis, are selected. Phase 2 also describes how data 
required to analyse these technological systems is to be obtained, validated 
and described. 
Phase 3 describes the analysis (using the method established in phase 1) of 
the data obtained as a result of phase 2. Numerically, this analysis 
demonstrates the relative vulnerability of the end-user to the technological 
systems used to supply each of the selected goods or services. The outcomes 
of this phase provide the answer to Research Question (a) (RQ(a)). The 
outcomes from this analysis form the basic data required as input to the next 
phase of the research, and are likely to be as significant as the numerical 





Phase 4 uses the outputs of phase 3 and the data generated within phase 2. 
From these two inputs, this phase of the research generates a set of 
hypothesises changes, each representing a specific change to the 
technological system identified and described in phase 2 of the research. 
These allow the hypothetical approaches to a reduction in end-user 
vulnerability to be tested. 
Phase 5 of the research again applies the methods generated in phase 1 to 
the hypothesised modifications to original technological systems, developed 
in phase 4 of the research. The outcomes of this analysis test the hypotheses 
developed in phase 3 of the research, and allow answers to Research 
Question (b) (RQ(b)) to be developed.  
These research phases are illustrated in Figure 2. 
3.3 Phase 1: development of theoretical basis  
A metric is required to answer the research question, and a theoretical basis 
for such a metric must be developed and justified. This section builds upon existing 
techniques and theoretical bases, and on an analysis of issues not covered in the 
literature, to develop a metric, and a theoretical basis for that metric, that can answer 
the research question. 
3.3.1 Theoretical basis 
This section covers the definitions needed as the basis of any formulation of 
a theoretical basis, and the criteria for a theoretical basis in terms of both defensible 
theory and capability to answer the research question. In order to develop a 
theoretical basis for "exposure", which measures the technological contribution to 







Figure 2: Research phases. 
3.3.2 Criteria for theory  
The research field, as defined by the research question, specifies the 
evaluation of the technological contribution to end-user vulnerability. The research 
question implicitly includes several criteria for an acceptable theoretical basis.  
(a) As the "technological system" (as distinct from the final-goods-distribution 
system) must create and supply goods to the end-user, a heterogeneous 
system is described, i.e. a system having processing steps and intermediate 
goods or service streams. A theoretical basis for assessing the contribution of 
the technological system to end-user vulnerability must allow evaluation of the 
contribution of heterogeneous systems. 
(b) The study must be indexed to the security of the end-user, as opposed to 





(c) A nominated service level must be specified, to describe and quantify the 
specified goods or services to be delivered to the end-user. 
(d) A quantifiable metric must be generated, and this metric must be 
demonstrated to provide a measure of the contribution of the technological 
system to the user’s "vulnerability". 
Since the research questions seeks to “measure of vulnerability can be 
attributed to the technological systems”, the quantifiable measure must be based 
upon, i.e. derived from, the configuration and components of the technological system 
alone, with no necessity for direct consideration of the probabilities of hazard 
occurrence or the instantaneous states of the technological system, or the 
correlations between hazard frequency and component state.  
 
Term Definition 
End-user The proposed approach is defined in terms of a single, representative 
urban-dwelling end-user. It is proposed to simply note the number of 
end-users likely to be represented for each example study.  
Service level to 
end-user 
For any case, it is necessary to define a service level for the goods or 
services supplied to an end-user. This will allow a Boolean evaluation 
of whether the service level is, or is not, available. Separate analyses 
can be considered for differing service levels if required. 
Technological 
system 
Defined as a heterogeneous system involving creation and 
transmission of intermediate products and delivers goods or services 







A technological system has been defined to include processes and 
intermediate streams that may include partially complete goods or 
services, essential information etc. As a service level for the delivery of 
the final goods or services is defined, the delivery of these can be 
defined using a Boolean value (True/False). The level of intermediate 
services can then also be defined, as Boolean variables, according to 
its effect on the service-level delivery of the final goods or services. 
Time-frame for 
consideration 
Timeframes for consideration are:  
• Operational time-frame, in which the technological system is 
dependent only upon inputs in order to function. 
• Maintenance time-frame, in which minor spare parts and additional 
skills are required in order to return the system to operational mode.  
• Replacement time-frame, in which major sections of the 
technological system must be replaced.  
These are proposed because they have well-defined differences in 
technological requirement and hence significant differences in the 
exposures calculated for each. Maintenance and replacement 
scenarios include durations in which equipment can be acquired or 
(re)created. 





3.3.3 Validation of theoretical basis  
The theoretical basis proposed for the calculation of exposure is presented, 
and, provided that the inputs are adequately defined as Boolean values, the proposed 
theoretical basis allows calculation of exposure in terms of a Boolean algebra that is 
provable in terms of formal logic. As proposed by Davis et al. (2007), the question of 
whether the proposed approach will generate novel or more useful insights into a 
phenomenon can be tested. Two complementary approaches are proposed. Firstly, 
classical risk analysis can be applied to one of the examples selected for analysis as 
part of this research; the comparison of outputs will illustrate whether additional 
insights are generated by the proposed approach. Secondly, in the development of 
the theoretical basis for the "exposure” concept, it was noted that homogeneous 
systems can be considered as a subset of all possible heterogeneous technological 
systems. It is therefore possible in principle to either take a homogeneous system that 
has been analysed in a publication related to homogeneous systems, or to generate 
an exemplar homogeneous system and analyse this using both the exposure 
approach and one or more of the graph theory metrics that are commonly applied to 
homogeneous systems. It would also be possible to use a process of formal logic to 
show that the proposed exposure metric would generate outputs of equal significance 
to the homogeneous system analysis approaches noted in the literature.  
3.3.4 Implementation of analysis 
The approach used to answer the research question represents each 
technological system using a Boolean algebraic expression, and evaluates that 
expression in a truth table, for combinations of inputs. Evaluation of that expression 
requires that the inputs to each truth table line item be represented, and that the 
Boolean expression generating the output from each table be calculated. Almost all 
computer languages contain provision for Boolean operations and for the construction 
of complex expressions by nesting these. It can be noted that software Expert system 
shells are effectively no more than constructs of interlinked IF‒THEN‒ELSE rules 
applied to named variables. As spreadsheets, and indeed almost all computer 
languages, include the capability to represent Boolean expressions, the criterion for 
the selection of an implementation approach gives prominence to the simplicity and 





spreadsheet approach to the construction of truth tables for each example studied, 
and it is noted that other approaches could generate identical outputs.  
3.4 Phase 2: development of initial data sets  
The research question relates to technological systems that deliver selected 
goods and services to end-users. Phase 2 of the research has generate the data 
relating to technological systems for delivering selected goods or services to end-
users. The task has two distinct sub-tasks: making the selection of the goods or 
services to be analysed, and acquiring and verifying the data for initial analysis. 
3.4.1 Selection of examples for analysis  
The research question indicates that the required data for analysis will relate 
to selected goods or services without further definition, and to end-users ‒ also 
without further definition. The analysis then requires the selection of goods or 
services, and a definition of the end-user. Earlier sections of the thesis have included 
background and scoping statements that provide context for this work, and hence can 
guide the definitions and selections made within this task. Specifically, an earlier 
section of the thesis has noted that urban-dwelling individuals requiring essential 
goods and services are increasingly vulnerable to failures of complex, interlinked and 
heterogeneous technological systems. Current risk analysis techniques do not 
quantify the impact of existing configurations, or proposed reconfigurations, of a 
technological system from an end-user perspective. There is a need for a means of 
comparing the vulnerabilities imposed on such end-users by technological systems, 
and of evaluating the changes proposed to reduce end-user vulnerability. As analysis 
is to be applied to a selection of goods or services, example studies involving selected 
goods or services are implied. Under the heading of "When to Use a Case Study 
Approach", Baxter and Jack (2008) consider that a case study approach should be 
used when the objective is to answer questions of how and why observed outcomes 
occur and when it is important to consider the contextual conditions of the studied 
case. 
End-user. In selecting case studies, Eisenhardt (1989) notes that the 
essential first step is defining the "population" from which the case studies will be 





cases... the concept of a population is crucial, because the population defines the set 
of entities from which the research sample is to be drawn". For this study, the 
"population” is the complete set of end-user needs. The research question neither 
refines the population by stipulating typical nor refines any other particular descriptor 
for the end-user; however, the introduction to this thesis references urban individuals 
and cites apartment dwellers as an example. This effectively narrows the scope of the 
"population". Although the research question does not include any finer definition, 
considerations include the scope of persons who could possibly fit within the 
definition, the homogeneity or otherwise of the group and various practical issues. 
Practical considerations would suggest that data would be indexed against users in 
significant Australian or New Zealand cities. This practical consideration would need 
to be challenged if it were considered that such cities were sufficiently atypical, in 
terms of the technological systems used to supply similar end-user needs, as to 
negate their use as an indexation basis. Australian and New Zealand cities are 
considered to be reasonably typical of cities of similar size in the developed world, in 
terms of technological approaches to supplying end-user needs, and hence are used 
as a basis for the indexation of data. It is therefore proposed to define the "end-user" 
as an individual who fulfils the following criteria. 
(a) Lives in an apartment, and hence has limited practical capability for farming 
or for large-area solar collectors.  
(b) Lives close to the centre of a city of more than about 200,000 individuals. 
(c) Lives in Australia or New Zealand. 
(d) Is employed, i.e. is assumed not to be severely financially constrained. 
(e) Commutes more than 10 km to work, which is considered to be beyond the 
range of cycling or walking, for the majority of persons.  
The selected group may be assumed to have built their lifestyle around a set 
of assumptions regarding the availability of certain goods and services; other groups 
have found alternative approaches to the disposal of sewage, the acquisition of fresh 
foods etc. However, for the selected group, it is not practical to transition to such 
alternative approaches in the time-frame that would be required, and hence the 
continued supply of services in substantially the current manner can be claimed to be 





 Selected goods or services. The research question identifies supplied 
goods or services. A large range of goods and services exists. Several approaches 
could be proposed for the selection. It would be possible to use a hierarchy of needs, 
e.g. that proposed by Maslow (1943), and to make an arbitrary selection from each of 
the tiers of needs identified. It would also be possible to use a hierarchy of needs, e.g. 
that proposed by Maslow (1943), and to select, from one tier, all or most of the items 
that apply to the defined end-user. For example, if criteria for physical survival were 
selected, food, water and warmth needs would be identified. Yet another option would 
be to identify needs that are typical of some broad categories of indicative 
technological system that are involved in their production and delivery. 
The analysis of the research opportunity has not specifically hypothesised that 
the current technological systems used to supply needs that are more essential to the 
target group were exposed to greater vulnerability than the current technological 
systems used to supply less essential needs; the analysis also has not hypothesised 
that the exposure of the technological systems and the resultant user vulnerability 
were correlated with the level of need. For this reason, approaches (a) and (b) are not 
proposed. The analysis of the research opportunity developed a hypothesis that some 
types of goods or services were currently more vulnerable than others, and 
additionally hypothesised that there were features of many current technological 
systems that represented particularly high vulnerability. Provision for testing these 
hypotheses suggests the need to identify broad categories of goods or services 
having somewhat similar technological approaches within categories, but the greatest 
breadth across categories. This reasoning suggests that a theoretical approach rather 
than a random sampling approach should be adopted for the selection of the goods 
or services to be studied. Eisenhardt (1989, p. 537) explains that, in such an 
approach, cases "... chosen to fill theoretical categories and provide examples of polar 
types... random selection is neither necessary nor even preferable”.  
Table 6 sets out several categories of goods or services from which case 
studies could be selected. A larger “population” of candidate goods and services could 
be developed, but the items listed in Table 6 are considered to be both significant and 
representative of a range of technological sophistication levels and end-user need-





the level of need of the service, and the technological level of the current means of 
providing the service.  
























Assume mains voltage (i.e. within 
acceptable voltage range) 
4 Petrol High Med Petrol delivered at local petrol 
station  
5 Personal travel 
(few tens of km) 






Low High Generally implying air travel 
7 Simple message Med High A message to another individual 
8 
 
Personal or work 
information 
Low High Capability to store and retrieve, 
view, edit and share personal 
information – family records, 
important writings, music, business 









Case where required response to a 
medical situation is simple, but 
diagnosis and communication of 
correct action is essential. Choking, 










Implying short-shelf-life food 
requiring limited cold chain needed 











Implying short-shelf-life food 
requiring sophisticated cold chain 
distribution system and post-
harvest treatment needed for 











No cold chain required. Limited 
packaging required for transport. 











Sophisticated packaging and 
distribution chain required, possibly 
with bulk and retail packaging 
separated and storage of seasonal 























Vaccination for disease outbreak – 
requires cold chain distribution of 
vaccine 
1 Basic medicine High High Antibiotic, pain relief, dental care, 
blood transfusion 
1 Education for 
children  
 
High Low Subset of receiving and accessing 
non-stored information or of 
exchanging structured information 
1 Basic detergent  Med Med In the form of either soap or 
equivalent (personal, clothes and 
cooking utensil washing) 
1 Gas Med High Capability to cook food 
Table 6: Identification and selection of examples for study 
In order to generate the most broadly applicable answers to the research 
question, the examples selected should be representative of a range of products or 
services and typical of some broad categories of technological system required. 
These need to be representative and unbiased. The highlighted items from the above 
table represent both systems that are primarily long-life infrastructural systems 
(sewage), systems involving primarily the exchange of information, systems requiring 
planned and ad-hoc specialised production and delivery systems, and systems 
requiring essential commodities (e.g. fuel) and are therefore selected for study. As 
there is a need for comparison between systems and as it is not practically possible 
to select more than a moderate number for study, the above is considered to be a “fit-
for-purpose” approach to the selection of examples for analysis.  
3.4.2 Definition of examples  
A methodology for defining the scope of the selected initial example studies, 
and for obtaining the raw data for each, is required. This requires a decision on the 
type of study to be undertaken. 
Type of data required. Having selected examples of goods or services for 
study, a methodology for acquiring the data for initial analysis is required. It would be 
possible to identify a particular end-user, i.e. a specific individual, and a small number 
of clearly identified goods or services acquired on specific dates. The technological 
system that supplied those defined items could then be identified and would comprise 





"The case study is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident”. 
Yin (1984) develops a similar definition, i.e. that case studies are rich, empirical 
descriptions of particular instances of a phenomenon. A diametrically opposite 
approach would be to simply hypothesise example cases for the purpose of testing a 
proposed analysis method. Approaches similar to this are taken by some authors, e.g. 
Shen et al. (2011) in the investigation of theoretical aspects of networks. In 
considering the approach to be used, it is useful to review the process leading to the 
definition of the research topic. It was hypothesised that there were common factors 
spanning technological systems, which contributed to the vulnerability of a wide 
spectrum of end-users; this hypothesis needs to be tested. The research question 
additionally proposes a requirement to explore, quantitatively, the effects of 
hypothetical changes to technological systems. The "case study" approach, requiring 
a detailed description of a very specific example, therefore seems likely to fail to draw 
out the generality of conclusions indicated as required by the research question, and 
"constructed" examples will not offer the level of credibility required in order to answer 
the research question.  
It is therefore proposed that, instead of analysing case studies, experimental 
data from a range of primary and secondary sources will be used to develop typical 
data that are demonstrably representative of the technological systems delivering the 
selected goods or services. For example, rather than examining the specific steps 
that conclude with a specific cabbage arriving on a particular individual's dinner plate, 
the steps relevant to a small range of fresh green vegetables, to a person assumed 
to live in a representative inner city area, will be examined and a dataset that is 
representative of the technological system currently used to deliver perishable, locally 
produced foodstuffs to an end-user in an apartment building will be assembled. This 
approach effectively defines “simulation modelling”, generally following the 
description used by Davis et al. (2007), who defined simulation as "… a method for 
using computer software to model the operation of real-world processes, systems, or 
events (Law & Kelton, 1991)”.  
Format of data required. The data for evaluation will then consist of 





communication paths, raw materials and finished goods or services of the complete 
technological system required to deliver specified goods or services to end-users. 
These descriptions must be such that input parameters to the quantitative analysis 
method can be generated from the descriptions. 
Methodology for acquisition of data. A definition of a representative "end-
user" has previously been developed, and a small number of goods or services have 
been selected for evaluation. A description of the technological system, demonstrated 
to be representative of real-world cases, is required for each example studied. This 
section considers methodological options for acquiring the required data for each 
goods or service example to be analysed. The methodological options for acquiring 
the required data, for each example of goods or services to be analysed, include a 
survey approach, a multi-case study approach and a hybrid of these approaches. It is 
quite possible to use either informal case study data or indeed surveyed data as a 
means of ensuring that a simulation is an adequate representation of the "real world". 
Each of the candidate methodologies for data acquisition has specific characteristics; 
the positive and negative contributions towards answering the research question must 
be considered in selecting the methodology to be applied.  
A hybrid approach is proposed, in which a "construct" dataset is developed for 
each selected goods or service example using background knowledge and publicly 
available information, and specific items of each such dataset are tested by limited 
survey of actual examples of the technological systems used for the particular goods 
or services. This approach is practical, and since the data is representative of real 
systems, its analysis can reasonably be claimed to generate useful and demonstrably 
valid answers to the research question. The proposed approach can be illustrated 
with an example: if "petrol supply at a local station" is the example of goods or 
services, background knowledge would be quite sufficient to establish that bulk 
supplies arrive via diesel-fuelled tanker and that electric pumps are used to meter and 
dispense the petrol. A relatively simple survey of retailers would confirm the 
approximate number and location of bulk supplies and the number of refineries. The 
use of selected sources of information to confirm specific aspects of example datasets 






“A hallmark of case study research is the use of multiple data sources, a strategy 
which also enhances data credibility … Potential data sources may include, but are 
not limited to: documentation, archival records, interviews, physical artefacts, direct 
observations, and participant-observation... In case study, data from these multiple 
sources are then converged in the analysis process rather than handled individually”. 
In summary, datasets for the technological systems representative of those 
used for the delivery of each of the selected goods or services, to a representative 
end-user, will be developed from background knowledge plus publicly available 
information, and selected aspects will be clarified and validated by enquiry and by 
survey of actual systems. In validation of simulation data under the heading of 
"Strategies for Achieving Trustworthiness in Case Study Research", Baxter and Jack 
(2008) consider the importance for qualitative research of providing enough detail to 
allow the reader to assess the trustworthiness of the data and hence the credibility of 
the analysis. They note that such credibility will require careful formulation of the 
question, appropriate selection of case studies and sampling methods, plus 
systematic and detailed handling of information.  
Adopting these strategies, this research will ensure that enough detail is 
provided to allow readers to assess the validity of the work, ensure that the research 
question is clearly written and use sampling strategies that will ensure that the 
simulation case studies are indeed representative of actual data and that the basis for 
this assertion is documented. 
3.5 Phase 3: analysis of examples    
3.5.1 Analysis outputs  
The analysis of the initial examples will generate measures of the absolute 
and relative "exposure" of the technological systems that are studied. The theoretical 
basis of the proposed metric is developed within Chapter 4, where the validity of the 
Boolean algebraic representation of the technological system is argued, and where 
the exposure metric is justified as a valid measure of the contribution to the end-user's 
vulnerability. The exposure metric is established as the primary, but not the only, 
analysis approach for individual example studies. Beyond the metric of exposure, the 
examples will be treated in a similar way to case studies, and the processes of theory 





of defining the components and boundaries of each exemplar technological system, 
and identifying each point of exposure, whether to single or multiple failures, is also 
an output of the investigation and allows an analysis of the specific contributors of 
various subsystems to the exposure metric.  
This quantitative plus qualitative approach will analyse the hypothesis that 
some common technological systems are more exposed than others – and provide 
insights into the specific subsystems whose exposure values contribute most to the 
vulnerability of the end-user. In addition to the analytical method developed in Chapter 
4 of this thesis, classical risk analysis of one of the examples will be carried out; this 
will demonstrate whether additional insights are generated by the evaluation of 
exposure for that example. 
3.5.2 Interpretation of analyses   
The dataset used as the basis for analysis, plus the information resulting from 
the analysis of the dataset, effectively form a "case study”, in the terms used by (e.g.) 
Eisenhardt (1989) and also Yin (1984), who describe case studies as detailed 
descriptions of particular instances of a phenomenon.  
In case study literature, the process of deriving theory and/or hypotheses from 
case studies is described by authors such as Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007), who 
note the research strategy of building theoretical constructs or propositions from 
empirical evidence described in case studies. Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) also 
note that the process of building theories from case studies is a process that is poorly 
codified. An exposure metric, as developed in this thesis, is a single compound 
integer; it is useful for ranking the relative vulnerability of technological systems and 
for quantitatively assessing alternative proposals for changes to a particular 
technological system. The research question, "For goods or services delivered to end-
users, what measure of vulnerability can be attributed to the technological systems 
that are currently used, and what reductions can be obtained by changes to the 
technological approach or configuration?", implies a process of review and a process 
for the development and testing of theories and/or hypotheses. The analysis of the 
initial examples will allow the identification of the specific processes and streams 
(components of the technological systems) that contribute to the exposure of each 





developing propositions that show generalisable principles that, in ranges of 
technological systems, cause increases in exposure, and hence in vulnerability of the 
end-user who depends upon the system. These identifications will also provide the 
foundation for the formulation of hypotheses (hypothetical theories) for a reduction in 
vulnerability. 
3.6 Phase 4: hypothesising and testing changes to examples    
3.6.1 Generating hypothetical changes 
As the generation of alternatives is dependent on the outcomes of the initial 
analysis, this is the aspect that can be least well defined in advance of the initial 
analysis work. This exploratory research process of examining the results of the initial 
dataset analyses, proposing technological alternatives and examining the effects of 
proposed changes is considered to be one of the most potentially valuable aspects of 
the research. Davis et al. (2007) note that  
“Although scholars writing about theory development (e.g., Dubin, 1976; Pfeffer, 1982; 
Priem & Butler, 2001; Sutton & Staw, 1995; Whetten, 1989) may have different 
emphases, most agree that theory has four elements: constructs, propositions that 
link those constructs together, logical arguments that explain the underlying 
theoretical rationale for the propositions, and assumptions that define the scope or 
boundary conditions of the theory. Consistent with these views, we define theory as 
consisting of constructs linked together by propositions that have an underlying, 
coherent logic and related assumptions”. 
The research question proposes examining the effect of changes to the initial 
datasets (current representative technological systems). The basis for these changes 
will be developed as an outcome of the analysis of the initial datasets, i.e. if a particular 
item is found to contribute significantly to vulnerability in more than one of the initial 
datasets, then it would seem to be reasonable to define the characteristics of the item, 
seeking common factors. The identification of common contributors to user 
vulnerability will also allow the generalisation of the approaches to a reduction in user 
vulnerability. 
This is considered to be a valid approach for answering RQ(b). Eisenhardt 
(1989) provides a tabular breakdown of the steps required to generate theories and/or 





tabulation of evidence for each construct" and “search evidence for "why" behind 
relationships…” Eisenhardt (1989, p. 539) also notes that this analysis of "within case" 
data is the "least codified part of the process". The inputs to the theory and hypothesis 
development task are the outputs of the analysis task. It must be noted that the 
analysis task is a simulation, rather than a case study, under the definitions used by 
Yin (1984) or Andrade (2009).  
Having observed common characteristics of the processes and streams, 
which would be considered to be "constructs" in the term used by Davis et al. (2007) 
that contribute to the vulnerability of the end-user across multiple examples, 
propositions for the underlying causes can be assembled and categorised. From 
these propositions, hypothetical changes can be identified for testing.   
3.6.2 Analysis of effect of hypothesised changes  
RQ(b) is a "hypothesis-testing research" type of question, requiring 
approaches appropriate for this type of question. Within this task, technological 
changes that hypothetically reduce end-user vulnerability associated with the delivery 
of a particular type of goods or service that were developed in phase 4 will be tested. 
The test approach will be identical to that used in phase 3 of the research. Effectively, 
this task will be close in nature to an "instrumental" type of case study, as defined by 
Baxter and Jack (2008), i.e. accomplishes more than just understanding a situation, 
and additionally helps to refine theory and assists in our understanding of other 
matters. Eisenhardt (1989, p. 546) states in her conclusion that "... one strength of 
theory building from cases is its likelihood of generating novel theory", which is 
considered as justification for the approach. Hypotheses will have been formed by 
detailed observation of the specific processes, streams and subsystems that 
contribute to the exposure value, by deducing common characterisations of these, 
and then formulating exposure-reducing hypotheses based on those 
characterisations. The hypotheses will be tested firstly by simply observing decreases 
in exposure values for the delivery of the same service and service level, to the end-
user, and by critically assessing whether the characterisations of exposure causes 





3.7 Phase 5: development of conclusions 
3.7.1 Answering the research question   
RQ(a) asks “For goods or services delivered to end-users, what measure of 
vulnerability can be attributed to the technological systems that are currently used?” 
RQ(b) asks "For goods or services delivered to end-users, what reductions of 
vulnerability can be obtained by changes to the technological approach or 
configuration?" The "what reductions" phrase in RQ(b) indicates a need for a 
quantitative and qualitative evaluation of the effect of each hypothesised change.  
Having tested the propositions (that are embodied in hypothetical changes), 
Chapter 8 not only will report the outcomes in terms of contributions to the vulnerability 
of the end-user, and thus supply direct answers RQ(b), but also will test the 
categorisations used to develop hypotheses and will synthesise the tested 
propositions into a small set of principles that could be described as "coherent logic", 
in the terms used by Davis et al. (2007). These, demonstrably generalisable principles 
will supply the most important contribution of the study. 
The description and the definition of technological system “exposure” are 
considered to represent a contribution to the body of knowledge. The contribution can 
be described as follows: 
(a) They expand both the concept of risk analysis, which is generally applied to a 
whole system without detailed indexation to system configuration, to take 
account of the configuration of the technological system in question. By 
insisting on a tighter definition of the system and the time-frame in question, 
more rigorous outcomes can be expected from the application of the risk 
analysis approach.  
(b) They specifically identify the importance of identifying loci of weakness in a 
technological system, without consideration of the probability of hazard. 
(c) They identify and describe the concept that, for a technological system 
supplying goods or services to an end-user, a (mis)guided hazard has a 
qualitatively different effect from a probabilistic hazard. 
(d) They allow the consideration of heterogeneous systems, which is not possible 





(e) They allow demonstration, by reference to measurement theory, that they are 
a valid measure of the contribution of the defined technological system to an 
end-user's vulnerability. 
(f) They allow the hypothesising of principles based on an analysis of initial 
examples. 
(g) They allow testing of these principles by analysing hypothetical changes to 
initial examples, showing that the principles are generalisable. 
Chapter 1 has described the significance of the field of research. Answers and 
conclusions generated in this field can therefore be assumed not only to represent a 
significant contribution to the field of study but also to offer valuable application to 
society. 
3.7.2 Development of general conclusions 
The results from the analysis of hypothesised changes to the examples will 
themselves be reviewed. From the conclusions related to the example studies, more 
general conclusions regarding the value of the approach, and the applicability of the 
generalised conclusions, as well as the conclusions related to the specific examples 
will be presented. 
3.8  Conclusion of methodology description 
The methodology includes the development of a metric to measure end-user 
vulnerability. The methodology has proposed and justified the use of exemplar 
studies, analysed quantitatively, as a means of answering the research question. 
From initial analyses, hypothesised changes and re-analysis, the methodology has 






4. DEVELOPMENT OF A THEORETICAL BASIS FOR MEASURING 
VULNERABILITY 
4.1 Introduction  
Previous chapters have established both a gap in the awareness of the 
contribution of technological systems to end-user vulnerability and a gap in the 
theoretical basis for measuring this contribution. The first phase of the research, 
defined in Section 3.3, requires the development of and justifies a theoretical basis 
for the analysis of the exposure of an arbitrary technological system and a method of 
application of the theoretical basis.  
This chapter commences by establishing the context of the measurement and 
the theoretical approach. A theoretical basis for representing an arbitrary 
technological system, and for demonstrating that the representation is a valid 
mapping from the real system, is developed and refined. Starting with the 
representation of an arbitrary technological system, a proposal is made for generating 
a measure of the contribution to vulnerability, which is the phenomenon of interest. 
That attribute is then shown to be a valid measure of the phenomenon of interest, 
described as the contribution of a technological system to end-user vulnerability. The 
accuracy, precision and scaling of the proposed measure are examined. 
4.2 Context for a theoretical basis 
The research question therefore requires the implementation and operation of 
an approach that meets the requirements for a contribution to the body of knowledge 
in the form of a valid measurement, as described by Hand (2004) and by Suppes 
(2009). In order to meet these requirements, it is necessary to represent a complex 
technological system, strictly within the identified context, which might involve a large 
number of operations and intermediate steps and partial design redundancies and 
possibly also single points-of-failure. The representation must at least be 
homomorphic in terms of the operations and streams, and preferably should be 
isomorphic in order to give assurance that the representation does not omit significant 
features of the real system. It is further necessary to identify, from that representation, 
an attribute that can be demonstrated to be a valid measure of the phenomenon of 
interest and to confirm that the metric is invariant with respect to irrelevant factors, 





correlated variables and that it has definable levels of both precision, such that 
independent researchers can obtain outputs that are numerically similar, and 
acceptable accuracy. It is also necessary to evaluate the scale factors of the metric, 
i.e. the rate of change and scope of values of the metric, and to evaluate how the 
values derived for the metric will correlate with the conclusions to be reached. 
4.2.1 End-user services 
The research question focuses on the delivery of goods or services to the end-
user, and hence a proposed metric must relate to this. Adequate definitions of a 
service level and of the specific goods or services allow a Boolean variable to define 
this delivery or non-delivery. The descriptions of goods or services and a service level 
therefore allow a clear definition of “delivery” for a particular case, but do not preclude 
a separate examination of technological vulnerability associated with various different 
service levels. 
4.2.2 End-user focus 
The contribution of the technological system to the end-user's vulnerability, in 
regard to selected goods or services, is the context of the research. The emphasis is 
on the contribution of the technological system rather than the significance of the 
particular goods or services under consideration. However, the example studies will 
be selected with a view to examining goods or services that have a range of effects 
upon, and hence significance to, end-users.  
4.2.3 Heterogeneous system description and representation  
The contribution of the technological system to vulnerability cannot be 
constrained to consideration of that portion of the technological system that is 
responsible for the final distribution of completed goods or services. It must be 
assumed that the “contribution” arises from the whole technological system, which 
includes the incremental addition of value to the goods or services, which is 
distinguished from the simple distribution of goods that is implicit in the analysis of 
supply chains and in the analyses applied to computer communication systems and 
power or water distribution systems. The analysis of the contribution of the 





technological system that is heterogeneous and must therefore consider processes, 
intermediate streams and sources of inputs.  
Researchers such as Pacheco et al. (2016) use the term heterogeneous, but 
without any definition. These researchers note (p1) that  "...Protecting and securing 
the resources and services of smart cities become  critically  important  due  to  the  
disruptive  or  even potentially life-threatening nature of a failure or attack on smart 
cities’  infrastructures...." and propose an approach to protection  based upon Moving 
Target  Defense  (MTD)  techniques for communications and data infrastructures; they 
therefore propose a much narrower interpretation of “heterogeneous” than is used in 
this work.  
4.2.4 Static and dynamic contributions 
Published definitions of “vulnerability” have been extensively examined in 
Chapter 2 of this work. Significant divergence and lack of clarity among published 
definitions have been noted. The proposed approach to improving the precision of 
these varied definitions is to use the phrase "dynamic vulnerability" to describe the 
dynamic response of a functioning system to a specified perturbation. Dynamic 
vulnerability measures, which are not analysed in this thesis, would take account of 
the instantaneous state of all system components and the magnitude of nominated 
perturbation(s), and would assume that the system will not actually fail. Metrics of 
dynamic vulnerability would measure the response of a system, starting at a defined 
status, to a defined perturbation. Dynamic vulnerability is then the inverse of 
resilience, as defined in this section. 
Once a defined level of service from a technological system is defined, a 
recursive application of that service level output will also define the nominal state of 
all streams and processes "upstream" of the final delivery of goods or services. This 
set of states, which represent nominal operating conditions for the defined service 
level, also allows a clear definition of a maximum tolerable disturbance for each 
stream and process variable, as the perturbation from the nominal state that will cause 
failure to achieve the service level output. The definition distinguishes the dynamic 
vulnerability situation from a static vulnerability measure. 
Having assigned the term “dynamic vulnerability” to describe dynamic and 





will be used to describe the contribution of vulnerability that is made to the user by the 
technological system components and configuration alone. The work of Chapter 4 has 
been to show that the proposed "exposure" metric is a valid measure of this 
vulnerability. The research questions upon which this thesis is based relate to static 
vulnerability. It is proposed that static vulnerability should be considered as a precise 
antonym of robustness, noting that robustness is commonly associated with the 
design and configuration of a technological system, rather than the margin between 
design and overload performance. 
4.3 Exposure as a theoretical measure of vulnerability 
The end-user focus and the definition of service level generate a very clear 
target for the consideration of vulnerability. The variations of the definition of 
vulnerability have been stated previously, and commonly include the concept of 
susceptible to attack, which requires a clear definition of the term "attack" and a 
definition of "susceptible". The research question seeks to quantify the contribution 
made to vulnerability by a technological system. The process of formulating this 
question specifically excludes consideration of the external events that could 
contribute to failure and also excludes consideration of the probability of any of those 
events occurring. This approach pre-supposes that, if a weakness existed, it could 
cause failure either because of random events over a long time-frame or because of 
malicious activity within a short time-frame. 
As the probability of external hazards does not affect the specific contribution to end-
user vulnerability of the technological system, any aspect of the technological system 
that is capable of causing failure makes the same contribution to vulnerability as any 
other aspect of the technological system that is capable of causing failure. Assuming 
either long time-frames or the presence of malicious activity, the contribution to 
vulnerability of the technological system can be associated with the number of modes 
of failure that are possible, and can be associated with the configuration of the 





4.4 Possible contributions to a measure from published techniques 
4.4.1 Specific contributory aspects and gaps 
Risk analysis approaches do not prescribe a description of the target 
technological system at all, and hence do not necessarily derive any measure that 
relates specifically to the technological system. The limited applicability of 
homogeneous systems has been described previously. Both resilience analysis and 
FMEA offer foundational concepts that can contribute to a metric that meets the 
requirements of this research, because both require a clear definition of the target 
technological system. An FMEA analysis commences by establishing a very clear 
definition of a technological system, which is commonly an interconnected system of 
valves, pipework, pumps and control systems, and then examines the effect of the 
failure of each component within that system. FMEA commonly assumes a Boolean 
(fail or operate) status of each input although, in some cases, fail-open, fail-closed 
and fail-fixed modes may be considered. The analysis normally examines the effect 
on the system output. FMEA analysis commonly results in a tabular representation of 
the effect of each selected component failure. FMEA is commonly carried out to 
establish whether a defined level of design redundancy (N‒1 etc.) has been achieved. 
For example, if an N‒1 design redundancy (system failure cannot be caused by the 
failure of any one component) is specified, FMEA would examine the effect of each 
individual component failure upon system output. If an N‒2 design redundancy was 
specified, i.e. system failure cannot be caused by the failure of any two components, 
then FMEA would examine the effect of each possible combination of two component 
failures upon system output. 
The research question requires assessment of the complete contribution of 
the technological system to end-user vulnerability. The FMEA analysis approach, 
which examines fail or no-fail conditions of each component without design review to 
achieve a specified design redundancy, can generate a tabulated representation of 
the single input fail criteria that cause a failure to meet the service delivery criteria. 
Therefore, if each possible failure mechanism could be evaluated as either 
operational or non-operational, and the delivery or non-delivery to the end-user is the 





similar outputs that could be represented in a tabular format showing single failure 
causes. 
4.4.2 Capabilities to be added to published approaches 
Resilience analysis generates output responses to single inputs, and so does 
not completely characterise a system whose failure may arise from combinations of 
failures. Similarly, FMEA provides a simple tabular representation of the effects of 
each component’s failure and is generally used only to demonstrate that a design 
redundancy requirement of a tightly defined system is met. The development of an 
adequate theoretical basis requires that all of the potential failure modes of a 
technological system are defined and characterised, as well as being shown to 
provide a valid measure of the attribute of interest. This is the capability to be 
contributed by the enumeration of a technological system’s exposure as a measure 
of its contribution to the end user’s vulnerability  
4.5 Development of proposed metric 
The aspects of published techniques that can be built upon to generate a 
theoretical basis that meets the requirements of the research question have been 
identified. The limitations of published techniques have been identified, and the 
capabilities that must be added have also been identified. The criteria to be met by a 
theoretical basis, in order to address the research question, have been established. 
4.5.1 Measurement theory – the criteria for a metric 
"Measurement" is itself a concept requiring careful application to any new 
analysis approach, in order to ensure the relevance of the proposed approach. 
Suppes (2009, p. 825) states that  
"A conceptual analysis of measurement can properly begin by formulating the two 
fundamental problems of any measurement procedure. The first problem is that of 
representation … we must show is that the structure of a set of phenomena under 
certain empirical operations and relations is the same as the structure of some set of 
numbers under corresponding arithmetical operations and relations. Solution of the 
representation problem for a theory of measurement does not completely lay bare the 
structure of the theory, for there is often a formal difference between the kind of 





second fundamental problem, determining the scale type … based on the proof of an 
invariance theorem for the representation”.  
Similarly, Hand (2004, p. 3) offers an initial definition ‒ "…quantification: the 
assignment of numbers to represent the magnitude of attributes of a system we are 
studying or which we wish to describe.” This definition is operationalised initially by 
noting the previously established context for the measurement and a "phenomenon 
of interest", by representing the heterogeneous system in some way, and establishing 
a mapping from the real system to a system that corresponds to, and behaves in the 
same way as the real system, within which a measure can be developed. Finally, the 
definitions are operationalised by defining an attribute to represent the phenomenon 
of interest, and confirming the validity of the measure. 
4.5.2 Representation of a heterogeneous system 
Heterogeneous technological systems can be described as progressively 
adding value to raw inputs, and ultimately generating a specified output. These 
systems could also be described in terms of applying processes to input and 
intermediate streams, generating further intermediate streams until the final output is 
created. It should be noted that a homogeneous system is a specific case of a 
heterogeneous system, in which the process types are limited to aggregation and 
distribution, with no transformations. The definition of a service level of output allows 
representation of the output using a Boolean variable. Consider the final delivery of 
the goods or services; this can be assumed to be feasible if a set of conditions is 
fulfilled, e.g. a road exists, an operational truck is available and fuel and a driver are 
available. This could be represented as a Boolean AND function with four inputs. If 
each of those inputs is considered in turn, it is proposed that their availability can also 
be represented as a Boolean variable, which is the output of a Boolean function of 
several inputs. Extending this principle allows a complete technological system to be 
represented as a complex Boolean algebraic expression, which considers the specific 
processes, the intermediate streams and the input streams, and results in a Boolean 
representation of the service level delivery conditions for defined goods or services to 
an end-user. Figure 3, using standard symbols for AND and OR gates, illustrates a 







Figure 3 A representative complex technological system. 
 
Figure 4 provides a more realistic example of a heterogeneous technological 
system, including cases in which some streams have alternative sources, and 
including processes that have some common requirements and some unique 
requirements. Real technological systems may also include operations that are 
mutually exclusive, indicating a need for a functionality representing the case where 
IF (a) then NOT (b). Such a “NOT” construct can be used in conjunction with the 
definition of stream availability level, e.g. to describe a situation in which the sufficient 
level of stream capacity to ensure the functioning of (a) will preclude the sufficient 
level of stream capacity to ensure the functioning of (b).  
A computationally complete Boolean algebra requires only the "AND", "OR" 
and "NOT" constructs, and these have been shown to be sufficient to represent an 
arbitrary heterogeneous technological system for delivering goods or services to an 
end-user. The final service delivery can be represented by a Boolean variable and, 
by applying the definition recursively, intermediate streams can be considered to have 
Boolean values according to whether they do, or do not, cause failure of the final 
service level delivery. This allows the representation of streams and process 
availabilities as Boolean variables. The “NOT” function can be used, although its value 
in the field of this thesis is problematic, but, as there is no function that allows 
“distribution”, a stream availability cannot be simply assigned to the input of more than 
one gate. The system needs to be re-drawn as demonstrated in Figure 4. This re-
drawing illustrates the correct treatment of the case where an input stream affects 







Figure 4 Rationalised representation of representative complex system. 
 
4.5.3 Interpretation of data: defining and measuring the attribute 
A truth table, as illustrated in Figure 5, based on Boolean algebra, and 
including all valid inputs, can be used to represent the possible outputs of the 
technological system for each possible combination of input availability or non-
availability.  
 





Considering a system, of which representative parts are illustrated in Figure 5 
above, it can be seen that there are a number of points for which a single failure will 
cause the system output to fail. These are added to generate the E1 value, 
representing the highest level of vulnerability. There are also cases where a 
combination of two or more failures will need to occur simultaneously in order to cause 
the system output to fail. These generally arise from duplicated systems, are 
represented using “OR” gates and are added to give the E2 value. Continuing this 
approach, it is possible to construct a composite metric of the form {E1, E2, E3... En}, 
where E1 is the number of single points of failure and E2 is the number of cases where 
two independent failures must occur in order for the system to fail. The E2 value must 
exclude cases where either one of the inputs would alone have caused output failure 
– otherwise the values would be over-represented. Similarly, the E3 value must 
exclude cases where a combination of two of the failing inputs would have caused 
output failure. This representation and concept expands upon the “N‒1”, N‒2” design 
redundancy concept, arguably adds rigour to that definition and is proposed to provide 
a measure of the relevant attribute. 
It has previously been argued that probabilities of a particular process or 
stream failure, i.e. the probability that a hazard aligned to that process or stream is of 
sufficient magnitude to cause the operation of the process or stream to fall below a 
level that would cause failure of the technological system output, should be excluded 
from consideration for two reasons: firstly, because these will tend towards a 
probability of 1.0 over a sufficiently long time-frame or under the assumption of 
directed attack; secondly, because they are characteristic of external hazards rather 
than the intrinsic components and the configuration of the technological system that 
are the topic of the research question. It has also been established that (a) arbitrary 
heterogeneous technological systems supplying to a single point with a defined 
service level can be represented as a Boolean algebraic expression, and (b) the 
response of the system to permutations and combinations of failures can be 
represented in the form {E1, E2, … En}. It is therefore argued that the number of 
vulnerability points, i.e. possible points of failure, of the technological system is a valid 
mapping of the “vulnerability that can be attributed to the technological system” on to 
an attribute. Within AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009, as the definition assigned to the term 





work, the quantitative evaluation {E1, E2, … En} will be referred to as the “exposure” of 
the technological system.  
4.5.4 Clarifying the definition of the attribute  
Granularity. Generating an accurate exposure value requires a careful 
consideration of the assessment process and, specifically, the granularity of the 
representation. To illustrate using an example, if every transistor in a memory chip 
were considered to be a potential cause of failure, the “exposure” value calculated for 
the computer would be exceedingly high. In contrast, if the computer were considered 
to be a complete, replaceable unit, then it would be assigned an exposure value of 1. 
A pragmatic definition will address this issue: if some subsystem is potentially 
replaceable as a unit, and can be attacked separately from other subsystems, then it 
should be considered to be a potential source of failure. This definition is proposed to 
allow an adequate level of precision – i.e. reproducibility by different practitioners. 
System boundaries. One system boundary must be at the end user: 
definition of the other system boundaries is essential for an analysis and will be set 
pragmatically at the points where a sufficiently large number of sources of the input 
stream are available, and hence can be considered to be unconditionally available. 
Contributory systems. It can be expected that there will be cases where a 
stream that is an input to one technological system is itself the product of another 
technological system, i.e. a contributing system. The technological system that 
generates the input will itself have some degree of “exposure”, and it is important to 
have a valid basis for calculating the contribution that is made to the exposure of the 






Figure 6 Contributory system 
A more generalised approach is required. The problem can, in fact, be 
generalised by considering that each input to a gate (Boolean AND or OR operation) 
has an exposure vector, and developing the principles by which the gate output can 
be calculated from these inputs. This is illustrated in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7 Generalised approach – contributory system 
For the AND gate, the contributory exposure vectors are simply added 
component-wise; hence the output metric is  
{ (A1+B1+C1), (A2+B2+C2), (A3+B3+C3) … (An+Bn+Cn)}. 
For the OR gate, the issue is more complex. For the case where there are 







It should be noted that, when calculating the E3 value, one fail from each input 
MUST occur for the output to fail; however, each remaining combination of fails 
contributes to the E3 value. The E4 and subsequent values are calculated in exactly 
the same way as the E3 value. It can be noted that, because the contributory system 
has effectively added streams and processes, the length of the output exposure vector 
is increased when the contributory system is considered. In principle, an exposure 
vector of very great length could be postulated.  
The fact that contributory E1 values are added to the total exposure of a parent 
system is significant: a single point of failure is not lost when the contributory system 
is added to the parent system. As a practical example, if the “O” ring seal failure had 
been identified as a contributor to the E1 exposure of the Thiokol Solid Booster Rocket, 
then the elimination of all E1 values for the parent system, which was the Challenger 
space shuttle, could not have been achieved unless the “O” ring weakness was 
addressed. The use of an exposure metric potentially addresses the colloquial saying 
“it’s always the smallest things that get you”. 
Pragmatic limits on depth of analysis. Some pragmatic observations can 
be made. As, for example, E3 combinations cannot by definition include any E2 or E1 
combinations, and E4 combinations cannot include any E3, E2 or E1 combinations, 
there will be a tendency for the values of these quantities to decrease. Upper bounds 
can be set: for a system with N inputs and, if E1 = n, then E2 ≤ (2(N ‒ E1)) etc. and it can 
be observed that, if a system with N inputs has an En value of 1, then this system can 
be only a single “OR” with N inputs and all higher E values (E1…E(n ‒ 1)) must be zero. 
The proposed approach is therefore to nominate a level to which exposure values will 
be evaluated. If, for example, this level is set at 3, then the representation would be 
considered to be complete when it could be shown that no contributory systems added 
to the E3 values of the system as represented. 
4.5.5 Interpretation of “exposure” values 
A significant purpose of this investigation is to allow the evaluation of proposed 
changes and the comparison of technological systems. The effectiveness of proposed 
changes can be assessed by considering the composite metric. For example, it might 
be considered to be valuable if the E1 value were reduced by a given percentage. 





validly assigned a single value that can be proven to be mapped from the actual 
“exposure”. A rational means for converting an exposure represented in the form {E1, 
E2, E3... En} into a single attribute value is useful though not essential. The mapping 
from the exposure expressed as {E1, E2, E3... En} on to a single attribute value can be 
made by considering that there is likely to be an average cost of protecting each point 
of exposure and hence that simply adding the unique E1, E2, E3 values provides a 
single value for the attribute, which offers a valid means of comparing technological 
systems. It is also noted that a qualitative interpretation of the distribution of E1, E2 
etc. values will provide additional insight and would also allow the assessment of 
progress towards, for example, a target of E1 = 0. This conclusion assumes that the 
E1 and E2 etc. combinations are exclusive, as previously defined. 
4.6 Evaluation of proposed approach and metric 
Recognition of the concept that long supply lines and systems with large 
numbers of potentially fatal flaws and with no alternative sources are "exposed" can 
be found in documents as historical as "Sun Tsu, The Art of War" (Griffith 1963), in 
the concern expressed by Senator John Glenn regarding the Mercury spaceflights 
(Glenn, 1997) and in very many other publications. Although the term published 
definitions of “vulnerability” and the phrase “contribution to vulnerability” may not be 
precisely defined, these observations indicate that the “exposure” attribute is a valid 
representation of the phenomenon of interest. In addition to providing a valid 
representation, it must be demonstrated that the proposed assessment of "exposure" 
represents a reproducible and accurate measure that actually represents the 
contribution of the technological system to vulnerability. 
4.6.1 Representation 
Suppes (2009, p. 825) notes that  
"A conceptual analysis of measurement can properly begin by formulating the two 
fundamental problems of any measurement procedure. The first problem is that of 
representation, justifying the assignment of numbers to objects or phenomena. What 
we must show is that the structure of a set of phenomena under certain empirical 
operations and relations is the same as the structure of some set of numbers under 





Similarly, Hand (2004, p. 3) proposes an initial definition as "quantification: the 
assignment of numbers to represent the magnitude of attributes of a system we are 
studying or which we wish to describe". Hand (2004, p. 132f) presents detailed 
descriptions of the “validity” of a representation, and describes several distinct types 
of validity, which are effectively descriptions of alternative approaches to establishing 
validity.  
In the context of this work, an evaluation is needed of whether the proposed 
theoretical basis (the numerical evaluation of “exposure”) actually represents the 
performance indicator described in the research question, by considering the validity 
criteria proposed in works such as Hand (2004). Hand's concepts of "criterion validity" 
and "content validity" seem to be of lesser relevance, because they are related to 
other comparative measures, whereas the proposed measure has been developed in 
response to an identified "gap" and therefore does not align clearly with other 
measures. Hand's (2004, p. 133) description of "construct validity", in contrast, is 
described as "... involves the internal structure of the measure and also its expected 
relationship with other, external measures. Construct validity thus refers to the theoretical 
construction of the test: it very clearly mixes the measurement procedure with the concept 
definition”.  
The term vulnerability generally has two elements: firstly, the knowledge that 
possible failure modes exist; secondly, the knowledge of practical inability to 
adequately prevent those modes. The lack of ability to prevent failure modes is likely 
to include practical issues of physical access to particular loci of potential failure, but 
is also likely to include an awareness that the multiplicity of such loci and the lack of 
adequate alternatives present a major practical problem. It is proposed that these 
somewhat intuitive concepts are actually described in quite rigorous logical terms by 
the Boolean representation of the technological system involved and, because the 
exposure metric {E1, E2, E3 … En} is constructed directly from the representation of 
the technological system, this has a construct validity in the terms proposed by Hand 
(2004). 
The extent to which the proposed theoretical basis represents the issues in 
the research question is effectively an examination of the scope and validity of the 
framework of assumptions and boundaries within which the representation is claimed. 





probability expressed as p = 1.0 was established. The definition of service level does, 
certainly, allow a Boolean evaluation of the provision of a stated service. It might be 
argued that an infinite number of service levels is theoretically needed to characterise 
the supply of goods or services, but this is unlikely to be a practical issue: a water 
supply that is adequate for two criteria, e.g. “drinking only” and a “normal bathroom 
and clothes or dish washing and food preparation”, is likely to achieve the goals of the 
measurement, i.e. informing decision and allowing comparison of alternative 
technological systems. The exposure metric does depend critically on the system 
boundaries selected. These boundaries effectively represent inputs that are 
considered to have an exposure of {1,0,0} and, for a valid calculation, the system 
boundaries need to be defined precisely. 
4.6.2 Completeness and uniqueness 
As the Boolean algebraic representation of the real system will generate the 
same results, in terms of Boolean delivery or non-delivery of service levels, as the 
real system under the same combinations of input failures, the Boolean 
representation can be said to be homomorphic. The real system and the Boolean 
algebraic representation can be said to be homomorphic in terms of the processes 
and streams. Assuming adequate descriptions of the processes and streams and 
relationships, it is actually possible to re-draw an actual system from the Boolean 
algebraic representation. This proves that the representation is not only homomorphic 
but also isomorphic, allowing an inverse mapping. 
4.6.3 Adequacy 
It must be established that it is possible to represent all practical technological 
systems unambiguously by Boolean algebraic expressions. Several authors have 
drawn attention to the complex interactions and possibly feedback loops between 
subsystems. It is important to establish with confidence that an arbitrary technological 
system can be represented unambiguously with a Boolean expression. A particular 
consideration is whether technological systems in fact include feedback loops, and if 







Figure 8 Feedback loop representation 
Figure 8 demonstrates a progressive re-drawing of a system initially 
considered to include a “feedback loop”. For a system, e.g. an electronic system, 
where initial conditions are not pre-determined, the output of this system as shown in 
the first representation, is indeterminate when S05, S06 and S10 are true. As the 
evaluation of exposure considers the number of points that will cause the failure of an 
operational system, initial conditions are always determined. The system can then be 
simplified as shown in subsequent parts of Figure 8. For systems with input conditions 
that are not indeterminate, representations of configurations involving feedback can 
be decomposed to simple Boolean representations and therefore the exposure values 
can be determined. 
Haimes and Jiang (2001) consider fractional values of interaction between 
infrastructural systems, using these fractional values to assess the decrease in 





These concepts have at least superficial similarity to the colloquial concepts of inter-
system feedback. Although valuable, Haimes and Jiang’s approach to a description 
of interdependence does not quantify exposure as a metric of vulnerability and relies 
on problematic processes for calculating the levels of interaction. 
Feedback must be considered in its broader context. Diamond (2005) and 
others have noted that, within a geographically and economically constrained 
civilisation, a full positive feedback of failures, caused by a single essential resource 
failure, can cause societal collapse. Geographical regions, e.g. those affected by 
natural catastrophe, are now not tightly constrained in terms of trade, geography or 
information; therefore, disaster relief is possible. However, our highly inter-connected 
world is certainly still exposed to global environmental failures such as major climate 
change, and Diamond's scenarios emphasise the exposure concept because there 
are effectively exposure values associated with all major environmental resources, 
including fresh water, clean air and a viable temperature range. These are not 
discounted, but the topic of this thesis is technological contributions and it is the 
technological contributions to which attention is drawn.  
4.6.4 Precision 
Precision is achieved when different practitioners apply the same concepts 
and techniques to a problem, and all generate metrics that are close in value to those 
generated by others. The Bureau Internationale des Poids et Mesures (2008) 
provides a well-accepted distinction between the term "precision" and the term 
"accuracy”.  It defines (p22) precision as "closeness of agreement between indications 
or measured quantity values obtained by replicate measurements on the same or 
similar objects under specified conditions". This is similar to the concept of 
reproducibility. Achieving an adequate level of precision is closely linked to the 
definition of system granularity, and indeed to the definitions of what constitutes a 
“process” and an “intermediate stream”. Consider an example: at a macro level, a cell 
phone needs power only. A main processor unit may contain more than a billion 
transistors and, if any should fail, the unit will not operate, and a decision is therefore 
required on whether to assign an exposure value of 1 billion or an exposure value of 
1. Two somewhat pragmatic tests can be applied. If a subsystem can be replaced as 





for an attack to be directed at a subsystem without affecting its neighbours, then it 
should be considered to be a “process”. There is no real mechanism for an attacker 
to target a single transistor of a chipset; neither is it possible to replace even a 
processor alone – which would suggest the personal computer (PC) motherboard as 
the appropriate level of granularity for a “process”. It would be possible in future to 
build up a library of exposure vectors for larger components, e.g. the PC, to be 
incorporated into analyses using the principles developed for contributory systems. 
4.6.5 Accuracy 
When considering representation, evidence has been presented that the 
metric does relate to the attribute of interest – the question of accuracy remains, i.e. 
whether the measure offers a moderately linear representation of the quantity of 
interest. The Bureau Internationale des Poids et Mesures (2008) provides a well-
accepted distinction between the term "precision" and the term "accuracy”. It defines 
(p21) accuracy as "closeness of agreement between a measured quantity value and 
a true quantity value of a measurand ". Real examples of the importance of this issue 
can readily be envisaged. If alternative changes to the technological system have, for 
example, a cost ratio of 2:1, and the alternatives have exposure values that also have 
a 2:1 ratio, then the quality of the decision will depend critically upon the accuracy of 
the exposure measure. The adequacy of the accuracy of the proposed measure is 
justified by a simplifying assumption. To adequately mitigate each exposure value will 
require some effort and expenditure and, whereas costs might vary significantly 
between cases, it is reasonable to assume that, when a large number of exposure 
“points” (single or combination failure points) is under consideration, the expenditure 
for mitigation will bear at least a moderately linear relationship to the number of such 
points. This principle will apply whether the designer’s target is to bring E1 to 0 or E1 
and E2 to zero. 
4.7 A consistent set of definitions and metrics 
An internally consistent and defensible set of definitions is needed to avoid 
confusion in the remainder of the thesis. Figure 9, below, illustrates many of the 
concepts. The following definitions are proposed, and correlations with published 














Figure 9 Illustration of selected terms 
 
(a) Risk 
Definition. The probability that a given hazard will occur (at a level above the 
maximum tolerable level) during a nominated time-frame.  
Explanation. Risk must be applied to a hazard that, in turn, is always related 
to a specific weakness: a hazard is irrelevant unless it is associated with a weakness.  
It has already been argued that, when either long time-frames or (mis)guided 
hazards are considered, the risk probability approaches 1.0. If a specific risk has a 
known probability function, i.e. it will exceed a nominated value for a known 
percentage of time, it would be possible to calculate a Bayesian probability that there 
will be an instant when the loading of a particular weakness plus the hazard value will 
exceed the maximum tolerable value of that weakness. Although this is 
computationally possible, both the "guided hazard" and the long time-frame 
arguments deprecate the value of this approach. The practicality of the approach is 





hazards linked to it, and that every potential hazard for every weakness must therefore 
be considered to be a component of a Bayesian probability calculation. 
Alignment. This definition aligns with many published definitions, but differs 
from many non-academic definitions, e.g. the insurance industry's usage that 
considers an "insured risk" to be the asset that might suffer damage. This aligns with 
common definitions: risk is quoted as "high", when a hazard is likely to occur, through 
to "low", when it is assessed that a hazard is unlikely to occur. 
(b) Hazard 
Definition. Something that causes a perturbation in the performance or 
availability of a process or stream that is part of the technological system – e.g. a 
severe weather effect, e.g. “more than xx mm rain” is a hazard. 
Alignment. Consistent with AS/NZS ISO GUIDE 73:2009, which defines 
Hazard (3.5.1.4) as a "source of potential harm". 
(c) Service_level 
Definition. Rate of delivery of specified goods or services, to a single point.  
Explanation. Definition of a service level allows a Boolean representation of 
“harm”, i.e. the non-supply of goods or services. 
(d) Harm 
Definition. The failure to deliver some specified level of service or goods.  
Explanation. This definition applies equally to the output of a technological 
system and to the end-user failure-to-receive.  
Alignment. This definition does not consider the consequence of failure-to-
deliver, e.g. if a technological system delivers toothpaste, then this definition of "harm" 
refers to the failure to deliver toothpaste, rather than caries or halitosis.  
(e) Technological system  
Definition. Scope is defined by that needed to produce the service level of 
specified goods and where failure will cause specified harm, i.e. a failure to supply. 
(f) Weakness 
Definition. When applied to a technological system, “weakness” is proposed 
to be defined as a stream, process or other facility whose function is a part of the 
technological system in question, and whose absence or inoperability contributes to 





Explanation. Weakness is directly associated with the potential for harm, i.e. 
the potential that, if the locus of weakness fails, then "harm" (a failure to deliver 
service) may result. The uncertainty in the "may" is due to two factors: if the attack on 
the weakness is below the maximum tolerable limit, or the configuration of the system 
provides redundancy for the function of the weak point. 
(g) Exposure 
Definition. A metric derived from the number and the configuration of the 
weaknesses of a technological system.  
Explanation. Exposure is qualitatively related to the difficulty or cost of 
preventing harm. A high level of exposure means that protection is difficult and 
expensive as many weaknesses must be protected. 
Alignment. This definition clarifies the ISO definition.  
(h) Vulnerability 
Definition. A summation, for each combination of weaknesses that can cause 
the defined harm, of the risks that hazards associated with those weaknesses will 
cause the harm. If the risk for every hazard is considered to be p = 1.0, vulnerability 
is synonymous with exposure. 
Explanation. The entity that is proposed to be "vulnerable" must be identified 
and could be a person, or a technological system, associated with a specified harm. 
The definition considers both exposure and total hazard probabilities, indexed to a 
specific HARM. The concept of how close an operational system is to failure is 
captured by the concepts of resilience and maximum tolerable disturbance, and 
should not be associated with the term vulnerability. 
Alignment. Aligns moderately with the definition stated by Akgun et al. (2010, 
p. 3561), who propose that "... [v]ulnerability can be defined as a ‘‘weakness in the 
system defended". 
(i) Robustness 
Definition. Opposite of exposure. 
Explanation. Robustness can therefore also be mapped directly to the 
exposure metric. A system whose E1 and E2 exposure values are zero could be 
asserted to be robust, because these values show that there are no single or dual 
process or stream failures that will cause the system to fail. In contrast, a system 





vulnerable, because a failure of any of the contributors to the E1 value will cause 
failure. The proposed definition is NOT the opposite of vulnerability, because risk is 
not involved. The proposed definition relates only to the system configuration and 
components. 
Alignment. Published definitions are similar but opposite to the definitions of 
resilience.  
(j) System state 
Definition. The instantaneous load level of each process and stream of a 
technological system.  
(k) Resilience 
Definition. Dynamic output response of a system, to a perturbation whose 
level is below the maximum tolerable disturbance for the weakness with which the 
perturbation is aligned. This is the “dynamic vulnerability” of the system.  
Explanation. A system is only "resilient" as long as the output function is 
continuous with respect to input perturbations, i.e. "harm" (system failure to meet the 
service level) has not occurred. Any measure of resilience must specify the initial 
system state, the perturbation level and the perturbation target, i.e. the weakness. It 
is argued that, whereas the resilience metric is applicable to systems that have not 
failed, the exposure metric measures possible modes of failure. This division of 
applicability scopes is valid for common cases such as the supply of 230 VAC 
electrical power, which is generally either available or not available, and a system that 
is dependent on an electric motor that either operates or does not, according to the 
availability of the power supply.  
Alignment. Published definitions of resilience, as noted in Chapter 2 of this 
thesis, commonly consider system performance responses to perturbations of inputs, 
and specifically the time taken to return to some defined state or an integration of the 
deviation of system response against time. These definitions implicitly assume a 
response function without discontinuities, i.e. that the system does not actually fail, a 
knowledge of the instantaneous state of the system and a means of calculating a 
dynamic response to a specified perturbation. 





Definition. The level of perturbation for each stream or process, over and 
above the system state loading that is normal, for the system service delivery level to 
the design number of users that will cause stream or process failure. 
Alignment. Simply refines the descriptions used by Starossek and Haberland 
(2010) and Gómez et al. (2011) by establishing the clear boundary between an 
operational system responding to a perturbation and a system that causes harm, i.e. 
fails. 
(m) Resilience limit 
Explanation. Hollnagel et al. (2006) consider how close a system’s normal 
usage is to the failure level; this term is proposed to capture this concept. A simple 
measure might be the ratio of maximum tolerable disturbance to normal state. 
4.8 Conclusions  
4.8.1 A valid theoretical basis 
This chapter has developed the theoretical basis of the analysis, by starting 
with a review of the context for an acceptable theoretical basis for a solution to the 
research question, and then demonstrating how valid constraints on two existing 
techniques lead to the same conceptual framework for a solution. It has then been 
demonstrated that an arbitrary heterogeneous system can be mapped on to a 
Boolean expression and that the evaluation of the Boolean expression for all 
combinations of process or stream failure generates a metric that is a valid 
representation of the number of weaknesses (or the number of points requiring 
protection effort) of a technological system. Finally, it has been demonstrated that this 
attribute’s metric is a valid representation of the phenomenon of interest (the system 
property described in the research question), the metric is invariant with respect to 
factors specifically outside the defined context, the metric does adequately consider 
all factors that are valid within the defined context and the accuracy and the precision 
of the proposed measure are fit for purpose. 
4.8.2 A theory of exposure 
This thesis is concerned with the contribution of technological systems to end 
user’s vulnerability, and a theoretical basis for measuring this by an evaluation of 





definitions of theory, including "A supposition or a system of ideas intended to explain 
something, especially one based on general principles independent of the thing to be 
explained" and "A scientific theory is an explanation or model used to account for 
observations". Wacker (1998) proposes that conceptual definitions, domain 
limitations, relationship building and predictions are the essential elements of a valid 
“theory”. This thesis provides a system of ideas intended to explain something and 
additionally provides conceptual definitions, a domain limitation (introduction), 
relationship building as a result of validating the metric and a predictive capability 
because the proposed metric can be used to evaluate potential changes. On this 
basis, a "theory of exposure" could be considered to meet the definitions of a valid 
theory, when formulated as “An end-user’s vulnerability to a technological system 
supplying specific goods/services is measured by the number and the nature of 







5. DEFINITION OF EXEMPLAR STUDIES 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter defines the initial exemplar technological systems to be studied. 
The technological descriptions assume that the individual user lives in a city with a 
population of about 200,000‒500,000. This size is selected because it encompasses 
a significant number of cities, particularly within Australia and New Zealand. While 
this population range is noted, it is not intended to be a rigorous definition, but rather 
a range that allows representative exemplar studies to be described. Mega cities 
(perhaps of many millions) might, for example, have dedicated power stations that are 
not envisaged within the exemplar studies, and villages of tiny population might (for 
example) lack an internet Point of Presence. An operational time-frame is assumed, 
i.e. it is assumed that no maintenance or replacement of equipment is needed but 
operational supplies are required. Section 3.3 of this thesis notes that “maintenance” 
and “replacement” time-frames are longer and hence in practice allow specialised 
equipment to be acquired or (re)created. The end-user is not a named individual, but 
must be demonstrated to be representative. It seems to be reasonable to consider 
that a "representative person" will be neither blind nor deaf, and will be capable of 
operating household or personal equipment. On the basis of smartphone and laptop 
ownership statistics, the physical and intellectual ability to operate a smartphone can 
reasonably be assumed. It also seems to be reasonable to assume that a 
"representative person" will have the financial means to live in an apartment, with 
power, water and communications facilities connected, and will have the financial 
capacity, independent of technological capacity, to purchase common goods or 
services. The examples are chosen to demonstrate goods or services whose absence 
would effectively force significant lifestyle change upon the representative persons.  
5.2 Description and verification of examples 
5.2.1 Format of example descriptions 
A consistent format, as described in Table 7, is used across all examples, 
using the following headings. 
• Title, and version control information.  





• Confirmation of analysis time-frame. 
• Justification for inclusion of the example – in terms of significant effect upon 
the end-user if the goods or services are not available. 
• Clarification of the end-user service level and goods or services description.  
• Text description of the example. Clarification of boundaries, i.e. inclusions and 
exclusions, and justification in terms of selected level. 
• Confirmation that the example description is representative of real 
implementations of the service: this is likely to involve include research of 
actual systems implemented in a small number of cities and/or referenced 
within public sources.  
• Representation of process, stream and configuration descriptions in terms to 
















The sanitary removal of 
human waste, on an “as-
required basis”, and 
resulting in the discharge 
of environmentally 
acceptable waste. 
The capability to store and 
retrieve, view, edit and 
share work information.  
  
The service, in this case, is 
the supply of petrol at a 
local petrol station. 
The service, in this case, is the 
correct application of a first-aid 
measure. 
The supply of a perishable 
food. Fresh whole milk is 
selected because it is a 
staple food and requires a 
technological system that is 
similar to that required by 
other fresh food. 
The supply of an essential 
medicine that enables an 
apartment dweller to 







e An “operational” time-
frame has been selected 
for study, i.e. it is 
assumed that no 
maintenance or 
replacement of 
equipment is needed. 
An “operational” time-
frame has been selected 
for study, and so no 
maintenance or 
replacement issues are 
considered. 
An “operational” time-
frame has been selected 
for study; hence 
maintenance and 
replacement of 
components are not 
envisaged. 
Only an “operational” time-frame 
has been selected for study: 
An operational time-frame 
has been selected for study. 
An operational time-frame 
has been selected for study; 
hence no significant 
maintenance or replacement 
of equipment or processes 








Public transport services 
(trains, buses) in New 
Zealand are generally 
considered to require on-
board toilet facilities if the 
journey is longer than 2 
hours; although this is 
clearly only a guideline, it 
does demonstrate that 
the facilities are 
considered to be essential 
for even relatively short 
occupancy intervals. 
The storage and 
transmission of 
information is 
foundational. A consulting 
engineer without access to 
functional email, or file 
server facilities, is likely to 
be unable to carry out 
expected tasks. Similarly, 
the apartment dweller is 
unlikely to have the 
storage space to hold 
significant tomes of family 
history or reference 
material. 
For the size of city 
considered, public 
transport (coverage and 
frequency) commonly 
makes such activities as 
grocery shopping and 
commuting to work only 
marginally practical for 
many, and the distances 
are arguably too long for 
many to reasonably walk. 
Life-threatening medical 
emergencies can certainly occur 
for the apartment dweller; for 
many, the time until death is 
shorter than the time for a 
paramedic to arrive. Life or death 
will depend upon the ability of a 
co-dweller to diagnose the 
problem, and apply the correct 
measure. 
It is common for apartment 
dwellers to purchase, store 
and use fresh food ‒ and 
deprivation of this capability 
would constitute a 
“significant change to 
lifestyle”. This justifies the 
consideration of a fresh food 
example. Fresh milk is a very 
common food. 
There are a number of 
medical conditions that, with 
treatment, allow a person to 
live a reasonably normal life 
‒ but would severely reduce 
their capabilities without 
treatment. Asthma affects a 
significant portion of the 
western world’s population. 
The "Ventolin™" 
bronchodilator is generally 














The sanitary removal of 
human waste, as 
required, via the lavatory 
and resulting in the 
discharge of 
environmentally 
acceptable water to 
waterways, sea or landfill. 
The definition of service 
delivery implies that the 
complex information is 
able to be read, seen and 
updated by more than one 
party, before being read 
by the intended 
“recipient”. 
 
The service is achieved 
when pre- or post-
purchased petrol, whose 
quality is within the fuel 
specification limits, is 
supplied at a normal flow-
rate, to a vehicle parked in 
the forecourt of the petrol 
station. 
The delivery of the description of 
the manoeuvre, to the first-aider, 
in a form that can be 
appreciated, and within minutes. 
 
The availability, to a 
consumer, on demand, of 
whole milk with acceptable 
bacteriological, nutritional 
and taste properties (and 
Codex standard protein, fat 
etc. levels). 
Service level criteria are 
defined in terms of delivery 
of the medication (of 
adequate purity and known 
strength to the end-user, in a 




















s Water-flushed lavatory, 
flushing water, gravity-fed 
systems, pumping 
stations, coarse screen 
sedimentation, trickle-
filter aerobic digester 
clarifier, oxygenation 
ponds, dewatered bio-
solids, transport to 
landfill. 
Laptop hardware and 
software, packet 
exchanges with router, ISP 
exchange packets with 
local router if local table 
(updated by BGP and 
similar protocols, allows it 
to use T3 and/or T1 links 
to high speed routers and 
local ISP has links to DNS 
servers, exchange packets 
if T1 links to undersea 
cables). 
Petrol pumps, purchase 
transaction and 
transaction completion, 





Differential diagnosis between 
choking and heart-attack, access 
a source of information, identify 
the condition and receive 
detailed instruction on the 
treatment. 
Working refrigerator, 
transport from the retail 
outlet, retail outlet, 
communications and 
stocktaking system and 
financial transaction 
capability. Transport to the 
retail outlet, bulk transport 
of consumer packages, 
processing and packaging 
system, pasteurisation 
equipment. 
Raw feedstock materials, 
synthesis of active 
compound, packaging, 
ordering and payment 
system, distribution chain, 
manufacture of (empty) 
metered-dose inhaler units, 
filling, shipping and 
distribution chain, 
pharmaceutical dispensing 














A survey of sewage 
systems used by cities 
within this size range 
reveals a level of 
uniformity. 
Statistics show that a large 
proportion of the 
population have either 
laptops or "smart phones" 
and rely on these for work 
as well as essential 
personal information. 
For the type of petrol 
station described, the 
processes and equipment 
are observably very similar 
across a wide range of 
locations internationally. 
Much “first-aid” literature 
strongly suggests that the field is 
considered to be significant.  
The processes generating 
pasteurised and chilled milk 
are defined by regulatory 
bodies such as the IDF and 
Codex formulations. 
Medical statistics identify 
asthma as a common 
condition. Ventolin™ is 
commonly prescribed for the 
relief of even severe asthma. 






5.2.2 Granularity of example descriptions 
Analysis requires the definition of streams, which may be streams of liquid, 
transported streams of items, streams of electrical power, streams of information or 
other intermediate or final products, and also definitions of “processes”, which 
transform streams. Practical definition requires a consideration of the granularity of 
the representation; for example, it would be possible to define a “power station” as a 
process that takes fuel and produces electricity, but it would also be possible to 
consider a power station boiler that takes fuel and produces steam, a power station 
steam turbine that takes steam and produces shaft power and a power station 
generator that takes shaft power and produces electricity. It would also be possible to 
consider finer levels of granularity; for example, it would be possible to describe the 
components of the steam turbine, e.g. main valves and their actuators, drain systems 
and lubrication systems.  
The “exposure” metric generated by the analysis will depend on the degree of 
granularity described, and therefore a valid level of granularity. Considerations of 
granularity must be defined rigorously; the definition is proposed to include the 
following.  
(a) A process should not be subdivided beyond the point where an attack would 
inevitably affect an adjacent sub-process. If any attack would inevitably affect 
an adjacent sub-process, it is not valid to consider the exposure of the two 
sub-processes separately. Two examples will illustrate this principle. A 
computer CPU chip may contain a billion transistors; however, as these are 
not practically accessible individually, they should be considered as a single 
point of failure (actually, this numeration will extend to the motherboard 
including all SMDs, but excluding RAM contents, because these can be 
accessed separately and represent an additional source of failure). In contrast, 
consider a long above-ground pipeline comprising many flanged pipe spools 
(possibly identified on an engineering bill of materials (BoM) as spool 
123AA_001, spool 123AA_002 … spool_123AA_020). As such spools can 
potentially be attacked individually, a higher E1 value could be assigned. For 
an underground pipe, it might be more likely that a pipe might be replaced on 





an undersea fibre-optic cable carrying internet data, the cable can be “hooked” 
and brought to the surface for repair, although this is a major operation. For 
the undersea cable, the number of repeaters can also be assessed, and an E2 
value based on the assumption that two adjacent repeaters need to fail, in 
order to make the complete cable inoperable, can be built.  
(b) A process should not be subdivided beyond the point where a component or 
process would normally be replaced as a unit. For example, a computer printer 
has paper transport, electronics and similar subsystems, but it would normally 
be considered to be a disposable unit for which significant repair costs would 
exceed the new purchase cost. The proposed analysis is of the number of 
weaknesses, not of the number of possible attacks; although it is possible that 
some printer subsystems could be attacked without necessarily affecting the 
others, a significant failure would be considered simply as “printer failure”, and 
would result in the installation of a new printer.  
(c) As the granularity should be consistent within each example, if an internet 
router within an apartment is considered, so should a router operated by the 
ISP through which the household’s internet connection is made. 
(d) The level of granularity should be consistent across examples. This issue is 
assisted by the use of standardised contributory subsystems, applied to more 
than one example study. 
(e) The granularity should allow meaningful assessments across all possible time-
frames – hence, items that can be individually replaced should be identified 
so that a “replacement” time-frame can be assessed. 
5.2.3 Selection of analysis depth 
Within Chapter 4, it was proposed that the treatment of contributory systems 
should be addressed by setting a level to which the exposure values should be 
calculated, e.g. whether analysis should stop at E2, E3 or further. Rarely, engineering 
systems will include main, backup and emergency systems (N‒3 design redundancy): 
examples include the provisions for lowering landing gear on fighter aircraft or 
lubrication oil systems on the main turbo-generators of a power station; however, even 
in cases where system level N‒2 design redundancy has been specified, this is 





to duplicate. For this thesis, it is not proposed to consider exposure modes and values 
below E3. This level is considered to be more stringent than good engineering practice 
for most fields.  
5.3 Contribution of common subsystems 
The example studies are representative of many particular examples used for 
the delivery of the nominated goods or services. The analyses of the common 
contributory subsystems are similarly representative of many actual examples, and 
are defined so as to align in scope with the example studies. Several of the example 
systems include elements of communications, a need for financial transactions and/or 
a need for various commercial road transport. Where these subsystems are 
essentially identical across the examples, it is reasonable to treat them separately, 
and to improve the consistency of the examples by referencing the same common 
subsystem analysis. It is therefore important to ensure that the same subsystem 
scope is included in each relevant example, and that the individual example analyses 
include all exposures that are not in the common subsystem’s scope. 
5.3.1 Internet communications system 
Initial description. Whether a “smart phone” or a laptop or tablet is used, a 
user application such as browser software or an email client serves as a user 
input/output device and, with the operating system and software drivers, converts data 
to and from packets that are exchanges with a domestic router. From the point where 
packets of data leave the household router, an “internet communication system” 
conveys these packets to the input of another household router. There is significant 
variation in the input/output systems; however, for very many examples, the system 
between the exit from the user’s router and the entry to the remote user’s router is 
essentially identical. This internet communication system includes the telephony 
copper wire from the household router to the suburb’s digital subscriber line access 
multiplexer (DSLAM) cable termination point, the fibre-optic cable from the suburban 
DSLAM to the ISPs and Point-Of-Presence at the city’s “peering point”, i.e. the point 
where the city-wide internet connections are multiplexed on to a national peering 
network of fibre-optic links. From one of a small subset of these peering points, 





optic cable system. The routing in each case is directed by a border gateway protocol 
(BGP) that ensures that all routers can recognise the destination of packets and send 
these to the next appropriate router. Undersea fibre-optic cables use a very heavily 
protected set of optical fibres, with repeaters about every 400 km, to transmit packets 
to a remote termination point. The process is then reversed, leading ultimately to the 
presentation of packets to the input of a household router at the designated 
destination. 
Justification for presentation of example. From the point where packets 
leave the domestic router, an almost identical system provides a foundational service 
for many others, and for several examples studied in this work. 
Service and service level. The exchange of packets of information between 
the household router and the systems outside the household is proposed as the 
service level.  
Example description and definition of boundaries. As the TCP/IP software 
within users’ systems is capable of error detection and for requesting the resend of 
packets, there is no need to specify “error-free reception of a file” as the service level. 
Furthermore, as household systems (smart phone, browser application etc.) vary 
considerably, these are not defined as within the common internet subsystem. The 
systems outside the household, from the telephone line leaving the router onwards, 
are defined as within the boundaries of the internet contributory system. For the 
exemplar system, the local household router exchanges packets via the simple 
telephone system's copper wires to the roadside DSLAM system that commonly 
serves a city suburb. The roadside DSLAM facility multiplexes the packets exchanged 
with the complete suburb's internet connections, and exchanges these with the ISP's 
point-of-presence, which is commonly located in a telephone exchange building 
serving a city. The ISP's point-of-presence is also a "peering point", connecting to 
other national "peering points". The ISP's point-of-presence exchanges packets with 
other national peering points, allowing full internet connections. For offshore 
connections, ISPs purchase bandwidth from organisations that provide and service 
undersea cables, and packets are forwarded from peering points, via undersea cable, 
to offshore equivalents of peering points. At the distant end, a mirror image process 





Confirmation that example description is representative. Discussion with 
local ISPs has indicated that the system as described is representative; however, it is 
noted that many variations are possible, including the increasing availability of fibre to 
the home. 
Definition of processes, streams and configurations. Packets are 
exchanged with the local DSLAM system IF local copper-pair cables are intact. The 
DSLAM multiplexes these packets to its fibre-optic cable IF it has power, AND the 
termination system is operational AND the multiplexer is operational. Packets are 
exchanged between the DSLAM and the ISP point-of-presence IF the fibre-optic 
system from the DSLAM to the city telephone exchange is intact. Packets are 
exchanged within the national peering points IF the national fibre-optic cables are 
intact, AND the ISP's routers AND router tables AND power supplies are operational. 
Packets are exchanged with the undersea cable service provider IF the fibre-optic 
cable to the undersea cable termination point is operational. Packets are exchanged 
from end to end of the undersea fibre-optic cable IF the cable is intact AND power for 
repeaters is available. 
5.3.2 Financial transaction 
Initial description. Many, although not all, of the exemplar systems include a 
requirement for a financial transaction with the end-user. As this is common, and as 
the EFTPOS system for such transactions is very common, this is selected as a 
common subsystem. The “financial subsystem” will be referenced as such within each 
example, but will itself include the “internet system” as a contributory system. The 
scope that is uniquely within the “financial system” therefore excludes the scope 
defined for the internet communications common subsystem. 
 Justification for presentation of example. As the use of debit cards for 
even very minor transactions is common, it is useful to consider the exposure of the 
simple financial transaction system. 
Service and service level. The service level will be deemed to be the display 
of a “transaction-accepted” message at the merchant’s EFTPOS terminal. This 
message will normally be sufficient assurance for the merchant to release the 





Example description and definition of boundaries. The financial 
transaction system uses the internet communications system several times; however, 
as the communications system is considered to be elsewhere, the subsystems 
required are as follows. The “acquirer bank” system that the EFTPOS terminal 
connects to, and which manages further transactions, is required. The merchant 
needs a service agreement with the acquirer bank and hence the acceptance of the 
acquirer bank’s terms and conditions. In order to use the EFTPOS system, the end-
user also requires an account and hence acceptance of the user bank’s terms and 
conditions. Having received a request from an EFTPOS terminal, the acquirer bank 
requests information on credit availability from the user bank and makes the financial 
transfer to its account. The acquirer bank then makes the transfer of credit, possibly 
overnight in a batch mode, to the merchant’s bank.  
Confirmation that example description is representative. The EFTPOS 
payment system is now almost ubiquitous in New Zealand; amounts of less than $10 
are commonly transacted.  
Definition of processes, streams and configurations. Noting that the 
communications systems are addressed elsewhere, the processes and hardware 
required for financial transactions are the EFTPOS terminal, which fulfils a similar 
function to a domestic router, and the computers, applications and storage systems 
at the acquirer bank, the user’s bank and the merchant’s bank. The accept message 
to the EFTPOS terminal will originate from the acquirer bank. The acquirer bank will 
issue the accept message once the user's bank has accepted the transfer of funds to 
the acquirer bank and it has queued the transfer of funds to the merchant’s bank. The 
user’s bank will confirm the transfer of funds to the acquirer bank once it has 
confirmed that the EFTPOS transfer request refers to an account whose user has 
accepted the bank conditions, i.e. is valid, and has sufficient credit. The acquirer bank 
will confirm the queuing of the transfer of funds to the merchant’s bank once it has a 
confirmation from the merchant’s bank that the merchant has accepted the bank terms 
and has a valid account.  
5.3.3 Road transport system 
Some example cases, including those concerned with the transport of raw 





by road. Although all these cases do require a road system and fuel, there are few 
other similarities, because, in some cases, vehicles such as milk tankers are required 
whereas, in other cases, general-purpose vehicles such as passenger cars or light 
trucks are adequate. As an identically scoped road transport system cannot readily 
be applied across multiple examples, road transport is treated separately within each 
example. Chapter 7 of this thesis identifies several general approaches to decreasing 
exposure, one of which is the use of re-purposable components. The adoption of 
standardised shipping containers is an excellent example of that principle. 
5.3.4 Other systems 
Electrical power is used by many examples, but the circumstances of the 
power delivery vary (three-phase high-voltage supplies to factories, single-phase low-
voltage supplies to houses and supplies to different countries are some examples). 
For these reasons, electrical power will not be treated as a common subsystem, and 
electrical power supplies will be treated separately for each example. Urban-supply 
potable water is used in several examples, and the means of supplying it is identical 
in each case but, as the means of supplying it is somewhat trivial, an exposure of E1 
= 1 is simply added to each relevant example.  
5.4 Detailed description of examples 
5.4.1 Example study #1: sewage system  
Initial description. The service, in this case, is described briefly as the 
sanitary removal of human waste, on an “as-required basis”, via the lavatory installed 
in a multi-storied apartment and resulting in the discharge of environmentally 
acceptable water to waterways or sea, and the dumping of solid waste of 
environmentally acceptable specifications to landfill. This example therefore includes 
the plumbing within the apartment, the pumps and pipework for aggregating and 
moving the sewage and the sewage treatment plant. 
Time-frame for analysis. An “operational” time-frame is assumed, i.e. it is 
assumed that no maintenance or replacement of equipment is needed but that 
operational supplies are required. Practical issues for this example will include the 
assumption that landfill capacity is available for dewatered sludge and that any 





Justification for presentation of example. Public transport services (trains 
and buses) in New Zealand are generally considered to require onboard toilet facilities 
if the journey is longer than 2 hours. Although this is clearly only a guideline, it does 
demonstrate that the facilities are considered to be essential for even relatively short 
occupancy intervals. Historically, the provision of sanitary means of sewage disposal 
has been considered to be a primary contributor to population health, and to be 
essential if major disease outbreaks (either as a result of direct contamination, 
facilitation of breeding of flies, rats or other disease vectors, or indirectly by 
contamination of drinking water supplies) are to be avoided in any population 
concentration. Natural disasters and major equipment malfunctions have occasionally 
caused treatment facilities to be unworkable. The resultant discharge of raw sewage 
into municipal waterways constitutes a significant hazard, requires significant 
remediation and is certainly not acceptable over even a medium term. For the 
apartment dweller, the lack of a workable method of the sanitary disposal of sewage 
will effectively reduce the apartment to the status of emergency accommodation, and 
the lack of this service will certainly involve significant and unwanted changes to the 
lifestyle of the apartment dweller. Without a functional sewage disposal system at the 
end-user level, apartment dwellers would be obliged to make very significant changes 
to their lives – perhaps by using portable sewage collection systems at street level, 
as was done in Christchurch following the 2011 earthquakes.  
Service and service level. The service, in this case, is the sanitary removal 
of human waste, as required, via the lavatory installed in a multi-storied apartment 
and resulting in the discharge of environmentally acceptable water to waterways or 
sea, and the final disposal of solid waste of environmentally acceptable specifications 
to landfill. In practice, many sewage treatment station processes will include 
bypasses, allowing untreated sewage to be dumped to waterways or sea in case of 
equipment failure or overload – however, such operations would not be within the 
service level definition. 
Example description and definition of boundaries.  
(a) The service commences with a water-flushed lavatory in an apartment. This 
initial operation also requires the availability of flushing water, which would 





header tank in the apartment block, and would require the power supply to the 
apartment building plus a level control system for the header tank.  
(b) Almost all city-scale sewage systems currently use gravity-fed systems, which 
are commonly clay or ceramic pipe systems or concrete and brick-lined 
tunnels in larger cities, to link dwellings to major pumping stations.  
(c) Pumping stations are commonly located in deep pits accessible from ground 
level, and incorporate large-capacity, low-head pumps that are commonly 
duplicated with changeover valve systems to allow maintenance. The 
pumping station pumps would commonly require three-phase 415 V power 
supplies, and a motor-start system operated by a control signal generated 
either locally or remotely. Multiple pumping stations between any one 
apartment and the local sewage treatment station may be required.  
(d) Sewage treatment commences with an initial coarse screen with a motor-
powered system for extracting large pieces. Screened waste goes to a 
sedimentation process with a powered scraper chain system for removing 
initial settled sludge and a pump to transfer this to the sludge treatment 
system. Waste from the initial sedimentation process is pumped to a trickle 
filter to remove finer particles and allow decomposition. An aerobic digester 
takes the trickle filter outlet and aerates this thoroughly using a powered air 
blower and a sparged air-contact system (deodorisation). A final clarifier 
allows spent digestate to settle and to be pumped to the sludge treatment 
system, and allows clarified and treated water to be discharged to oxygenation 
ponds. Oxygenation ponds allow natural oxidation processes to eliminate 
bacteria.  
(e) Treated water is discharged to waterways. 
(f) Treatment plant sludge is commonly digested anaerobically to generate 
methane and bio-solids.  
(g) Bio-solids are mechanically dewatered and conveyed into trucks. 
(h) Trucks convey the dewatered bio-solids to landfill.  
Explanation. As electrical power supplies to sewage pumping stations and to 
local flushing water supply pumps are unlikely to have multiple feeders, these must 
be considered in the exemplar system, upstream to the nearest substation. The 





to be necessary for the exemplar systems to consider the electrical power supply 
further upstream. Significant pumping stations would commonly have a "local/manual" 
capability, in which a remote control is normal, but allowing an operator to select 
"manual" at the pumping station and thereafter to operate the pumps and valves 
locally. As the dewatered and treated solid waste is disposed to landfill, the example 
must include the road transport aspects, the landfill capacity and the waterway 
discharge and testing. Some treatment plants include embedded cogeneration using 
the anaerobic digester gas; others do not. As the embedded cogeneration is not in 
any way necessary to the operation of the sewage treatment station, it is not 
considered here.  
As electrical power supplies to sewage pumping stations and to local flushing 
water supply pumps are unlikely to have multiple feeders, these must be considered 
as contributing to E1 values downstream from the nearest substation. Although 
substation configurations vary, these commonly have multiple in-feeds; thus, it is not 
reasonable to assume that a representative substation has exposure at the E3 level. 
Significant pumping stations would commonly have a "local/manual" capability, in 
which a remote control is normal, but allowing an operator to select "manual" at the 
pumping station and thereafter to operate the pumps and valves locally. As the 
dewatered and treated solid waste is disposed to landfill, the example must include 
the road transport aspects, the landfill capacity and the waterway discharge and 
testing. Some treatment plants include embedded cogeneration using the anaerobic 
digester gas; others do not. As the embedded cogeneration is not in any way 
necessary to the operation of the sewage treatment station, it is not considered here. 
Confirmation that example description is representative. An informal 
survey of the configuration of sewage systems used by cities within this size range, 
specifically Auckland, Melbourne, Sydney and also Wellington, reveals a level of 
uniformity, and hence the configuration in the example is considered to be 
"representative”. There are still some smaller cities that rely on the discharge of 
sewage to the sea; however, this is neither common nor desirable practice. Some 
treatment plants include embedded cogeneration using the anaerobic digester gas; 
others do not. A representative cogeneration system is described, but no contribution 





5.4.2 Example study #2: collaboratively developed work information 
Initial description. The service, in this case, is the capability to store and 
retrieve, view, edit and share information; although the title specifies work information 
that could include client lists, design information, accounting records, reference 
information, academic papers and contractual agreements, other vital information 
such as family records, important writings, ethical, political and regulatory information 
and music will be very similar. The "information" addressed by this example should 
be considered to be complex, because the definition could be expected to include 
text, music, images, design information and databases and should be considered to 
have at least potential longer term significance. The definition also specifies storage 
(although the storage term is not defined). The definition specifies sharing (hence 
transmission to a defined recipient and an integrity check). The definition includes 
"edit", implying that the information can be updated in some way that is intelligible to 
self and others. The example assumes that the end-user has normal eyesight, that 
material is in a mutually understandable language and that the user has the financial 
resources to obtain communication services.  
Very little editable information is truly analogue; almost all reference 
information is in, or can readily be represented in, a digital form. Issues relevant to 
the selection of "example information" include: is the format specified and whether 
this is or is not publicly available; to a lesser extent, is the format commonly used, 
versatile and capable of including complex information in an editable and storable 
form? Options for "example information" would include a photograph, spreadsheet, 
word document, engineering drawing or pdf file. The example that is selected is the 
exchange and updating of a simple spreadsheet. The technological aspects of this 
example will therefore be much broader and more complex than ephemeral 
messages such as an SMS message or a shout of warning, and will include the 
consumer electronics (end-user equipment ‒ hardware and software), the 
communications network and the remote end-user equipment. The significant issues 
to be addressed in the development of this example are defining the granularity of the 
processes and streams and determining which processes and streams do not actually 
contribute to the boundary level of exposure (E3), i.e. are massively duplicated. 
Time-frame for analysis. As an “operational” time-frame is assumed, no 





means that there is no need to consider such issues or those of outdated and 
unsupported software or of hardware, such as a digital video disk (DVD) reader, 
maintenance or replacement. Although it does not impinge on the definition of the 
current example, it is noted that much concern has been raised over the longevity of 
current information storage approaches; this specific issue will be addressed when 
hypothetical changes to the example study are considered – and is particularly 
relevant for compressed and “lossy” representations such as JPG and MP3, which 
are dependent on complex algorithms to restore information to a presentable form, 
and for “closed” representational formats such as those used on current DVDs. 
Justification for presentation of example. It can be observed that the 
storage and transmission of information is foundational to civilisation ‒ the recording 
of medical, veterinary and agricultural knowledge, the teaching of engineering, the 
recording of contracts and commitments, and the recording of family history 
information, cartography and chemical information are essential. A consulting 
engineer without access to functional email, or file server facilities, is likely to be 
unable to carry out expected tasks. Similarly, apartment dwellers are unlikely to have 
the storage space to hold significant tomes of family history or reference material but 
their lifestyles will be significantly impaired if that type of material is inaccessible and 
future generations are impoverished if recent learnings cannot be incorporated into 
the body of knowledge. The apartment dweller is also likely to be geographically 
remote from a “tribal village” and hence is dependent on records rather than oral 
history and local knowledge for life-context. For at least a significant portion of 
apartment dwellers, employment requires immediate access to both means of 
communication and stored and editable data. The inability to receive, store, update, 
edit and pass on information, such as that defined in the example scope, would 
effectively isolate a significant portion of the representative population from 
employment in their selected fields of expertise; as such, the lack of this service would 
effectively force significant lifestyle change upon the representative users. 
Service and service level. The definition of service delivery implies that the 
complex information can be read, seen and updated by more than one party, before 
being read by the intended recipient. The service will be deemed to be delivered when 
a representative user can read, at a convenient time, information created and updated 





a third party” implies that at least recent edits are reasonably possible. Note that the 
identification of a destination individual "alone" does not imply encryption, but that 
"read" does imply that the recipient can comprehend the information in the same way 
as it was sent, edited, sent and stored. The service definition can then be refined to 
mean that a representative user can read, at a convenient time, a simple analysis 
spreadsheet that has been transmitted to the representative user alone, and can in 
turn edit the document and dispatch it to another party. 
Example description and definition of boundaries. This example describes 
a PC being used to view and edit a spreadsheet that has been developed by a remote 
colleague and emailed.  
(a) User’s PC, with power supply, operating system and software. 
(b) Data communications, which has a local component, an internet transmission 
path (which is considered to be a common subsystem by this thesis) and a 
remote component to the remote user’s PC. 
(c) The remote colleague’s PC with power supply, operating system and software. 
Confirmation that example description is representative. Statistics for 
Australia and New Zealand show that a large proportion of the population have either 
laptops or "smart phones", and hence are assumed to also have the financial means 
to connect to the internet, and the intellectual capability to operate the devices. 
Allowing for the percentage of population who are either too young or incapacitated, 
this indicates that the exemplar end-user is representative of a large proportion of the 
population. Not only are the example details considered to be representative of the 
specific service that is considered, but also the example is considered to be 
essentially identical to the case of an electronic (EFTPOS) financial transaction; in 
that case, an EFTPOS terminal is used instead of a laptop and a piece of bank-owned 
software is used instead of the second end-user. 
5.4.3 Example study #3: local fuel supply  
Initial description. The service, in this case, is the supply of petrol at a local 
petrol station. The scope must consider the operation of the dispensing pumps, the 
local fuel storage tanks, the metering and transactional services, the refilling of the 
underground tanks from fuel stored in national reserves and the creation, from crude 





source. New Zealand currently has only one refinery. As the station is unlikely to have 
duplicated power feeders from the nearest substation, this supply must be 
considered. The local substation will probably have at least dual in-feeds from the 
national grid; thus, there is no need to consider power supply security further back 
than it. The financial transaction subsystem (EFTPOS) is covered elsewhere. A 
staffed station is assumed and hence staff facilities including sewage and water 
supply are required.  
Time-frame for analysis. An “operational” time-frame is assumed; hence 
maintenance and replacement of components are not envisaged. Although petrol 
stations have some storage, the refilling of the underground tanks from fuel stored in 
national reserves can be accomplished by only a limited number of approaches, which 
must occur frequently, and therefore will be considered to be an operational issue.  
Justification for presentation of example. Within very large cities, the 
population density generally makes good public transport economic and allows a 
citizen to carry out normal functions, such as grocery shopping and commuting to 
work, using public transport. For the size of city considered (of a population between 
about 200,000 and 500,000), public transport coverage and frequency commonly 
make such activities as grocery shopping and commuting to work only marginally 
practical for many, and the distances are arguably too long for many to reasonably 
walk. For such representative persons, the lack of an operational private vehicle will 
certainly cause significant disruption to lifestyle. 
Service and service level. The service is achieved when pre- or post-
purchased petrol, whose quality is within the standard fuel specification limits, is 
supplied at a normal flow-rate, to a vehicle parked in the forecourt of the petrol station. 
Example detailed description and definition of boundaries.  
(a) Petrol pumps are operable if both fuel and electrical power to operate the 
pumps are available.  
(b) The pumps can be operated if the fuel can be metered, a local control and 
data collection system, to transmit the amount pumped to the cashier, is 
functional and a capable operator is available. The fuel metering will be 





(c) As the station is not automated, the availability of a capable operator is 
practical only if an operational water supply, an operational sewage disposal 
system and power for lighting and security are available.  
(d) A customer financial transaction is required, and is proposed to be EFTPOS. 
(e) As the station storage is limited, the supply of the bulk fuel must be considered.  
(f) The production of bulk motor specification fuel from crude oil must be 
considered, noting that New Zealand has a single refinery.  
Confirmation that example description is representative. For the type of 
petrol station described, the processes and equipment are observably very similar 
across a wide range of locations internationally.  
5.4.4 Example study #4: targeted first-aid 
Initial description. The service, in this case, is the correct application of a 
first-aid measure. A significant number of unpredictable medical events could possibly 
affect an apartment dweller. In many cases, these can be life threatening; in a 
significant proportion of examples, the correct application of first-aid can markedly 
improve the probability of avoiding injury or death. Illustratively, these could include 
electrocution, poisoning, acute allergic reactions, cardiac arrest, acute asthma attack 
and arterial bleeding from an accidental cut. The accepted approach for treating acute 
choking, i.e. a foreign body blockage of the airway, is known as the “Heimlich 
manoeuvre” and is selected for this example. An acute airway blockage can present 
itself unpredictably, quickly and without warning. In the context of a representative 
apartment dweller, in a situation where a person’s airway has become blocked, the 
person’s life is under threat within a matter of minutes. The remedy for this particular 
situation is simple provided that the diagnosis is made quickly and accurately, and 
that the procedure is described.  
Making the assumption that the end-user does not have significant first-aid 
training, they are reliant on a specific technological approach to get the “service”, i.e. 
the diagnosis and the treatment information that is required. This example will 
consider the contribution of the technological system to their vulnerability. The 
example has similarities to the work information example and the financial transaction 
subsystem – however, it differs because this system requires only one-way 





Time-frame for analysis. Only an “operational” time-frame can be 
considered. The essence of the issue is very short term access to critical diagnostic 
and treatment information – the process is either successful or disastrous within a few 
minutes, i.e. it has a defined time interval. There is no option for repairs or 
maintenance to technological systems or components during the defined time interval. 
Justification for presentation of example. Life-threatening medical 
emergencies can certainly occur for the apartment dweller. For emergencies that 
involve loss of airway, acute loss of blood or electrocution (to name a few), the time 
interval between instantiation and death is an order of magnitude shorter than the 
time for even a quickly dispatched paramedic to arrive. For such situations, life or 
death will depend upon the ability of a co-dweller to diagnose the problem, identify 
the appropriate life-saving measure and apply that measure. A targeted first-aid 
example represents a case where the life and well-being of the apartment dweller is 
critically affected and is therefore justifiably included. The diagnosis of choking is not 
difficult but it may also not be trivial. The Heimlich manoeuvre is not difficult to perform; 
however, it is not intuitively obvious – it needs a detailed explanation to be made quite 
quickly available to the first-aider. The example illustrates a case in which some trivial 
assistance may be required to fully understand a situation and, having achieved that, 
where some very specific and detailed information must be transferred to a person 
within a short period of time. As the apartment dweller has no real knowledge of 
geographically close experts, and is dependent on technological approaches for 
diagnosis and treatment method, the current technological means of providing the 
“service” does contribute to the end-user’s current vulnerability. 
Service and service level. The service is defined by the delivery of the 
detailed description of the manoeuvre, to the first-aider, in a form that can be 
appreciated. The service level is defined by time. If complete airway obstruction has 
occurred, the choked person could suffer permanent brain damage within 4‒6 
minutes and death within 10‒15 minutes. 
Example description and definition of boundaries.  
(a) The first-aider communicates symptoms and understands the required action, 
which is described by a remote expert. 
(b) The communication system is needed to identify and contact the remote 





is qualified. Assuming that a qualified person or other knowledge source is 
identified and contacted, he, she or it will probably have no problem in 
diagnosing the problem or recommending the solution.  
(c) The provision of the first-aid advice depends critically on the availability of a 
knowledge base that has the capability to understand symptoms, to allow 
confirmation and refinement of these symptoms and to identify and describe 
recommended actions in a form and timeliness to allow remedy. 
Explanation. The example description is adequately covered in the initial 
description. It might be significant to make a differential diagnosis between choking 
and heart-attack, but this is unlikely – circumstances and history are likely to make 
the diagnosis of choking clear. Therefore, the necessity is for the co-dweller (strictly 
speaking, the Heimlich manoeuvre can be performed by the choking victim alone) to 
access a source of information, identify the condition and receive detailed instruction 
on the treatment – within the time-frame that will preserve life. The person making the 
diagnosis and applying the treatment is likely to use a “smart phone” to access an 
internet-based medical self-diagnosis service, and follow the treatment. The example 
definition of service does not consider outcomes; simply, the information that is 
necessary to enable an effective remedy to the medical condition is conveyed, in a 
manner that can reasonably be expected to be comprehensible, to the co-inhabitant. 
Confirmation that example description is representative. There are large 
bodies of literature and institutions devoted to the named topic of “first-aid”, strongly 
suggesting that the field is considered to be significant and there is the real possibility 
of improving a medical outcome using minimal, i.e. non-specialised and non-
professional, procedures. The general field is therefore considered to be 
representative of a broad spectrum of “first-aid” procedures. As most first-aid 
procedures require minimal equipment and rely primarily on diagnosis and simple 
actions applied quickly, the Heimlich manoeuvre can be considered to be 
representative of a first-aid procedure, because it requires no equipment, requires 
immediate action and primarily requires diagnosis and knowledge. Although many 
local or national medical services do offer “helpline” types of access to human experts, 
and emergency calls to ambulance services are available to bring paramedics to a 





(n.d.) service and the St Johns organisation’s first-aid advice (n.d.); therefore, the 
technological approach presumed for the example is considered to be representative. 
5.4.5 Example study #5: perishable food 
Initial description. The service, in this case, is the supply of a perishable 
food. Vegetables, fruit, dairy products, meat and fish and bakery products could be 
considered. Fresh whole milk is selected because it is a staple food and requires a 
technological system that is similar to that required by other nominally processed fresh 
food. Nevertheless, the technological system is not trivial ‒ the pasteurisation step 
requires close control if bacteriological safety is to be obtained without deterioration 
of the nutritional and taste qualities. The example will therefore consider the 
aggregation, processing, transport and retailing of milk. As a large number of cows, 
located in a wide area, produce the raw material and a large number of tankers are 
capable of farm collection, it is reasonable to consider that scope beyond the 
processing plant's reception area is adequately duplicated. The example considers 
that the availability of a consumer pack of acceptable quality whole milk, in the 
refrigerator of the user’s apartment, is the correct end-point of the example. 
Time-frame for analysis. An operational time-frame will be considered. This 
implies that neither equipment maintenance nor equipment replacement is required. 
Consumables such as “cleaning-in-place” (CIP) chemicals and fuel need to be 
considered. Financial services are necessary for retail transactions and fuel, drivers, 
vehicles and roads are necessary for transport, but maintenance is not considered to 
be necessary within the operational time-frame. 
Justification for presentation of example. The apartment dweller obviously 
needs food, although it could be argued that it is possible to survive without any fresh 
food and/or by eating out as an alternative to purchasing, storing and cooking food. It 
would be very common for apartment dwellers to purchase, store for the short term 
and use fresh food ‒ and deprivation of this capability would constitute a “significant 
change to lifestyle”. This justifies the consideration of a fresh food example. Fresh 
milk is a very common food ‒ alone or as an ingredient. Usage is common across age 
groups, cultures and socio-economic classes. It can be considered to be a 
representative fresh food. As moderately similar systems would be required for the 





of a category of goods or services whose non-availability would cause significant 
lifestyle change. 
Service and service level. The service and the service level are defined by 
the availability, to a representative individual consumer, on demand, of whole milk 
with acceptable bacteriological, nutritional and taste properties (and Codex standard 
protein, fat etc. levels) at the point of use, which is the apartment refrigerator. 
Example description and definition of boundaries. 
(a) At the delivery point (where the service and the service level are supplied), a 
working refrigerator and electrical power are required. Transit to the apartment 
requires electrical power to operate the elevator.  
(b) Transport from the retail outlet to the consumer location requires fuel, a driver, 
an operational vehicle and roads.  
(c) The purchase requires availability of the product, a retail outlet and a 
transaction system. 
(d) The retail outlet requires staff, electrical power, functional lighting, 
communications and a stocktaking system. 
(e) The retail outlet requires a functional sewage system and a functional water 
supply.  
(f) The retail outlet requires the bulk transport of consumer packages. 
(g) The processing and packaging system, pasteurisation equipment, control 
system, CIP system, CIP chemical supply, pipework and valve changeover 
system for CIP, electrically powered pumps, electrically operated air 
compressors, fuel and fired hot water heaters, packaging equipment, 
packaging material supplies, water supply, waste water disposal, sewage 
system and skilled operators. As limited numbers of processing plants are 
practically accessible for the retail outlet, these must be considered. Although 
there will be variation in packaging equipment types, each of these can be 
considered to be a single process and a single "weakness". Processing plants 
are staffed and therefore require an operational sewage disposal system. 
Processing plants require a substantial water supply for processing, CIP and 
staff facilities. 
(h) On-farm processing is not considered; the scope boundary is at the outlet of 





Explanation. Power is required for the processing facility, for the retail outlet 
and for the end-user’s refrigerator. These power supplies can be considered to be 
separate. As neither the processing facilities, nor the retail outlet, nor the apartment 
would commonly have duplicated electrical power feeders, these and associated 
protection systems must be considered back to the nearest substation. The substation 
can be assumed to have multiple input feeders; thus, the electrical power system need 
not be considered any further "upstream" than the substation. The hot water boiler 
and hot water circulation system for the pasteuriser would commonly be fired with fuel 
oil, but including enough storage that it would commonly be supplied directly from a 
fuel wholesaler, hence applying a portion of the processes noted in relation to the fuel 
supply example. 
Confirmation that example description is representative. The processes 
leading from raw milk collection, up to the point where pasteurised and chilled milk is 
packaged, are defined in considerable detail by regulatory bodies such as the 
International Dairy Federation and Codex milk formulations ‒ and can therefore be 
considered to be representative. Distribution to supermarkets, retail sales and 
distribution to individual dwellings are similar across most of the western world and 
are considered to be adequately representative as are the processes from retail outlet 
to end-user availability. 
5.4.6 Example study #6: essential specific medicine 
Initial description. The service, in this case, is the supply of an essential 
medicine that enables an apartment dweller to continue to function at a normal level. 
This example could consider either a new vaccine that is researched, developed and 
distributed in response to a new disease or a well-known medicine that is required on 
an ongoing basis for a chronic condition (e.g. insulin, Ventolin™) or a well-known 
medication that is needed for a not-infrequent acute condition (e.g. penicillin). The 
new vaccine example is not selected as an example to be studied because, although 
there are standard processes for attempting to find or develop a vaccine, it is not 
certain that these are sufficiently standardised that a described system will be able to 
be confirmed to be representative.  
The “vulnerability” criterion suggests the selection of a medicine that is needed 





availability would result in significant lifestyle change for those requiring the medicine. 
For useful analysis, a medicine should have a well-known composition and synthesis. 
For regularly used medicines, the World Health Organisation (WHO) publishes a 
model list of essential medicines. The medicine selected from this list for study is 
salbutamol sulphate, commonly marketed as “Ventolin™”, which has been used 
widely for the relief of acute bronchospasm (asthma). Without this common medicine, 
many persons’ ability to function adequately will be affected. This example will 
illustrate the synthesis, and delivery models, without the ill-defined discovery aspect 
that is associated with developing a vaccine for a new epidemic. The service will be 
considered to have been delivered when a fully charged metered-dose Ventolin™ 
inhaler is handed over to a user. It is useful to note that, although Ventolin™ is 
commonly administered by metered-dose inhaler (MDI), it is actually quite possible 
(although less convenient) to administer the salbutamol sulphate orally, intravenously 
or using a hand-pumped nebuliser (atomiser) to provide fine droplets of dissolved 
substance. The dose tolerance is high, allowing many alternative delivery options to 
be considered to be feasible.  
Time-frame for analysis. As an operational time-frame is to be analysed, no 
significant maintenance or replacement of equipment or processes will be required. 
Because MDIs are not refillable, they will be treated as consumable items. As 
relatively large supplies of salbutamol can be produced with a fixed set of reaction 
glassware, an operational time-frame clearly need not take account of the 
maintenance or replacement of this equipment. As relatively large numbers of MDI 
devices can be filled and sealed by a production line, an “operational” time-frame 
clearly need not take account of the maintenance or replacement of the filling and 
packaging equipment. 
Justification for presentation of example. There are a number of medical 
conditions that allow a person to live a reasonably normal life with treatment, but 
would severely reduce their capabilities without treatment. Asthma affects a 
significant portion of the western world’s population, and specifically about 800,000 
New Zealanders are affected by asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder and 
other respiratory conditions; if not controlled, they can lead to significantly decreased 
ability of the individual to function. Certainly, for many people, the lifestyle that is 





Within a longer time-frame, although asthma is defined as a reversible 
bronchospasm, repeated episodes, i.e. as would occur without adequate medical 
control, lead to progressively irreversible damage to the lungs and to longer term 
impairment. The simple “Ventolin”™ bronchodilator, using the salbutamol sulphate 
active ingredient, is very widely used and is generally effective in controlling 
bronchospasm. The effects upon lifestyle and the significance of the proportion of the 
population affected justify the inclusion of an example of this type, and the 
effectiveness of Ventolin™ justifies its specific example. 
Service and service level. The service level criteria are defined in terms of 
delivery of the medication, of adequate purity and known strength, to the end-user, in 
a form that the end-user can use. As the medication is normally self-administered, the 
criterion is the availability of the active ingredient, in a form that allows self-
administration, using available equipment, as required. Because the medication is 
normally administered via an MDI, this will be assumed to be the basis of the example. 
It is noted that, although the active ingredient, salbutamol sulphate, is normally 
administered using an MDI, it can be taken orally or given intravenously, and, because 
the effects of exceeding the recommended dose are generally not severe, the dosage 
is not particularly critical.  
Example description and definition of boundaries.  
(a) User acquisition of MDI: financial transaction. Pharmaceutical dispensing 
systems including financial transactions, as most countries have at least part 
charges.  
(b) User acquisition of MDI: prescribing permission. Medical diagnostic and 
prescribing systems, which include regulatory issues, financial transaction 
systems and availability of skilled staff 
(c) MDI filling, packaging and distribution. The filling of MDIs requires loading with 
the active ingredient formulation, pressurisation with propellant, assembly of 
metering valve and sealing and swaging of the completed unit (under clean-
room conditions). Assembly of the consumer package requires attaching the 
printed label to the MDI, folding and gluing the printed box, packing of the 
inhaler and information sheet and the distribution of filled MDIs. Shipping and 





(d) Manufacture of MDI container and distribution. Manufacture and filling of MDI 
containers. Components are container, propellants, formulation, metering 
valve and actuator (plastic mouthpiece/holder). The container is manufactured 
by a deep-drawing operation, taking an aluminium sheet as the raw material 
and using an electrohydraulic deep-drawing press to create the container. The 
metering valve is created using two pieces of equipment. The perforated 
actuation tube that releases the dose when depressed, and allows the loading 
of another dose of propellant plus active ingredient, when released from 
depression, would normally be formed using an electrically operated CNC 
lathe, from an aluminium or plastic tube stock. The metered-dose chamber is 
formed by a deep-drawing operation that is similar to that used to form the 
container (the chamber must hold a metered dose, at a pressure similar to that 
in the main container but of smaller volume) and minor components such as 
spring, tube seals etc. The container and cap are each formed by a common 
electrically operated pressure-injection process using a thermoplastic. The 
metering valve is assembled using common semi-automated processes. 
(e) MDI active ingredient distribution. Distribution via a traceable distribution 
chain. 
(f) MDI active ingredient – synthesis, testing and dilution. Creation of the active 
ingredient. Assembly of raw feedstock materials, which are available from a 
large number of sources, for the synthesis of salbutamol. Synthesis of the 
active compound, confirmation of purity and analysis. This process has been 
optimised to a six-stage chemical process as described by Imperial College 
(2016) "ChemWiki" ‘Synthesis of Salbutamol’. It is assumed that the active 
compound is made in only one location. Steps include the creation of a 
formulation, including dilution with an acceptable substrate, of the active 
compound, packaging and cold storage of the active ingredient, ordering and 
payment system and related communication systems to allow wholesale 
distribution of the active ingredient, and the distribution chain for the active 
ingredient to national level factories that are responsible for the manufacture 
and filling of MDIs. 
Explanation. As MDIs are normally carried on the person, and do not require 





multiple options for the pickup of MDIs by end-users are available, these are also not 
considered to contribute to the defined exposure. 
Confirmation that the example description is representative. The "end-
user" is not a named individual, but must be demonstrated to be "representative". The 
criteria for "representative" are set out earlier and, as current medical statistics identify 
asthma as a very common condition, it is considered that an asthma sufferer can 
reasonably be identified to be representative of a portion of the target population. 
Ventolin™ is very commonly prescribed for the relief of even acute and severe 
asthma, and can thus be considered to be a representative treatment.  
5.4.7 Homogeneous system example 
This section will describe the development of a representation of a 
homogeneous system. This will be a completely hypothetical example, and will not be 
verified by interviews etc. Its only purpose is to demonstrate that an exposure metric 
can be developed for a homogeneous system example and to assess the insights 
available from the analysis of exposure.  
 
 






Considering the system shown in Figure 10, the individual streams and 
dependencies can be represented as follows (using the notation “Pa” to represent 
process node or vertex A, and “LM” to represent the edge from vertex L to vertex M). 
Out IF    (Pm AND (LM OR KM)) 
KM IF    (Pk AND (JK OR IK)) 
JK IF    (Pj AND CJ) 
CJ IF    (Pc AND AC) 
AC IF    (Pa AND Input) 
IK IF    ( Pi AND DI) 
DI IF    ( Pd AND AD) 
AD IF    (Pa AND Input) 
LM IF    (Pl AND HL) 
HL IF    (Ph AND (EH OR GH)) 
EH IF    (Pe AND BE) 
GH IF    (Pg AND FG) 
BE IF    (Pb AND DB) 
DB IF    (Pd AND AD) 
FG IF    (Pf AND BF) 
BF  IF    (Pb and DB) 
Substituting the input conditions for intermediate streams, the complete system can 
be represented by Equation 9: 
 
Equation 9 
It is to be expected that, as this is a homogeneous system, the resulting 
Boolean expression is shown to be dependent only on the processes and the single 
input stream. The total exposure of the system can be shown to be {2, 2, 4}, and the 
analysis of exposure is shown to illustrate the actual vulnerability of the system. 
Although this example does show that it is possible to represent a homogeneous 
system as a Boolean expression and to calculate the associated exposure, it can be 
noted that few, if any, systems are truly homogeneous; for example, a computer 
communications network will require processors, power and memory at each node, 
as well as connections to the other nodes. 
5.4.8 Dynamic system example: newspaper vendor example 
Many aspects of supply chains have been studied extensively, and the field of 
study of this thesis has been carefully distinguished from those. It is however valuable 
to apply the theoretical basis of this thesis to a classical problem in order to illustrate 





The “newspaper vendor problem” is a classical problem in the field of 
operations research and supply chain theory. This example problem is described by 
Khouja (1999), although many other authors have proposed variations to consider 
risk aversion, resale discounting and limited stock exchange. In Khouja’s explanation 
of this model, a newspaper seller purchases a stock of newspapers from a wholesaler 
and sells them one by one to purchasers over the course of a day. The model’s 
premises are: (a) the newspaper stock must be purchased once, at the start of each 
day; (b) the demand for purchased papers is variable; (c) unsold papers have zero 
value at the end of the day; (d) the vendor wishes to maximise profit. 
This thesis investigates the technological barriers to the availability of the 
nominated services, and how the technological aspects contribute to the vulnerability 
of the end-user of the services. This example will be studied on that basis. An 
“operational” time-frame for analysis is assumed, i.e. it is assumed that the newspaper 
vendor’s shoulder bag, the roads and the newspaper production facilities remain 
operational for the time-frame of the analysis and require neither repair nor 
replacement. In this case, the service for the end-user is the acquisition of a 
newspaper. In other examples studied in this thesis, the process for transporting 
goods or services to the place of use has been considered; however, for this case, it 
is equally likely that the purchased newspaper will be read on the train or bus, and 
the final transport step is not normally considered in the models that are published in 
the context of operational research. The classical “newspaper vendor” study does not 
consider the capacity of the newspaper production plant, or its continued operation; 
these are assumed.  
Assumptions made in the current thesis study of this classical problem are as 
follows.  
• There is no technological reason but only a profit maximisation reason why 
the newspaper vendor cannot order sufficient papers. It is assumed that the 
printer’s capacity is not limited.  
• There is no interchange of stock amongst vendors during the day ‒ if that were 
possible, the process description would include a range of "OR" gates to 
illustrate the fact that a vendor could have multiple potential suppliers of stock, 
and, assuming good communication and logistics, there would effectively be 





• The vendor's ability to purchase "sufficient" papers is not constrained by the 
vendor’s financial capability.  
• Each purchaser has the financial means to purchase a newspaper. 
The model for analysis within this thesis then reduces to the following.  
(a) The purchaser is assumed to be at a location used for retail sales by the 
vendor.  
(b) The purchaser (end-user) carries out a minor financial transaction to purchase 
the newspaper. 
(c) The vendor has transported himself or herself to the normal sales location, 
carrying the stock of papers. 
(d) The vendor has completed a financial transaction with the newspaper supplier, 
for the purchase of stock. 
5.5  Conclusion to the definition of examples 
The process for assembling the initial datasets must provide data that can be 
analysed in following tasks, but must also be demonstrably valid and representative, 
as set out in the project methodology. The assembly of data has been documented 
sufficiently well to allow replication of the results by a competent researcher or 
independent validation of the results by a review of the input data. This chapter 
supplies all the material needed for the analysis to be documented in the following 
chapter, and has carefully considered the granularity of the representations and the 
configurations of the system, including the design redundancies. The subsystem 
definitions align with the Chapter 6 tables that analyse the contribution of each 






6. CALCULATION OF EXPOSURE OF EXAMPLES 
6.1 Introduction  
Having developed a theoretical basis for the evaluation, and having selected 
and described a suite of examples, this section implements the analysis and presents 
the results. Several approaches to the calculation of exposure values are considered 
in this section and, after examination, an approach that is appropriate for the 
examples is selected and refined. The refinement includes the establishment of 
reasonable limits of calculation. The implementation of the analysis method is 
described. For the analysis of the examples, analyses at subsystem level are 
presented – the subsystems are those described in Chapter 5. The full analysis that 
considers all processes and streams, and all relationships, is presented in Appendix 
B to this thesis. This section describes the steps taken to validate the analysis method, 
and to verify the results. Chapter 5 included validation that the example descriptions 
and scopes were valid for the purposes of analysis.  
In addition to analysing the examples that have been specifically selected for 
study, this chapter also applies the analytical method to an illustrative homogeneous 
system and to a dynamic system (newspaper vendor) problem. The analysis of the 
homogeneous system demonstrates that such a system can indeed be shown to be 
a special case of the category of heterogeneous systems, and that the exposure of 
such a system can be calculated and shown to offer useful insights. The application 
to the dynamic system is presented simply to demonstrate application to a classical 
supply chain optimisation problem – and, in this case, also shows valid conclusions. 
The exposure metrics obtained for each of the example studies are discussed, in 
terms of absolute values, significant characteristics and relative magnitude. 
6.2 Application of the analysis method to the examples 
6.2.1 Implementation of the analysis method 
This section will refine the proposed analysis method. The process for 
implementation of the analysis approach will also be developed as will the process for 
the setting-up of inputs. This task and section will include the enumeration and 
description of failure combinations that imply one, two, three or more weakness points 





intermediate streams that are required for multiple dependent streams ‒ this may 
result in weighting according to the exposure reduction offered. Generating the 
qualitative analysis outcomes will be by inspection, reasoning and deduction. Three 
approaches to the generation of the quantitative outputs are considered. 
(a) Algorithmic approach. It is possible to construct an algorithm that will 
systematically test each possible combination of inputs to the Boolean 
expression representing the technological system. For a system with n inputs 
(processes and input streams), this equates to (2n ‒ 1) combinations. It is 
possible to design more computationally efficient algorithms that initially 
establish, by testing, all of the (n) E1 values, then establish, by further testing, 
all of the (2(n ‒ E1) ‒ 1) combinations, counting the E2 values (i.e. testing all two-
input combinations, and only counting those that did not trigger the E1 criteria) 
and then establish, by further testing, all possible E3 values and only counting 
those that did not trigger either the E2 criteria or the E1 criteria. 
(b) The progressively contributory approach. Noting the generalised calculation 
approach presented in Section 4.5, it would be possible to develop a 
methodology that started with the processes and streams that are most distant 
from the end-user, to calculate their contribution to exposure and to apply this 
approach recursively to processes and streams next closer to the end-user 
until the exposure value applicable to the end-user is derived.  
(c) Inspection. The exposure metric can be derived by simple inspection of the 
well-defined Boolean expression and the well-defined process definitions.  
The selection of the process for the generation of quantitative results is on the 
basis of "simplest approach, achieving fit-for-purpose". Initial estimates of the 
numbers of processes and streams involved, and the complexity of the configurations, 
suggest that the (c) approach is practical and can be shown to yield correct results. 
6.2.2 Representation and verification of analysis results 
Different descriptions of the exemplar systems appear in three places: 
Chapter 5 establishes that the exemplar process is representative of processes used 
in typical cities of the 200,000‒500,000 population range selected, and identifies 
major subsystems, dependencies, design redundancies used in actual systems and 





appendix (Appendix B), each process and each stream associated with each 
subsystem are identified, and the logical relationships (logical gates) that describe the 
system configuration are defined. The exposure values derived in the spreadsheet 
are then presented in Chapter 6. The use of a consistent set of subsystems between 
Chapter 5, Chapter 6 and Appendix B make it less likely that key items are omitted or 
incorrectly accounted for. The process therefore gives a good level of assurance that 
the final derived values do represent the described and verified example.  
6.3 Analysis of examples 
Having described the example systems and confirmed that they are 
representative of real systems and established example boundaries, the exemplar 
systems and common subsystems are defined in Appendix B. The analyses of the 
common subsystems and the exemplar systems are reported in this section.  
6.3.1 Analysis of contributory systems 
This analysis is of the exemplar common subsystems, as described in Section 
5.3 of this thesis that contribute to various combinations of example studies. The 
analysis is undertaken separately to ensure the consistency of treatment across 
examples. The subsystems to be evaluated are internet communications and financial 
transactions. Power supply, road transport and potable water supply are treated 
separately within each example.  
Internet communications. The basic systems of the internet are responsible 
for an increasing proportion of total data transmission; this includes not only www 
page requests and email but also much of the traffic associated with phone calls and 
financial transactions; these include the software TCP/IP protocols that are used to 
disassemble and reassemble files from the local and T1 packet routing protocols, and 
the less visible but equally essential systems associated with domain name servers 
and border gateway protocols.  
Although the internet is designed to be able to survive multiple link failures, 
several factors have resulted in a situation where a relatively small number of very-
high-capacity transmission media actually carry a huge proportion of the total data 
traffic, and a relatively small number of high-capacity routers, with associated router-





internet traffic. What was a highly distributed network of connections, each having 
approximately equal capacity, has been refined by market pressures into a system in 
which a very few linkages actually have the capacity for the imposed traffic – although 
other paths for data may exist, they may be totally incapable of handling the traffic if 
the main linkage became unavailable.  
Technological contributor 
 
Legend:  E1 is the number of single proc/stream failure exposure.  E2 is the duel 
proc/stream exposure (excluding E1’s), E3 is the triple proc/stream 
exposure (excluding E1’s and E2’s). 
Exposure 
contribution 
E1 E2 E3 
Household router exchanges packets via the simple telephone 
system's copper wires to the roadside DSLAM system that 
commonly serves a city suburb.  
2 0 0 
 The roadside DSLAM facility multiplexes the packets exchanged 
with the complete suburb's internet connections, and exchanges 
these with the ISP's point of presence, which is commonly located 
in a telephone exchange building serving a city.  
2 1 0 
The ISP's point of presence is also a "peering point", connecting 
to other national "peering points". The ISP's point of presence 
exchanges packets with other national peering points, allowing 
full internet connections.  
5 3 0 
File transferred from network access point to peering point. 3 2 0 
Data transfer via undersea cable. For offshore connections, ISP's 
purchase bandwidth from organisations that provide and service 
undersea cables, and packets are forwarded from the peering 
point, via undersea cable, to the offshore equivalent of the 
peering point.  
1 7 0 
At the distant end, a mirror image process leads to the exchange 
of packets to the distant router's termination point. 
12 6 0 
TOTALS (not summed, because various examples use 
different sections of this standardised system) 
   












Financial transactions. EFTPOS transaction systems are ubiquitous in New 
Zealand; few people carry cash and there are cases, such as the Huntly library in the 
Waikato (2016), where cash is no longer accepted (this issue is in dispute).  
Technological contributor 
Legend:  E1 is the number of single proc/stream failure exposure.  E2 is the duel 
proc/stream exposure (excluding E1’s), E3 is the triple proc/stream 
exposure (excluding E1’s and E2’s).  
Exposure 
contribution 
E1 E2 E3 
The EFTPOS terminal, which fulfils a similar function to a 
domestic router, obtains a merchant-to-user transaction request 
and ensures the security protocols for the communication of 
packets. 
3 0 0 
Communications from EFTPOS terminal to acquirer bank. 12 6 0 
The accept message to the EFTPOS terminal will originate from 
the acquirer bank. The acquirer bank will issue the accept 
message once the user's bank has accepted the transfer of funds 
to the acquirer’s bank and it has queued the transfer of funds to 
the merchant’s bank. 
8 0 1 
Communications acquirer bank to user’s bank. 12 6 0 
The user’s bank will confirm the transfer of funds to the acquirer’s 
bank once it has confirmed that the EFTPOS transfer request 
refers to an account whose user has accepted the bank 
conditions, i.e. is valid, and has sufficient credit.  
7 0 0 
Communications acquirer bank to merchant bank. 0 0 0 
The acquirer bank will confirm the queuing of the transfer of funds 
to the merchant’s bank once it has confirmation from the 
merchant’s bank that the merchant has accepted the bank terms 
and has a valid account. 
7 0 0 
TOTALS  49 12 1 
Table 9: EFTPOS subsystems and exposure 
6.3.2 Analysis of example study #1: sewage system 
The definition and analysis of the sewage system supplied to the apartment 
user shows that the system can be considered in three sections: those closely 
associated with the user and the apartment, the sewage pipework system and the 









Legend:  E1 is the number of single proc/stream failure exposure.  E2 is the duel 
proc/stream exposure (excluding E1’s), E3 is the triple proc/stream 
exposure (excluding E1’s and E2’s). 
Exposure 
contribution 
E1 E2 E3 
Apartment systems 
These contribute significantly to the E1 value, i.e. represent single 
points of failure. These include the pump to supply water to the 
header tank, its power supply, the apartment toilet and the 
pipework to the local sewer header.  
4 0 0 
The sewage pipework and pumping system 
This subsystem makes only a nominal contribution of 2 to the E1 
value and of 2 to the E2 value: this observation illustrates a 
contrast between the analysis of exposure as affecting the user 
and the potential cost for a utility provider. The 2011 earthquakes 
in Christchurch caused multiple breaks in a very large proportion 
of the total pipework system, leading to a 2015 recommendation 
to completely replace the city's sewage system.  
6 2 0 
The sewage treatment plant 
There is variation between the extents of duplication of major 
components in plants in different cities ‒ the example that has 
been analysed is considered to be representative. In most plants, 
major components are provided with various bypasses; these will 
allow sewage to be removed from the apartment, but will result in 
the discharge of untreated sewage to waterways. 
18 2 2 
Cogeneration system 
Digested sludge – not essential. 
0 0 0 
Final disposal 
The treated liquid. 
6 0 4 
TOTALS  34 4 6 
Table 10: Sewage example subsystems and exposure 
 
Whether the definition of the service includes a requirement for 
environmentally acceptable discharge will have a major effect on the exposure values. 
If the definition of service allows the dumping of untreated sewage into waterways, 
then the defined service is not affected by the availability of the sewage treatment 
system. As skilled operators are required for sewage treatment plants, they contribute 
to the exposure of these systems. Multiple vehicles and personnel are considered to 
be capable of the transport of bio-solids; thus, this is assessed to contribute only to 
exposures of higher order than E3. The local road system is required for the disposal 





available to trucks, this is considered to be a contribution to an “E” value higher than 
E3.  
The combined metric is analysed as {34, 4, 6}. The largest numerical 
contributor to the evaluated “E” value is actually from the multi-stage process required 
by the sewage treatment plant; this contribution is very closely associated with the 
definition of the “service”, which stipulates “environmentally acceptable discharge”. 
The pipework system from the user to the treatment plant makes a significant 
contribution to the total exposure, because there is a need to account for the length 
of the pipe sections. The significance of this issue has been demonstrated by the 
experiences of Christchurch, following the 2011 earthquakes. Sewage disposal is 
dependent on a power supply, which is local to the user, for a booster pump and on 
a power supply for the treatment plant. The treatment plant power supply is more 
significant and hence more difficult to substitute, but the necessity is linked to the 
requirement for an environmentally acceptable discharge quality. As the end-user 
payment for sewage removal services is via quarterly municipal “rates” bills, an 
electronic financial transaction system is not a contributor to the end-user’s exposure 
in this case. Road system and power supply requirements are in common with other 
examples; however, the absence of an immediate need for a financial transaction 
service is noteworthy. 
Summary. This analysis of the exposure of the technology chain evaluates 
the vulnerability that it imposes on the end-use. Specifically, this analysis shows that, 
as for many services, the contribution of services close to the end-user is noteworthy. 
In this case, the gravity-fed pipework system from the user to the pumping station 
represents a significant vulnerability for the end-user, a conclusion that is validated 
by the experience of Christchurch citizens after the 2011 earthquake. The major 
contributor to the numerical exposure is the multiple sequential stages of treatment 
that are needed to transform the sewage into streams that can be discharged without 
environmental damage.  
6.3.3 Independent risk analysis of sewage system 
An independent consultant was tasked with carrying out a risk analysis of a 
sewage system. The scoping of the study was aligned with the example study, and 





points of exposure that are identified as a result of the analysis in Section 6.3.2. It is 
possible that these unidentified exposure points were considered by the consultant to 
have a low risk of hazard; however, the value of that assumption is shown to be 
limited.  
6.3.4 Analysis of example study #2: collaboratively developed work 
information 
This example study can be considered to be two local operations and an internet 
connection. The operations local to both of the end-users contribute, as might be 
expected, significantly to the E1 value. Contributors include the power supply to two 
computers and routers, data wiring via the telephone system, normally referred to as 
the “plain old telephone system” (POTS), and to the two local internet points of 
presence and the power supply wiring to the local substation. The internet system is 
considered separately, as a standard subsystem. 
Technological contributor 
 
Legend:  E1 is the number of single proc/stream failure exposure.  E2 is the duel 
proc/stream exposure (excluding E1’s), E3 is the triple proc/stream 
exposure (excluding E1’s and E2’s). 
Exposure 
contribution 
E1 E2 E3 
Local end-user functions 
The local end-user components and inputs include a functional 
local PC (considered to be a single hardware unit), a local PC 
power supply (which includes local and household wiring as 
contributors to the E1 value), a local substation transformer that 
contributes 1 to an E2 exposure and an assessed contributor to 
the E3 value from the national grid power supply.  
In addition to the PC hardware, the local PC operating system, 
email client software and file display software (spreadsheet) are 
considered to contribute separately to the E1 value, because each 
can be targeted independently of each other and independently 
of the PC hardware.  
6 1 1 
Data communications  
This is the internet communication subsystem – from local router 
to remote personal router. 
25 19 0 
Remote user systems 
The remote user components and inputs are essentially identical 
(in terms of their contributions to exposure) to those of the end-
user.  
7 1 1 
TOTALS  38 21 2 






In considering the granularity of the analysis, it is noted that, for most current 
PCs, as both the operating system and the applications are in volatile storage and 
can be “attacked” separately, both contribute to the E1 value. The internet connection 
that is sandwiched between the two users generates a significant contribution to the 
higher E values, arising from the multiple parallel transmission paths of T3 and T1 
carriers. This is true for the representative example; however, there are certainly real 
cases where the level of redundancy is nil. In 2011, an old lady cut off Albania’s 
internet connection with her shovel, while scavenging for copper. Local routers are 
powered from the household 230 VAC power supplies and, as representative 
examples do not have uninterruptible power supplies (UPS), the household power 
supply contributes to system exposure even when the PC has a significant battery 
life. The ubiquity of the internet system for data transfer needs to be noted; also, 
although a representative configuration (i.e. an exposure value) can be defended, 
actual situations can differ. At a public meeting to discuss disaster preparedness in a 
small New Zealand town, locals expressed confidence that they had cell phones, 
landline phones and internet communications – and then found that all of these 
services were carried on a single fibre-optic cable.  
In another age, the person generating the data (the topic of this example) 
would have posted a hard copy to a colleague. That approach actually incorporated 
many E1 values, and generates interesting comparisons with the internet. A letter that 
has been destroyed cannot be recreated, whereas a corrupted data packet can be 
resent until an ACK advises that the received message checksums are valid, and 
hence error-free transmission has occurred. 
6.3.5 Analysis of example study #3: local fuel supply 
For the common case of an individual motorist seeking to refuel a vehicle, a 
local distribution centre, i.e. a petrol station, retails a bulk commodity. The commodity 
(petrol) is created in a centralised facility (refinery) and is distributed via a nationwide 











Legend:  E1 is the number of single proc/stream failure exposure.  E2 is the duel 
proc/stream exposure (excluding E1’s), E3 is the triple proc/stream 
exposure (excluding E1’s and E2’s). 
Exposure 
contribution 
E1 E2 E3 
Petrol station pumping system 
The system that pumps petrol from the underground storage 
tanks to the client’s vehicle.  
For the defined example, a skilled operator is required. 
5 1 1 
Pump control and metering system 
A control signal is required to operate the pumps (on/off) and a 
metering system is required to tally the quantity of fuel dispensed. 
7 1 1 
Petrol station staff facilities 
A staffed station requires water, sewage and power (required also 
for other systems). 
36 4 6 
Petrol station transactions 
EFTPOS financial transaction required. 
49 12 1 
National bulk supply chain 
Fuel is distributed nationally using road tankers; these require 
vehicles, fuel, drivers and roadways, all of which contribute. 
1 2 3 
Production of fuel 
In New Zealand, there is a single refinery, which accepts crude 
oil and distills ISO standard petrol. There are also multiple points 
at which refined petrol can be imported, and cross-availability 
agreements between companies who retain stocks. 
0 0 0 
TOTALS  98 20 12 
Table 12: Local fuel supply example subsystems and exposure 
 
The systems at the forecourt make a significant contribution to the total 
exposure; it is useful to note that metering and control systems for pumps contribute 
as well as the actual pumps. The financial transaction (EFTPOS and banking) system 
actually affects all examples that rely on a retailer-to-consumer transaction, and is a 
major contributor to E values. Road transport uses vehicles that are commonly 
available, and hence actually contributes little to the higher exposure values. A 
manned petrol station has been selected for the example; the station cannot be 
operated without staff present, and this incurs the vulnerability to the end-user of a 
petrol station that is inoperable because staff facilities (sewage disposal, provision of 
water and light) are unavailable. These facilities make a major contribution to the 
exposure that the complete system incurs for the end-user. 
Summary. This analysis of the exposure of the technology chain evaluates 





despite the statistical reliability of the internet, the end-user is vulnerable to the non-
availability of internet services, which includes not only the common subsystem that 
has been defined but also the domestic router, the power supply and the PC operating 
system and drivers. Non-availability is noted as involving not only technological 
failures but also technological effects such as surveillance, which may make the 
internet effectively unavailable to some users. This example considers the user’s 
capability to view a file, and this incurs a vulnerability associated with file format 
capability. 
6.3.6 Analysis of example study #4: targeted first-aid 
The technological system associated with this end-user need is actually very 
similar to the “work information” example. In both cases, basic PC and internet access 
technologies that are used directly by the end-user, who in this case is the first-aider, 
contribute to the E1 values. The internet communications system itself is a significant 
contributor to both the E1 values and the higher E values; this topic has been covered 
in detail elsewhere. 
Technology contributor 
Legend:  E1 is the number of single proc/stream failure exposure.  E2 is the duel 
proc/stream exposure (excluding E1’s), E3 is the triple proc/stream 
exposure (excluding E1’s and E2’s). 
Exposure 
contribution 
E1 E2 E3 
Local end-user functions 
The local end-user components and inputs include a local PC and 
power supply, which includes local and household wiring as 
contributors to the E1 value, a local substation that contributes to 
E2 and E3 values. The local PC operating system and the 
software contribute separately to the E1 value, because each can 
be targeted independently. 
5 1 1 
Internet communications 
 In the way that the example is constructed, this requires the use 
of a complete internet communications system. 
13 13 0 
Selected static response 
At the remote “end”, this application reaches a different situation 
from the “work” example: the input can, is simply a case of 
identifying the correct diagnosis and presenting the response. 
5 0 0 
TOTALS  23 14 1 
Table 13: First-aid example subsystems and exposure 
 
A significant difference between this example and the work information 





If the “Heimlich manoeuvre” can be identified as the information required, then a static 
information source is quite adequate – nothing needs to be generated in real time at 
the “end” of the technology chain that is furthest from the end-user. 
As with the “work information” example, the exposure generated by the 
internet data transmission hardware and protocols is a major contributor to this 
example. The home PC “subsystem” is also a subsystem that contributes, but to a 
lesser extent.  
At the “far end”, i.e. the end furthest from the user, more than one option for 
the identification of a diagnosis and for the provision of the first-aid information could 
have been assumed with approximately equal validity. A human physician, for 
example, and an emergency department specialist, could interact with the end-user, 
or an expert system shell could be used to refine the diagnosis and provide advice. 
Summary. This analysis of the exposure of the technology chain evaluates 
the vulnerability that it imposes on the end-use. Because the example proposes an 
internet-mediated communication, the analysis shows that the end-user is vulnerable 
to non-availability of the internet. The user, i.e. the first-aider, is also vulnerable to a 
failure of the consultant system, whether human or artificial, that generates the 
diagnosis and recommends treatment. 
6.3.7 Analysis of example study #5: perishable food 
This is an example where exposure is spread throughout a technological 
system, with major local contributions from only the financial transaction system and 
local power supplies. As the “service” is defined in terms of the product in the end-
user’s refrigerator, contributors to exposure include the apartment power supply and 














Legend:  E1 is the number of single proc/stream failure exposure.  E2 is the duel 
proc/stream exposure (excluding E1’s), E3 is the triple proc/stream 
exposure (excluding E1’s and E2’s). 
Exposure 
contribution 
E1 E2 E3 
User storage 
The example also assumes that the user can store the milk in a 
refrigerator that requires power. 
4 0 0 
User transport  
Processes associated with transport of consumer quantities of 
fresh milk to individual user’s premises make a limited 
contribution to the end-user’s exposure as the example assumes 
use of the user’s own transport.  
0 0 0 
Retail transaction 
The purchase of the fresh milk in consumer quantities from the 
retailer requires the full EFTPOS system, which is treated as a 
subsystem and contributes to the exposure of the end-user. 
49 12 1 
Retailer system 
The retailer requires power, stock checking and refrigeration 
systems, which contribute. 
3 2 1 
Retailer staff facilities 
The retail outlet, described in the example, is unworkable without 
staff, and is therefore unworkable without staff facilities. Potable 
water has been assessed to have only a low exposure (E1 = 1); 
however, the sewage system, as previously analysed, makes a 
very significant contribution to the total exposure.  
35 4 6 
 Bulk transport to local retail facility  
The transport to the retailer contributes little to the exposure down 
to E3 levels because there are very many transport alternatives.  
2 1 2 
Raw milk processing 
Processing phase – from reception of the raw milk to the 
generation of the processed, quality-controlled and packaged 
milk product in a form that can achieve a stated shelf life requires 
testing to confirm quality and payment basis, pasteurisation and 
standardisation. The example shows that a representative 
processing plant packages the standardised and pasteurised milk 
into consumer packs for dispatch to retailer. 
22 2 0 
Raw milk collection system 
The supply of raw milk to the processing centre involves a very 
large number of farms and a significant number of bulk transport 
options. None contribute to exposure levels in the E1, E2 or E3 
levels, these are not considered in this analysis. 
The metering testing and billing systems do contribute. 
13 1 2 
TOTALS  128 22 12 






As there are very many farms, the supply of raw milk contributes to an “E” 
value higher than 3. Similarly, there are enough alternative road routes, tankers and 
drivers to ensure that no contribution to “E” values below E3 are made by these 
processes and streams. For the representative example, it is assumed that, although 
there may be more than three processing facilities in a country, as supply chains are 
assumed to be regional, these facilities are deemed to contribute to E2 values. As one 
of the essential input streams, for which not adequate storage technology exists, 
electrical power remains a contributor to the exposure of this technological system, 
and, although the national grid is likely to have many generators and significant 
transmission line redundancy, local power supply options commonly do not include 
those levels of design redundancy. Power is used at more than one point, even though 
distinctly different power sources and distribution systems are involved, and therefore 
these add separately to the exposure. As with all systems involving end-user 
purchase, the financial transaction system (EFTPOS) contributes a large exposure to 
the end-user. As with other examples, staff with particular skills are essential; if 
unskilled staff can carry out tasks with the help of instructional material, this 
significantly decreases the exposure to a lack of skilled staff; a fully automated retail 
facility or delivery system would also reduce the exposure offered by the retail facility. 
Staff facilities, and particularly sewage disposal systems, contribute significantly. 
Summary. This analysis of the exposure of the technology chain evaluates 
the vulnerability that it imposes on the end-use. Specifically, this analysis shows that 
the end-user is vulnerable to the failure of the financial transaction system (EFTPOS) 
that has been used for the example, and this system, in turn, is vulnerable to failures 
of the internet communications system. As noted previously, non-availability can 
result either from a direct technological failure or from a technologically incurred 
feature such as surveillance capability, which renders the system effectively 
unavailable to the user. For a short-shelf-life product, dependence on a single 
centralised processing facility incurs vulnerability for the end-user. Transport systems 
have high levels of design redundancy and therefore incur minimal vulnerability. In 
addition to the vulnerabilities associated with the transactional facility, the retail 
facility’s dependence on staff, and hence staff facilities, incurs significant 





6.3.8 Analysis of example study #6: essential specific medicine 
The supply of an essential specific medicine is a complex process. The 
technological system that places an MDI in a user’s hands involves a local retail and 
regulatory system, a distribution supply chain and a multi-component manufacture 
and packaging system.  
Technological contributor 
 
Legend:  E1 is the number of single proc/stream failure exposure.  E2 is the duel 
proc/stream exposure (excluding E1’s), E3 is the triple proc/stream 
exposure (excluding E1’s and E2’s). 
Exposure 
contribution 
E1 E2 E3 
User acquisition of MDI: financial transaction 
The delivery, into the user’s hands, of a filled and functional 
Ventolin™ MDI is the end-point of this subsystem and the service 
level assigned for this example. For Australia and New Zealand, 
as part charges on medication such as Ventolin™ MDIs are 
levied, a financial transaction is required.  
49 12 5 
User acquisition of MDI: prescribing permission 
MDIs are acquired from pharmacies, which acquire wholesale 
stock and require a prescription from a medical practitioner as a 
prerequisite for dispensing. 
0 0 1 
MDI filling, packaging and distribution 
Following manufacture and distribution of MDI parts, the 
canisters are filled with the propellant and the active ingredient, 
and the metering chamber with metering valve is assembled and 
sealed to the canister. The completed unit is labelled and 
packaged, and the individually packaged MDIs are distributed in 
bulk packs.  
4 1 1 
MDI: manufacture of container and distribution 
The design of MDIs has become reasonably standardised, and 
manufacture requires deep drawing of the canister and the 
metering chamber and the retaining cap from aluminium strip-
stock, and the CNC machining of the hollow metering valve 
system. Near-identical MDI designs and a moderate number of 
manufacturing plants exist.  
1 2 2 
MDI active ingredient – distribution 
Trackable distribution chain for sterile, diluted active ingredient. 
0 0 0 
MDI active ingredient – synthesis, testing and dilution 
A “six-step” salbutamol synthesis process has become common. 
This uses commonly available chemical feedstocks and has a 
good yield. The purified salbutamol is distributed in standardised 
concentrations for packaging. 
4 0 1 
TOTALS  58 15 10 






The aluminium strip, from which the MDI bodies are formed, is considered to 
be available from very many sources, and to contribute to “E” values higher than E3. 
Although there are alternative suppliers for the completed inhalers, in practice only a 
single branded type is available in most pharmacies; therefore, it seems to be 
reasonable to consider the production process. As with many other examples, the 
processes closest to the end-user contribute significantly to the end-user’s exposure.  
It is noteworthy that, although the MDI has become the most common method 
of administration, salbutamol can be effectively administered either via nebuliser or 
by intravenous injection: The vast majority of the contribution to the exposure value is 
associated with the manufacture, filling and distribution of the MDI, rather than the 
creation of the active ingredient or the dilution of the active ingredient into a form that 
can potentially be administered. If the active ingredient were available to the user, 
there is little technological reason why the basic user requirement could not be met 
with a much lower level of exposure. Some countries do have completely free health 
services, but most, including New Zealand, require a contribution from the end-user 
which, as a reasonable representation of reality, requires the involvement of the 
EFTPOS financial system; this system, plus the associated internet data transfer 
mechanism, is a significant contributor to the end-user’s total exposure. 
Summary. This analysis of the exposure of the technology chain evaluates 
the vulnerability that it imposes on the end-use. For this example, analysis shows that 
the end-user is vulnerable to the availability of the financial transaction system, which 
in turn is vulnerable to the availability of the internet system. As noted previously, the 
transport system has high levels of design redundancy and therefore incurs little 
vulnerability. The manufacture of the MDI canister also incurs limited vulnerability, but 
the local filling operations do incur notable vulnerability and the centralised synthesis 
of the active ingredient also incurs significant vulnerability. 
6.4 Application of theoretical basis to other examples 
6.4.1 Application to homogeneous system examples 
A single, completely hypothetical example of a homogenous system will be 
analysed for weaknesses (exposure points). This analysis would be expected only to 





graph theory approaches. This analysis would also serve to demonstrate how the 
proposed analysis of the exposure level can contribute insights in addition to those 
available from graph theory approaches. 
6.4.2 Analysis of the dynamic system (newspaper vendor) 
Assumptions made in the study are as follows. (a) There is no technological 
reason, only a profit maximisation reason, why the newspaper vendor cannot order 
sufficient papers; there is assumed to be no limit to either the printery capacity or the 
vendor’s purchasing capacity. (b) There is no interchange of stock amongst vendors 
during the day ‒ if that were possible, the process description would include a range 
of "OR" gates to illustrate the fact that a vendor could have multiple potential suppliers 
of stock, and, assuming good communication and logistics, there would effectively be 
only a trivial problem remaining. (c) The vendor's ability to purchase "sufficient" papers 
is not constrained by the vendor’s financial capability. (d) Each purchaser has the 
financial means to purchase a newspaper. 
The model for analysis, then reduces to:  
(a) The purchaser is assumed to be at a location used for retail sales by the 
vendor. 
(b) The purchaser carries out a minor financial transaction to purchase the 
newspaper. 
(c) The vendor has transported himself or herself to the normal sales location, 
carrying stock 
(d) The vendor has completed a financial transaction with the newspaper supplier 
for the purchase of stock. 
The exposure metric is shown to be {4, 0, 0}. The E1 value (4) reflects the 
possible failure of the input stream, i.e. papers from the newspaper producer, failure 
of fuel or road to allow transport from the point of bulk supply purchase to the point of 
sale and non-availability of the newspaper vendor. As the model relates to a single 
vendor, selling a single product that is sourced from a single point, there are no 
contributors to E2 or E3 values, i.e. there are no combinations of two or three failures, 






The whole newspaper vendor “problem” is an operational research problem of 
optimising a variable (profit) under conditions of uncertain demand and fixed supply 
cost – a semi-dynamic effect. If the vendor could download an electronic copy of the 
paper, a local printer could generate papers as required, paying the printery only the 
royalty for each copy sold. Such a change would eliminate the problem of predicting 
demand but this technological change would introduce the technological 
vulnerabilities of the printing process, including the availability of power, paper and 
communications to the newspaper file supplier. It is unclear whether the change would 
actually decrease the exposure of the end-user.  
Assuming that only cash transactions are possible, the newspaper vendor is 
one of the examples that has the lowest technological exposure of all of the example 
studies, and it is difficult to develop a technological solution that has lower exposure. 
The example almost epitomises a case where the end-user is minimally vulnerable to 
technological failures.  
6.5 Conclusions  
This chapter has summarised and interpreted the findings from the analysis 
and review of the initial examples. This chapter has also summarised and interpreted 
the findings from the analysis of the homogeneous system example and from the “risk 
analysis” of the selected example studies. The detailed analysis has revealed 
subsystems that contribute to more than one example, but are not common across all 
examples. The examples have identified themes and issues that are common across 
all examples, to various extents, allowing both generalised conclusions and a claim 
that the conclusions can reasonably be further generalised.  
The examples, as initially defined, have included a range of measures that 
have already reduced exposure. The use of shipping containers has allowed 
standardised handling equipment and the use of protection equipment has allowed 
effective design redundancy in national power supply grids. The use of standardised 
motor fuel specifications and standardised container road transport has allowed large 
levels of effective transport redundancy to be achieved. Although the examples are 
historical, it should be noted that almost all basic engineering standards, e.g. TEFC 





ISO OSI data specifications and open document format specifications, contribute 
significantly to the reduction in vulnerability of engineering equipment. 
This analysis and the summary have answered RQ(a): “For goods or services 
delivered to end-users, what measure of vulnerability can be attributed to the 
technological systems that are currently used?” 
6.5.1 Limitations 
The analyses have illuminated several difficulties with the actual determination 
of exposure; these issues are worthy of comment. In particular, it has been found that 
it is important to establish a reasonable granularity for systems such as a long sewage 
pipe. Simplistically, such a pipe would contribute a "1" the end-user's E1 value. Such 
a conclusion fails to recognise that sections of the pipe can fail independently of other 
sections, and thus can be considered to be separate weaknesses. A reasonable 
assessment of granularity has therefore been applied, assigning cumulative E1 
contributions to defined lengths of collection pipework. Similarly, it is important to 
establish a reasonable granularity for such items as a PC, which may contain billions 
of transistors, yet only a few simple and easily replaceable major components, and 
simple but large industrial equipment such as a trickle filter for sewage. The criteria 
proposed in Section 5.2.2 have been adopted. 
The analysis has asserted that some streams, including power from the 
national grid, international shipping and the road network, commonly have more than 
three independent sources and hence can be considered to be unconditionally 
available. These assertions are justified, in detail, within the analysis of the specific 
examples, although exceptions occur in real systems where, for example, a 
community is served by a single road and a single power feeder. 
The analyses have identified that issues of practical availability frequently 
exist; these commonly involve situations in which a user can access a service only by 
agreeing to specific contractual conditions. These situations need to be correctly 
identified as contributors to the E1 exposure value. 
6.5.2 Specific conclusions for initial examples 
This section summarises the analyses of each of the examples studied, 





Sewage system. Although the major contributor to exposure is the sewage 
treatment plant, it is notable that this exposure is predicated on the definition of the 
service, viz. the environmentally acceptable treatment of sewage. Had the service 
been defined as "the removal of sewage from the apartment", then the existence of 
bypasses for various stages of sewage treatment would have indicated a much lower 
total exposure. The treatment actually applied to the sewage is not complex, but 
economies of scale have led to the use of a single, centralised treatment plant. 
The second largest contributor to end-user exposure is the pipework leading 
from the apartment to the treatment plant and particularly the gravity-fed pipework 
leading to the first pumping station. Following the 2011 Christchurch earthquakes, 
multiple disruptions of sewage pipework were a source of considerable difficulty, and 
cost estimates for repair were enormous. Sewage holding tanks for individual 
dwellings are used in semi-rural locations, but are not commonly used for urban 
locations or apartments; hence, the sewage collection pipework is a single point of 
exposure. Similarly, there is some degree of holding capacity in the settlement ponds 
and trickle filter tanks of the sewage treatment plant, perhaps sufficient to allow the 
replacement of small motors, but the holding capacity is not large. Power supply is 
essential to both the pumping stations and the operation of the sewage treatment 
plant; some plants use methane from anaerobic digestion of sewage to operate a 
cogeneration plant and provide power locally ‒ although common, this was not 
considered to be sufficiently representative as to be included in the example definition. 
Loss of power supplied from the grid is therefore still considered to contribute to the 
exposure of the complete system. Although both are ultimately supplied from the 
national grid, the geographical separation makes it reasonable to expect that the 
pumping station supply and the sewage treatment plant supply will be sourced from 
separate substations and will certainly use separate low voltage feeders. 
Work information. As would be expected, the internet communications 
system is the largest contributor to the system’s exposure, and it should be noted that, 
although the internet was originally proposed to have large design redundancy, the 
pressures to achieve economies of scale have resulted in increased dependence on 
fewer and faster communications links; this dependence has increased the levels of 
exposure. For individuals, access to the internet is via a commercial agreement with 





terms, e.g. re privacy of communications, are unacceptable to the user. This issue is 
also relevant for ISPs seeking access to international carriers. The user’s PC, 
operating system, applications and power supply also contribute to the user’s 
vulnerability and these contributors can be reduced, as indicated in Chapter 7 of this 
thesis.  
Fuel. As most petrol stations have more than four pumps, the petrol station 
pumping equipment is massively duplicated and therefore does not actually contribute 
to the end-user's vulnerability at the E3 level. The largest contribution in this example 
is from the EFTPOS transaction requirement and the second largest is from the 
services required to allow staff to operate the petrol station. In defining the example, 
it was recognised that automated stations exist and require no staff, and that limited 
facilities for automated cash payments exist; however, it was argued that the staffed 
station using EFTPOS was representative of very many actual stations. The exposure 
contributed by the EFTPOS system arises not only from the communications 
requirements but also from an acknowledgement that such a transaction requires 
several parties to enter commercial agreements that potentially are unacceptable to 
them, and are therefore potential sources of practical unavailability. The staff facilities, 
and particularly the provision of sewage disposal and power, are sources of exposure 
and hence end-user vulnerability, but there is no real need to consider these as a 
source of a "feedback loop". 
First-aid. The details of the proposed system have been justified as 
representative; however, other possible approaches to providing this particular 
service could be considered to be equally representative. Under the described 
system, the contributors to exposure are moderately similar to those for the work 
information example, except for two important distinctions: (a) an automated search 
facility rather than another user are at the remote end of the communications system; 
(b) as the information supplied is static, i.e. generally will not change over a 
reasonable period of time, only a lookup system rather than an interactive system, as 
for the work information example, is required. This example requires care to describe 
the "user" as the person seeking the diagnosis and remedy, and to distinguish this 
person from the victim of the choking. 
Perishable food. The fresh food example is distinguished by the need to 





distribute and retail the treated product. As the raw material is accumulated from a 
large number of farms, the actual raw material supply does not contribute significantly 
to exposure at the E3 level, but the impracticality of long-distance transport and 
storage means that the processing plant does contribute to exposure, and the legal 
necessities of pasteurisation do not allow the processing plant to be bypassed. 
Pasteurisation, standardisation of protein and fat levels, and testing require close 
process control, which increase the economies of scale available from a centralised 
plant. The retail (EFTPOS) financial transaction necessities, and the retail staff facility 
necessities are similar to those for the petrol station example and contribute 
significantly to the end-user's exposure. As there are many transport options for raw 
material supply and for the distribution of wholesale products, these do not contribute 
significantly to the end-user's vulnerability. 
Essential medicine. Although, the chemical nature of the salbutamol 
molecule and the preferred method of synthesis are public knowledge, production of 
the purified and tested salbutamol is typically highly centralised. This centralisation is 
driven partly by economies of scale and partly by quality assurance requirements. 
The design of the MDI canisters is patented and thus public knowledge ‒ and the 
processes are standard metal production processes (deep-drawing, machining and 
crimping). Both the active ingredients (salbutamol, dilutant and propellant) and the 
MDI canister are high-value, long-life and low-volume items, and hence are readily 
amenable to stockpiling. Perhaps surprisingly, therefore, the major contribution to the 
end-user vulnerability is that associated with the final EFTPOS purchase transaction. 
Although it is recognised that cash transactions are possible, the EFTPOS transaction 
was justified as being representative in the example definitions. For a typical user, the 
medical practitioner permission, i.e. the legal requirements for access to prescription 
medicines, also contributes to the user's exposure. 
6.5.3 Analysis of relative total exposure of actual examples 
The total exposure of the analysed examples has been shown to be heavily 
influenced by the precise nature of the scope boundaries and the assumptions 
incorporated into the design of the examples. An objective of the thesis was to allow 
effort between infrastructures to be prioritised. An outcome that has perhaps been 





subsystems because their effect has tended to overshadow the exposure metrics 
associated with the more central and obvious aspects of the examples. 
6.5.4 Analysis of aspects that recur across examples 
A small number of common subsystems have been identified. The exposure 
contribution of each has been estimated and the values have been added consistently 
to the examples using these standard subsystems. Some subsystems, notably road 
transport and power supply, were not included as standard subsystems in the 
analyses presented in Chapter 5 and the initial sections of Chapter 6. The decision to 
treat these separately within examples, as opposed to treating them as standard 
subsystems, was made because, although the subsystem services were common, 
their delivery varied significantly between examples. Cross-checking between 
examples has been used to ensure a consistent treatment of subsystems such as 
road transport and power supply. 
6.5.5 Analysis of generalisable features of each example 
The examples that have been studied were chosen to illustrate a wide variety 
of technological systems and were chosen specifically to cover high- and lower-tech 
subsystems, and situations with offshore and onshore components. Each exemplar 
system does include aspects that can be generalised, and their identification is 
valuable. In particular, it can be noted that may of the studies show examples of cases 
where economic considerations (economies of scale) have progressively led to highly 
centralised production systems, whose final designs make large contributions to the 
end-user's exposure.  
Sewage system. The treatment of sewage is an example of a collection 
system, with a single point of processing, with limited options for storage at large scale 
(as for the fuel example) and with limited options for storage at the user end. The 
system is distinctive because there are practical, although highly undesirable, options 
for bypassing the treatment system. 
Work information. The analysis of the work information example illustrates 
the need for data formats that are mutually comprehensible by persons at distant ends 





communications system used. The example is generalisable to any field in which two 
individuals exchange and mutually contribute to some dataset, e.g. a document. 
Fuel. The fuel supply example is characteristic of a system in which goods are 
created at a single point and are distributed via a supply chain, with retail facilities for 
the end-user. Fuel could be considered to be a moderate value item, making 
significant storage impractical at user premises. As fuel is considered to have strategic 
value, there is large-scale storage at a national scale. There are standard 
specifications for fuel, facilitating at least options for local production. 
First-aid. The "first-aid" example is characterised by the need to access 
essentially static information (diagnostic and treatment advice) quickly. In the 
example, the data are held remotely and are accessed via a communications system 
and a remote data-search facility. In the example, both the communications system 
and the remote search facility contribute significant exposure. For any case in which 
static information is needed locally, there is no need for the information to be held 
remotely; it is entirely possible for reference information to be held locally. This 
conclusion can be generalised and shown to be applicable to fields including 
engineering and physics information, agricultural information, food processing 
information, animal husbandry and more general human and animal diagnostic and 
treatment information. 
Perishable food. The fresh milk example is characteristic of many short-shelf-
life products, featuring progressive creation and limited options for storage because 
of the characteristically rapid onset of spoilage combined with a low-value and high-
volume, high-throughput product. Short-shelf-life products will generally require 
frequent retail activity, and hence both transport and the use of cash or EFTPOS 
systems. 
Essential medicine. The essential medical supply example, examining the 
salbutamol MDI supply, is an example of a case in which components, whose makeup 
is public knowledge and that have a long shelf life, are progressively assembled into 
a final consumer device. This example can be generalised to cases where long-shelf-
life streams are assembled. Stockpiling of intermediate and indeed final products can 
be designed to exceed maximum expected times to recreate processes. Ventolin™ ‒ 











7. EFFECT OF HYPOTHETICAL CHANGES TO EXAMPLES 
7.1 Introduction 
Two approaches will be used in the process of hypothesising changes to the 
selected examples: (1) each example will be scrutinised for features that are specific 
to that example and that could be changed; (2) a set of standardised approaches will 
be considered. The examples that have been studied have been shown to be 
representative, but have necessarily assumed defined service levels as a requirement 
for the analysis. The exposure has not been re-estimated for different service levels 
but, for some examples, such variations are expected to have significant effects on 
the calculated exposure. As a notable example, if sewage can be discharged without 
environmental consideration, all of the treatment plant processes can be bypassed 
and the exposure of the user can be reduced. The examples as described have 
necessarily included some specific choices and design features. Approaches to 
decreasing the exposure for some of these features will be described in this section; 
it could be argued that the analysis process has contributed to highlighting these 
options. For each example, the hypothetical changes are described and their effects 
on exposure and hence on the user’s vulnerability are assessed. A summary of 
changes is provided, noting the type of each hypothesised change and an 
assessment of the economic and technical effort required and of the magnitude of the 
effect. 
7.2 Common features likely to offer significant reduction of exposure  
It is possible to identify several categories of hypothetical change. Examining 
each such category helps to identify valuable hypothetical changes within the 
examples. 
7.2.1 Local storage 
A static analysis of technological systems has been presented, because the 
weaknesses of technological systems are static. Nevertheless, it is useful to consider 
the possibility that a local store of some intermediate stream can, within certain 
criteria, have a similar effect to a configurational change. Two scenarios are 
examined. Firstly, a cache of an intermediate product can continue to supply that 





established. Secondly, a cache of an intermediate product can continue to supply that 
stream to an upstream process until an alternative source is found, if the normal 
source fails. 
 
Figure 11 Local storage effect 
 
Robertson (2010) considered the relationship between time-to-disaster and 
time-to-replace or time-to-repair. Figure 11 illustrates the effect of a cache on a 
system and shows that, if a cache, i.e. a local store of an intermediate stream, is 
sufficient to allow the repair of a supplying process before the cache is exhausted at 
the normal usage rate, then the local cache can be considered in the same way as 
an alternative process, with E2 being equal to 1. If a local stockpile of an intermediate 
stream is sufficient to allow the implementation of an alternative supplier of the 
intermediate stream before the store is exhausted at the normal usage rate, then the 
local cache can be considered in the same way as an externally available stream, 
with no contribution to E1. This criterion also implies that the supplying system has 
sufficient over-capacity with which to build up the cache. For cases where local 
storage cannot practically cover the time required to institute an alternative supply, it 
may still be valid to mention some qualitative decrease in vulnerability. The household 
storage of food supplies, water and fuel is highly significant for disaster situations, 
noting that disaster preparedness plans generally assume a relatively short period 





7.2.2 Technological substitution  
In many cases, alternative technologies may be substituted for existing 
technologies; such alternatives may allow significant reductions in exposure. This 
option is distinguished from the next by referencing only extant technologies. This 
category is particularly relevant to cases in which a current allocation of costs has 
resulted in one technology being preferred but not superior in any other way. In the 
context of this type of technological change, it must be noted that the existence of a 
durable and public specification for an intermediate stream will significantly promote 
alternative options for the stream’s supply. As practical availability contributes to 
exposure, a technological substitution that does not affect exposure to technological 
failure can reduce the total exposure by eliminating contributors to practical non-
availability. 
7.2.3 Technological breakthrough 
It is reasonable to at least consider the effect upon a particular example’s 
exposure should a specific technological capability become available. “Become 
available” could include several categories. 
(a) A technological capability that does not currently exist, e.g. a technology 
capable of the economical storage of MWh of electrical power at household 
scale. “Flow batteries” exist but are technically immature; pumped hydro is the 
only technically mature option for the storage of large quantities of power, and 
is restricted to very specific geographies. 
(b) Technology that is immature (in the terms of the NASA technology maturity 
index (2015)), e.g. “lab-on-a-chip” or “universal chemical fabrication” 
capabilities, or three-dimensional printing with engineering materials. 
(c) Technologies that are moderately mature but require optimisation for large-
scale use (macro-algae for sewage treatment and transport fuel production, at 
“village” scale).  
Hypothesised changes identified under this category do need some comment 
on both scientific possibility, i.e. precluding those that contravene laws of physics, and 
practicality, but that leaves a wide scope. It seems to be quite reasonable in the 
context of this study to consider advances that are currently only mentioned in SciFi 





food that is indistinguishable from “real” fresh food, but is synthesised from very basic 
raw materials. A number of technologies could be considered in this category, and 
would therefore include solar pyro-metallurgy, lab-on-a-chip, small-scale general-
purpose chemical synthesis and small-scale micromachining and fabrication.  
7.2.4 Re-purposable components 
The analysis of exposure considers the “availability” of a stream or process, 
with the general implication that a process is single purpose. It is quite possible to 
hypothesise a case where a multi-purpose component is substituted for a single-
purpose component, and thus reduces the “exposure”. Well-written instructions 
allowing a member of the public to carry out the functions of a specialised employee 
would be an example of this type. The human being is perhaps the best example of a 
re-purposable component. The level of diagnostic capability, tailored instructions and 
operational capability of the common external cardiac defibrillation units are an 
excellent example of the implementation of this principle. 
7.2.5 Repair priority or inherent difficulty of attack 
It is possible to consider that a specific failure would have such a major effect 
that heroic repair efforts would immediately be launched; hence repair would probably 
be completed before the effects of the outage were fully felt. It is also possible to 
hypothesise a case, such as the severance of an undersea cable, where the 
preliminaries to an attack would be very likely to attract attention before they 
succeeded. Such cases would allow hypothesising that, even though an exposure 
locus exists, its significance should be deprecated, on the assumption that either a 
hazard would be avoided or repair would be rapid and certain; for example, 
consideration that the outage of a very large utility will attract major repair efforts, 
whereas a localised sewage pipe defect may take a utility many weeks to address if 
there are thousands of others. This is a matter for comment within the analysis, rather 
than offering a hypothesis for change, and hence is not noted as a category of 
hypothetical change. Local bodies will give high priority to maintaining the function of 
sewage systems, but, following the Christchurch earthquakes in 2011, untreated 
sewage has leaked from the system for over 5 years; “portaloos” on residential street 





is to be abandoned and replaced by a new pressurised system. Despite urgency, 
quick repairs have not been possible. Under this heading, it is also relevant to note 
that commentators have periodically drawn attention to significant factors that are 
easily omitted from even well-structured analyses. Examples include the 
preponderance of internet services that are totally dependent upon advertising 
revenue for continuance, as no effective mechanism to enable user-funding has been 
set up. 
7.2.6 Standardised independent units and interfaces  
Where there are standardised components and/or standardised interface 
specifications and/or very many readily available substitution units, the actual 
exposure is reduced. Where publicly available interface specifications exist, the 
production of multiple options for use of the interface will tend to be encouraged. It 
may be argued that the success of the internet has been possible because the 
packetising of information allows standardised handling approaches and the well-
publicised TCP/IP protocols and mail, http, ftp etc., as defined by W3C, the Worldwide 
web consortium. All services allow very many suppliers to offer interoperable 
equipment. Other examples would include ISO-standard nuts and bolts, international 
fuel specifications, containerised shipping, micro-USB charging plugs and voltages, 
and Ethernet standards for communications protocols. An equally important 
application of this principle is the design of components for operation by multiple 
readily available tools – examples range from standardised nut and bolt sizes to a 
DVD format that can be read using a microscope rather than relying on a completely 
opaque specification plus firmware plus hardware and software. This concept is well 
understood in the mechanical engineering field, but has not yet been assimilated in 
the IT field. Programming languages appear to fail to implement this principle, 
although Java™ and, to a lesser extent, Microsoft’s .Net™ framework have attempted 
to do so. For data representation, the use of mark-up languages implemented in 
software is a good example of such an approach, because a text reader will allow a 
user to discern and edit the information represented. Open source document formats 
such as ODF (ISO/IEC 26300-3:2015 – “Information technology – Open Document 





7.2.7 Minimise exposure contributed by common subsystems 
Contributory systems: The analysis of examples has shown that large levels 
of end-user exposure are incurred when the provision of the goods or services is 
dependent on a significant technological subsystem that itself incorporates large 
levels of exposure. Use of a standardised subsystem such as internet 
communications may offer utility to the end-user, but the utility is associated with a 
very significant exposure. Technological alternatives that preserve the essential utility, 
but avoid the exposure contribution, need to be considered carefully. Small sensors 
and single-purpose devices can be created at low cost and can be connected to the 
internet; the functionality added by each is small, but the “exposure” added by each 
is significant and avoidable. Although disruption of major T1 links and associated 
routers is unlikely except briefly, the “Internet of Things” (IoT) allows burgeoning 
points of exposure for even local networks and other connected devices. Of particular 
concern are implanted medical devices, for which “exposure” is life threatening, and 
for which the addition of a significant contributory exposure (by internet connection) 
is a very dubious trade-off against functionality. 
“Effectively unavailable”. This thesis has already noted that various quite 
disparate categories of fault or event can cause a system to become “effectively 
unavailable”: these can include physical fault, but can also include situations in which 
other factors make the “system” become effectively unavailable. Although such 
"effective unavailability” may be manifested as a contractual issue, the technological 
basis is clear: economies of scale and non-availability of user-controlled technological 
options have led to a highly centralised privately owned technological system with 
many users. Those technological drivers have, almost inevitably, provided the 
foundations for situations in which either contractual practices or known operational 
practices of the owners, e.g. data sharing, blatant snooping, censorship or the 
injection of information intended to entrap or mislead, exist and may cause the service 
to be effectively unavailable to a user. The applications of internet services are 
currently resulting in the carriage of both very broad and very fine-grained data 
relating to individuals. It has been noted elsewhere that “unavailability” can mean 
“unacceptable availability” as well as non-availability. Media reports (e.g. "NSA slide 





suggested that various powers have taken advantage of the common landing points 
of several high-capacity undersea data cables to install surveillance equipment; this 
cannot be confirmed with certainty but end-users with concerns for privacy may 
consider that the internet communications system is effectively unavailable to them. 
The data generated by electronic financial transactions provide a very detailed picture 
of users' life patterns and the users have no effective control over the usage of the 
information exchanged. It is not hard to envisage situations (a citizen of a totalitarian 
country making regular donations to a democracy advocate or climate change 
scientists in a country ruled by climate change sceptics) where such a system could 
become effectively unavailable to a user. It can be observed that an individual living 
in a typical urban environment would find existence without a bank account very 
difficult – a situation that allows banks to impose terms and conditions with very little 
regard to user wishes.  
Reduction of specific internet exposure. Individual users’ subscriptions to 
ISPs allow the funding of access, and contributions are aggregated to generate 
revenue for such commercially driven ventures as the provision of undersea cables. 
Internet infrastructure, e.g. administrative controls, router update costs, DNS server 
costs etc., are also funded by user contributions. Some indirect revenue, e.g. access 
to cable corridors, is still likely to originate from government sources. Internet services, 
which include major news providers and services offering free web searching, free 
web-based email and free document processing and storage facilities, are still 
generally funded by advertising and an economic downturn would put pressure on 
advertising revenue and perhaps drive content providers towards pay-to-use content. 
Reduction of financial system exposure. The analysis of the EFTPOS 
system’s exposure shows the very large level of technological exposure incurred by 
this system. Previous notes on the potential for such a system becoming effectively 
available provide a quantitative basis for supporting the continued legality of a 
physical medium of exchange, whether cash or bullion. The recent emergence of 
machines capable of recognising large-denomination banknotes will assist this option. 
It may be observed that calls for the abandonment of cash as a legal tender have 
never gained wide support. Arguments that the tracking of financial transactions assist 





that such an aim does not require total and ongoing surveillance of all transactions 
can be made.  
Reduction of transport system exposure. Many aspects of transport 
systems are already standardised: fuel specifications, vehicle dimensions, vehicle 
speeds aligned with road design standards and the use of containers for bulk material 
movement. A private motor vehicle with a full tank of fuel has a very low level of 
"exposure" within an operational time-frame ‒ it is noteworthy that many persons 
perceive a private motor vehicle as giving them freedom and options. It seems to be 
possible that the future availability of easily hired utility vehicles will offer yet lower 
exposure for the user, but the current low levels suggest that transport vehicles are 
not a high priority for the reduction of user vulnerability. Bulk fuel supply has been 
shown not to be a major source of exposure for the short term, i.e. within an 
operational time-frame, as several strategically mandated stores offer alternative 
sources. For a longer time-frame, the supply of bulk fuel would contribute to the user's 
exposure and options for local fuel synthesis would offer attractive options. 
7.3 Hypothesised modifications to examples 
In this section, changes are hypothesised. Not all hypothesised changes are 
considered as worthy of analysis. For changes considered to be useful, the 
incremental change to exposure is noted. As hypothesised changes are identified, 
changed aspects rather than the complete system are described and incremental, 
rather than full, analyses of exposure are reported. The identification and assessment 
of hypothesised changes to each example will be considered under four headings. 
(a) Observations on example analysis, particularly large contributors to 
vulnerability, and specific features of note. 
(b) Review of applicability of types of hypothetical change, considering possible 
changes within each of the identified categories.  
(c) Proposal of actual hypothetical system re-designs, in sufficient detail to allow 
analysis, and presentation of the assessed effects 
(d) Summary of effect of hypothesised changes, commenting on the effectiveness 
and implications of the proposed changes.  
The effort required to effect a given change will be categorised as “Major”, i.e. 





changes to infrastructure, or “Minor”, i.e. works that can be accomplished with little 
more than maintenance budgets and without major disruption. The effects of 
hypothesised changes are also categorised as “Major”, “Moderate” or “Minor” 
according to the proportional change in the total exposure. 
7.3.1 Effect of hypothesised changes to communications  
Options for eliminating or reducing the exposure incurred by any contributory 
system should be investigated. The high values of exposure incurred by the internet 
communications system justifies efforts to reduce its contribution.  
(a) Observations on example analysis  
The packet transmission protocols allow detection of corrupted packets and 
hence requests for resends, acknowledgement of valid packet receipt and robust 
protocols for reassembly of files from packets without regard to arrival times and 
routes. Commentators have noted that the protocols contain good error detection and 
correction approaches; they are inherently unencrypted and hence the contents are 
insecure. ISO OSI protocols (ISO/IEC 7498-1:1994, Information technology—Open 
Systems Interconnection—Basic Reference Model: The Basic Model) have never 
achieved significant uptake, particularly compared with TCP/IP protocols, but, unlike 
the TCP/IP protocols, the ISO OSI protocols were designed to allow both open 
standards and seamless integration across all process "layers" ‒ an outcome that has 
not been achieved with TCP/IP. The internet originated as a highly decentralised 
network that would allow messages to be re-routed over many optional routes with 
semi-automated route selection, in response to outages. It has evolved into a state 
where a very large proportion of data is transmitted by a relatively small number of 
high-capacity undersea fibre-optic carriers. As well as increasing exposure to physical 
failures, this centralisation increases the exposure to practical non-availability 
because of issues such as surveillance.  
High-capacity overland data transmission has also evolved, driven by 
economy-of-scale considerations, into a situation where small numbers of high-
capacity lines carry the majority of data, and incur significant exposure. Although the 
re-routing of data transmissions is the mechanism that provides the internet’s 
robustness, and the DNS lookup methods are the key to usability for many 





tables and protocols and valid DNS lookups are essential for finding data. The 
mechanisms for reliably updating router tables and DNS server tables are both 
weaknesses within the definition developed in this thesis. In addition to the 
centralisation of data transmission paths, the internet has also progressively evolved 
into a state where large portions of the total online data storage are provided by a 
small number of well-resourced companies. The effects of this situation have been 
noted, e.g. New Scientist (2016).  
(b) Review of applicability of types of hypothetical change  
Local storage. Although many routers will include limited storage, increased 
storage will result only in excessive re-send requests rather than significant actual 
changes to exposure. This option is not considered further. 
Technological substitution. Wireless access is used increasingly and, 
assuming that wireless communication modules are readily replaceable, these reduce 
the vulnerability associated with last-mile cable access. 
Technological breakthrough. It is possible to consider a completely ad-hoc, 
self-discovering wireless network that will allow completely automated re-routing 
without cables. Self-discovering networks have been proposed, and are certainly 
feasible. Provided that a funding mechanism were developed and nodes were solar 
powered, a genuinely self-discovering network would reduce a user's exposure to 
negligible levels. 
Semi-dynamic effects. Although store-and-forward systems could be 
considered, the current protocols have extensive provision for detecting and re-
requesting corrupt packets. This approach appears to offer limited opportunities for 
significant gain. The use of uninterruptible power supplies for routers is the most 
promising application of this type of option. 
Re-purposable components. The internet already makes extensive use of 
re-purposable components including PCs and hard drives, and this approach seems 
to offer limited additional opportunity for vulnerability reduction. 
Standardised independent units and interfaces. The internet already 
makes extensive use of standardised independent units.  
Minimisation of contributory systems. For many large components of the 
internet system, e.g. undersea cables and high-speed router centres, uninterruptible 





contributory causes of exposure. The issue of commercial access and personally 
acceptable terms and conditions make very significant contributions to the issue of 
internet service availability 
(c) Proposal of actual hypothetical system re-designs  
No claim to consider all possible changes is made. No claims for economic 
desirability or affordability are made. Options must not be clearly impossible, i.e. 
violate basic scientific principles, but may not necessarily be technically feasible at 
present. The following list has been developed from a consideration of the sources of 
exposure identified in the example study, and the identified change categories. It must 
be noted that the scope of these changes applies to systems from the outward-facing 
domestic router port onwards, i.e. within the scope of the internet communications 
subsystem.  
Last-mile wireless. The last-mile cable between the DSLAM router and 
multiplexer and the household router is exposed to breakage, corrosion and other 
hazards. It would be possible to use a secure wireless carrier between the domestic 
router and the DSLAM router, with no changes to the remainder of the system. This 
change would eliminate a current E1 vulnerability for the user. 
DSLAM power. The power supply to the DSLAM router and multiplexer is a 
locus of exposure. Provision of a backup power supply to each DSLAM router reduces 
that exposure, with no changes to the remainder of the system. Provided the backup 
power supply met the criteria for a local storage solution, this change would eliminate 
a current E1 vulnerability for the user. 
Redundant paths. The original internet design provided multiple 
reconfigurable paths, and, although this design concept has survived, economies of 
scale have led to a situation in which the bulk of the total internet traffic is carried by 
a relatively small number of very-high-speed fibre-optic cables. These high-speed 
links have achieved high levels of availability but each represent a point of exposure. 
Even nation states may actually depend on a single high-speed connection to the rest 
of the world, and there have been cases (The Guardian, 2011) when a nation was in 
fact disconnected from the internet by the disruption of a single cable. Additional 
transmission routes, most probably additional undersea cables, with backup to 





The hypothesised change ensures that E1, E2 and E3 are all zero for transmission 
paths between peering points. 
Acceptable access, the issue of practical availability. The user currently 
requires the services of an ISP, who sets terms and conditions for the provision of 
services. The ISP will purchase transmission services and bandwidth from national 
and international providers, each of whom will offer services under set terms and 
conditions. Both the local ISP and the upstream providers are subject to the legal 
framework of the various jurisdictions in which they operate. Collectively, these 
commercial and legal conditions all represent loci of exposure that may make the 
service practically inaccessible to the end-user. Although it has been proposed that 
internet access should be considered to be a human right, these issues have not 
actually been addressed. It is reasonable to hypothesise a situation in which all users 
are assured of the privacy of their data and metadata and are required to offer terms 
and conditions that meet minimum standards, possibly via a "bill of rights" for 
consumers, and certainly by an acceptance of the acceptability of strong encryption. 
This hypothesised change would require contractual, technical and commercial 
aspects, as commercial provision would be required to ensure the provision of 
resources for expansion, repair and maintenance and operation, with no changes to 
the remainder of the system. This would reduce a current E1 vulnerability to users.  
Widely distributed wireless access. The hypothesised wireless link 
between the domestic router and the DSLAM would eliminate the exposure 
associated with the last-mile cable. A more generalised approach envisages 
modifications to the DSLAM to allow services similar to the GSM cell phone system 
to be offered, allowing any device to connect wirelessly, and hence offering mobile 
and near-anonymous wireless access to the current DSLAM level of connection. Such 
a change would also eliminate the "practical availability" E1 contributor and would 
provide massively redundant access points. 
Alternative router table update. According to Mr. Christopher Williams, 
Technology Correspondent (The Guardian, 2011)  
"Organisations that track global internet access detected a collapse in traffic in to and 
out of Egypt at around 10.30GMT on Thursday night…The shut down involved the 
withdrawal of more than 3,500 Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) routes by Egyptian 





internet. They are mostly used by ISPs so their networks can exchange information 
about how to best route the packets of data that make up all internet communications”. 
This action, carried out for political reasons, illustrates the issue of “exposure”. The 
internet was technically capable of routing data internationally but, once the 
government of the day decreed the non-availability of BGP information and the non-
acceptability of alternative data routes, citizens of the country effectively had no 
internet access. The BGP router information was a point of exposure, and provision 
of an alternative approach would allow the removal of a contributor to user 
vulnerability. 
Ad-hoc, self-discovering routing system. All of the previously hypothesised 
options assume packet transmission through a set of semi-automated routers 
connected by high-speed physical links. Re-routing is possible by arranging for the 
routers to select alternative paths, i.e. alternative cable or fibre-optic lines, en-route to 
the same destination. Although alternative paths decrease exposure, the total number 
of paths cannot be expected to be large. Significant work has been carried out, e.g. 
by Robertson (2007), to develop principles for self-discovering, ad-hoc free-field 
networks that effectively comprise a massively parallel network of independently 
powered, radio-connected and identical nodes with no interconnecting cables. A 
system using ad-hoc networks established by nodes using a self-discovery approach 
is effectively a significant internet re-design. However difficult technically, much has 
been learned about self-discovering ad-hoc networks and such are possible. This 
hypothesised approach would assume wireless access from the user’s router to the 
nearest available network node. Such a change would represent almost a complete 
technological development and substitution, but would remove all practical 
vulnerability from communications systems.  
(d) Summary of effect of hypothesised changes 
Simple and technically feasible approaches are able to reduce several (E1) 
contributors to vulnerability. More costly and difficult approaches, such as router 
updating and the provision of redundant capacity, are able to reduce exposure but 
rely on commercial and statutory enablers. Despite having been proposed as a "basic 
human right", the internet grew from a small network within a friendly environment, 





commented upon. An invulnerable communications system is possible technically, but 
would require the transition to a significantly changed technological approach.  
 Measure Type Effort Effect 
1 Last-mile wireless.  TECH_SUB  Minor Minor 
2 DSLAM power TECH_SUB  Minor  Minor 
3 Redundant paths TECH_SUB  Major  Major 
4 Acceptable access  CONTRIB’Y  Minor  Major 
5 Widely distributed wireless access  TECH_SUB  Minor  Minor 
6 Alternative router table update  TECH_NEW  Moderate  Major 
7 Ad-hoc, self-discovering routing 
system 
TECH_NEW  Major  Major 
Table 16: Effect of hypothesised changes to internet system 
7.3.2 Effect of hypothesised modifications to financial transaction systems  
Several of the studied examples, and many examples that have not been 
studied but that clearly affect users, depend upon financial transactions. This justifies 
consideration of these systems as standard contributory systems. The studied 
examples assume the use of an EFTPOS transaction system. 
(a) Observations on example analysis  
Considering the EFTPOS system used in the representative example, the 
computer hardware systems of two banks need to operate to allow the transaction. 
The acquirer-to-merchant transaction can be run in batch mode and hence does not 
incur the same exposure as the acquirer and user bank systems. Of equal importance, 
both the user and the merchant can have any access to the EFTPOS system only if 
the merchant accepts the acquirer bank’s conditions and their own bank’s conditions 
– and the end-user can access the EFTPOS system only if the user accepts their 
bank’s EFTPOS card conditions, which may include disclaimers regarding the 
accessibility of data to either official or commercial entities. The EFTPOS system 
makes use of the internet and the example assumes the subsystem boundaries 
identified for the internet communications subsystem, but also requires secure 
processing systems at each of the three relevant banks. 
(b) Review of applicability of types of hypothetical change  





Technological substitution. Several media of exchange avoid the use of the 
EFTPOS system entirely; ensuring that these media remain available and acceptable 
will eliminate all of the vulnerabilities associated with the EFTPOS system. The 
electronically verified credit card systems eliminate few of the vulnerabilities of the 
EFTPOS system. 
Technological breakthrough. Currency notes and coins are generally only 
recognised within a single country; an internationally recognised medium of exchange 
that is suitable for consumer transactions could be developed. Legal tender currency 
is storable, but is subject to theft; cryptocurrencies are less vulnerable to physical 
theft, but incur vulnerabilities associated with bitcoin wallets, cryptographic schemes 
and other hardware and software components. 
Semi-dynamic effects. None identified. 
Re-purposable components. None identified. 
Standardised independent units and interfaces. See above. 
Minimisation of contributory systems. As the EFTPOS system depends 
upon internet communications, it incurs that contributory system's vulnerabilities. 
(c) Proposal of actual hypothetical re-designed systems  
Several options are considered to be worthy of analysis. 
Credit card transaction. Many modern credit cards include electronically 
readable systems within the user’s card to ensure identification of the user. An 
EFTPOS transaction involves a real-time interaction between the terminal, the user’s 
bank and the acquirer’s bank and a batch-mode interaction with the merchant’s bank. 
In contrast, a transaction using such a card requires only a real-time interaction with 
the card-issuer’s bank and batch-mode interactions with the user’s bank and the 
merchant’s bank. All of the exposure values associated with real-time interactions with 
user and merchant banks are eliminated, because transactions with the user and 
merchant banks are stored and executed whenever possible. Practical availability 
issues are not avoided and, as the credit card issuer carries some risk, the practical 
availability vulnerabilities may actually increase. 
Paper-based credit notes. For credit card systems using “zip-zap” machines, 
effectively the merchant collects a promissory note from the user on the credit card 





rending the system effectively unavailable. The effect on vulnerability is the same as 
for the credit card option. 
Cash transaction (notes or coins). Cash transaction options include 
banknotes and coins or tokens (legal tender), all representing agreed physical media 
of exchange. Notes and coins are tokens of wealth, and their usage and acceptability 
are dependent upon banks or national exchanges and incur exposures related to 
issue and acceptance. They are generally recognised only within one country. The 
use of cash eliminates all of the vulnerabilities associated with an EFTPOS system, 
but is dependent upon the merchant's willingness to accept cash and to tender 
change. It does incur an exposure to physical theft. 
Cash transaction (bullion). Cash and coin depend on national or local bank 
issue. It is possible to consider a transaction system based on rare metal (bullion). 
Confirmation of authenticity is feasible based on physical properties including density 
and resistivity, and no dependence on external bodies is required. A technological 
development, capable of issuing small but accurately measured quantities of 99.999% 
gold, is possible and would offer an internationally acceptable payment system, 
eliminating all of the vulnerabilities of the EFTPOS system although incurring an 
exposure to physical theft. 
Promissory note (cheque). This is a document that is signed or otherwise 
authenticated by the user, authorising the bank to pay the bearer the transaction 
amount. In some countries, bank cards would be issued to users, guaranteeing the 
honouring of transactions up to an agreed limit (a limit of ₤50 was common in the 
1980s). Technologically, this system involves no more than paper, pen and bankcard 
at the point of transaction, and thus avoids the vulnerabilities of the EFTPOS system; 
however, as for credit card systems, vulnerabilities associated with practical 
availability are likely to be onerous as the bank bears some risk. 
Personal debit system to phone. In many developing countries, particularly 
regions of Africa, it is common for users to treat their cell phone prepay balance as a 
personal bank, and find it convenient and simple to make transactions either from or 
to their prepay balance. Such a system avoids the vulnerabilities of an EFTPOS 
system but incurs the vulnerabilities of the cell phone system. The vulnerabilities of 
the cell phone system avoid the last-mile vulnerabilities; also, the fact that this is a 





Personal debit system. The concept of a personal debit system is that the 
user carries a smart card or equivalent that both retains a verifiable record of the 
user’s credit balance and the means of authenticating this and a transaction. Such 
systems are not commonly available, but require only technology that is currently 
available. Such a system requires the card technology and also vendor technology 
that can transfer credit securely and reliably between the parties. This avoids almost 
all of the vulnerabilities of the EFTPOS system but incurs the few vulnerabilities of the 
card electronics and the vendor's card reader. 
Bitcoin transaction. The “bitcoin” transaction (as an exemplar of several 
blockchain-based “cryptocurrencies”) approach effectively requires both users and 
merchants to have access to bitcoin wallets. The hypothetical approach assumes that 
the user carries a hardware version of the bitcoin wallet, whereas the merchant has 
access to an online version. Both need access to the blockchain system. The 
technology for this system is available although not widely used. Although this 
hypothesised approach still requires access to the internet and computing power, it 
does not rely on the acceptance of financial institution terms and involves only two 
parties directly. The internet vulnerabilities remain, the additional vulnerabilities of the 
bitcoin wallet and the merchant wallet-reader are added, and the practical availability 
vulnerabilities of commercial and contractual access to EFTPOS and/or credit card 
systems remain.  
Barter. Simple transactions between willing buyer and willing seller, with 
personal agreement on the value of dissimilar goods/services are possible and have 
effectively no exposure to technological systems. 
Regulation of terms and conditions. Terms and conditions offered by 
financial institutions as a condition of holding an account may cause such accounts 
be practically unavailable to either users or merchants. Regulation constraining such 
terms and conditions may effectively remove such issues and allow users to consider 
the existing EFTPOS system to be available. Such regulation could remove one 
contributor (E1) to the user's vulnerability. 
(d) Summary of effect of hypothesised changes  
 Measure Type Effort Effect 
1 Credit card transaction  TECH_SUB  Minor  Moderate 





3 Cash transaction (notes or coins)  TECH_SUB  Minor  Major 
4 Promissory note (cheque)  TECH_SUB  Minor  Moderate 
5 Personal debit system to phone  TECH_NEW  Minor  Moderate 
6 Personal debit system  TECH_NEW  Minor  Major 
7 Bitcoin transaction  TECH_NEW  Minor  Major 
8 Regulation of terms and 
conditions  
CONTRIB’Y  Minor  Major 
Table 17: Effect of hypothesised changes to EFTPOS system 
7.3.3 Effect of hypothesised modifications to sewage system  
(a) Observations on example analysis  
The largest contribution to the E1 values is from the non-duplicated major 
components of the sewage treatment plant. As far as the apartment dweller is 
concerned, most of those systems could be bypassed, allowing service to continue, 
but with raw sewage discharged to waterways. This observation illustrates the 
importance of clarifying the “service”. The second largest contribution is from the 
extensive pipework system that is required to transport sewage from the apartment to 
the treatment plant – this is effectively a result of the highly centralised nature of the 
processing – which requires an extensive collection mechanism. Power to the 
pumping stations contributes to exposure and, although some pumping station 
equipment is duplicated, this still contributes to user vulnerability. Although the 
sewage treatment station discharges treated solid waste to landfill, as there are 
storage and alternative transport options for this function, its contribution to 
vulnerability is relatively small. 
 
 
(b) Review of applicability of types of hypothetical change  
Local storage. Local storage of sewage, i.e. close to the apartment, is actually 
quite practical for terms of a few days or weeks. “Pump-out” systems are actually 
increasingly commonly in peripherally urban areas where septic tank discharges are 
unacceptable but pipework and centralised treatment systems are also not practical. 
The exposure analysis demonstrates the contribution of local power supplies, and the 





technology. For typical industrial processes (requiring MWh power levels), there are 
currently no processes for the storage of power that are technologically mature and 
close to economically viable. A capability for storing MWh quantities of electricity 
would have a significant effect on the exposure of processes such as this. Noting the 
value of standardised approaches, it would be possible to consider a system using 
local storage in container-sized vessels, allowing either pump-out or transport 
substitution.  
Technological substitution. The 2011 earthquakes in Christchurch, New 
Zealand, caused very extensive damage to the clay pipework of the original gravity-
fed sewage system, with very large numbers of fractures within the estimated 1400 
km of pipes and major damage to the 16 pumping stations and also to the downstream 
facilities. Christchurch has decided that the cost of replacing the system is too great 
and has elected to install a completely new “pressure” system in which household-
scale disintegration and pump units allow the use of small-bore flexible pipework 
rather than large-diameter and inflexible gravity-fed clay pipe systems. This avoids 
the huge repair costs of gravity reticulation and the disruption to other infrastructure. 
Technological breakthrough. The development of an economical and 
convenient local (i.e. toilet) sewage breakdown technology is certainly technically 
possible and such technologies as composting toilets exist. It is not currently practical 
to use macro-algae to treat sewage and to generate biofuel at a village- or suburb-
scale system. However, as the power requirements of such a system are modest, this 
could be considered as a target for a technological advance. A smaller scale system 
of this type would possibly allow consideration of local power sources such as a solar 
photovoltaic system plus battery systems. 
Semi-dynamic effects. Raw sewage could be stored at the treatment plant, 
pending the repair of a component. When the volumes to be stored and the likely 
repair times are considered, this approach is not practical for other than the very short 
term at a city level. However, the storage of a few days’ volume is quite practical in 
the medium term at a household level. 
Re-purposable components. It has been assumed that at least three 
persons at the treatment plant are able to operate each item – hence E3 contributions. 
If plant item operating instructions were readily available, this contribution could be 





the E3 level; if compaction and dewatering allowed the use of standard shipping 
containers, then this contribution could be moved to beyond the E3 level.  
Standardised independent units and interfaces. Many components of the 
sewage system are already standard mechanical components. 
Minimisation of contributory systems. Although power and transport 
systems are used in many sections of the sewage system, the specific sources of the 
power vary, reducing the gains possible by substitution of a specific contributory 
system. The road transport system already has many alternative service options and 
is not considered to be a large contributor to exposure. 
(c) Proposal of actual hypothetical re-designed systems  
Storage systems. Containerised local tank systems would allow options of 
either pump-out or transport substitution; even at apartment scale, the criteria of 
sufficient storage to allow repairs to critical components would be feasible. At 
household or apartment locations, modest volumes would allow significant repair 
times and would meet the criteria to deduct the exposure associated with pump 
system failures and treatment plant failures, although it is unlikely that the storage 
volume could practically allow major pipeline repair. 
Pressure system. Historically, the primary causes of failure to the nominated 
service level have been physical damage to the pipework leading to the treatment 
station, or overloading because of excessive storm water ingress. Power failures and 
equipment failures have not been significant contributors to failure. For small 
communities installing a sewage system for the first time, and even for Christchurch 
replacing its extensively damaged “conventional” sewage system following the 2011 
earthquakes, it is common to select a “pressure” system in which household-scale 
pumps/disintegrators are used to process sewage and forward the low-viscosity liquid 
at pressure via a small-diameter flexible pipe. Such a system reduces capital cost, 
and decreases the maintenance cost and repair time of the pipework system; 
however, it depends upon the operation of the local disintegrator, the power supply 
and controls. This system effectively replaces all systems up to the main feed into the 
treatment plant. Combined with minimal local storage, such a system can reasonably 





Pumping station power supplies. Large-scale electrical power storage is not 
currently practical. If such a technology is developed, the exposure associated with 
both pumping stations and sewage treatment plants can be reduced.  
Pumping station alternative power. Pumping station exposure can be 
reduced by providing either ICE-based backup power or additional power feeds. The 
economics of such approaches are not considered in this analysis. 
Treatment station power supplies. Reductions to E2 values associated with 
power supplies are possible, by providing alternative power supplies to the treatment 
plant distribution board. It is technically feasible at present to provide most of 
treatment plant power from biogas generated from sewage and, although the 
cogeneration and digester plants have vulnerabilities, as these are alternative power 
sources, they effectively move the E1 contributors to E2 levels. 
Power storage for pumping stations and treatment plants. The storage of 
several hours’ power for pumping stations and treatment plants would require a 
technological breakthrough. If such a technology became available, the associated 
exposure at both treatment plant and pumping station would be avoided. 
Treatment plant manual control. Reductions to exposure are possible by 
providing manual control of all pumping station, sewage treatment station plant and 
bypass functions, and instructions for operation by non-specialised staff. These 
changes do not affect the remainder of the system. 
Solar-powered local system. As the development of an apartment-scale 
treatment system, requiring no more power than could reasonably be produced by 
solar thermal plus a photovoltaic system and generating environmentally acceptable 
waste streams, is technically feasible, this approach is proposed as a hypothesis to 
be examined. Although the hypothesis requires technological development, it is 
reasonable to postulate a gravity-fed system that uses solar-powered controls to 
maintain optimal conditions for biological degradation, uses solar-powered materials 
handling including pumping and aeration functions, and thus generates 
environmentally acceptable discharges at an apartment scale. Such a hypothetical 
system would avoid the need for extensive pipework, pumping stations and 
centralised treatment processes. Transport of treated waste would be required, but 





a household scale, can also be postulated, with identical exposure reduction for the 
individual end-user. 
Hybrid fuel system. Household or suburb-scale macro-algae fuel generation 
would require a complete technological change, providing the processing of sewage 
using either high-rate ponds or a photo-bioreactor with the generation of 
hydrocarbons suitable for raw fuel feedstock, using solar power and technology that 
is feasible on a suburb scale. This eliminates all major pipework systems, centralised 
power supplies and treatment plants. The treatment of the exposure of such a system 
requires care, because the production of treated sewage is not the only output and 
redefinition of the "service level" would be required. The overall exposure of the user 
would however be reduced.  
(d) Summary of effect of hypothesised changes. 
 Measure Type Effort Effect 
1 Storage systems TECH_SUB  Moderate  Major 
2 Pressure system TECH_SUB  Moderate  Major 
3 Pumping station power supplies  TECH_SUB  Moderate  Minor 
4 Pumping station alternative power  TECH_SUB  Major  Minor 
5 Treatment station power supplies  TECH_SUB  Major  Minor 
6 Power storage for pumping and 
treatment stations  
TECH_NEW  Major  Major 
7 Treatment station manual control  REPURP  Minor  Minor 
8 Solar-powered local system  TECH_NEW  Major  Major 
9 Hybrid fuel system  TECH_NEW  Major  Major 
Table 18: Effect of hypothesised changes to sewage system 
 
7.3.4 Effect of hypothesised modifications to work information system  
(a) Observations on example analysis  
It is important to note the major differentiation between this example and the 
first-aid example: in the first-aid example, both the diagnostic information and the 
treatment information are generally static and hence durable non-volatile storage is 
possible; in contrast, work information is volatile, i.e. frequently created and/or edited, 
and commonly has a limited temporal relevance. The major exposure contributors are 
the remote server holding the work information, the internet (all aspects) and the local 





remotely changeable operating system, a situation where all duplicated PCs are 
affected by the same change, or local power supply issues. The remote server 
exposure can be at least reduced by continuous backup systems. The internet is the 
single largest contributor to exposure; the extent and the nature of the exposure have 
been considered elsewhere, and changes could be considered. The local PC 
operating system can be attacked separately and hence is identified as a contributor 
to E1; an operating system can be implemented in firmware and signed by a trusted 
supplier. PC applications (software) can also be attacked separately and hence are 
identified as a contributor to E1; standardised file formats (ODF) and adequately 
robust development can, in principle, allow software applications to be implemented 
in firmware and signed by a trusted supplier. Reductions in the power consumption of 
PCs is progressively allowing operation from USB power supplies (power packs), 
which will reduce exposure to domestic 230 V power supplies. Currently, most 
household routers are still powered directly from 230 V supplies and could be 
operated via a power pack (battery with trickle charge). The data format for 
spreadsheets has achieved a degree of standardisation, and a significant number of 
applications allow users to view and update spreadsheets. Full adoption of publicly 
available ODF standards will further reduce both current exposure to the possibility of 
being unable to view and edit data, and future exposure to an inability to access 
today’s data, i.e. avoiding the "digital dark ages" issue.  
(b) Review of applicability of types of hypothetical change  
Technological substitution. The internet communications subsystem has 
been identified as the subsystem that contributes the largest single exposure to the 
end-user in this case. The internet’s exposure contribution arises from the relatively 
small number of T1 lines, the centralised process for distributing key international 
routing information and the multiple single points of failure close to the end-user.  
Several interlinked socio-economic factors also add to the exposure 
contributed by the internet: centralisation allows the internet to be subject to 
surveillance that may make the system practically inaccessible to groups; the 
anticipated proliferation of connection points (IoT) will significantly increase the 
number of sources of malicious software and/or surveillance. The ubiquitous nature 
of internet use makes it an attractive target, and commentators such as Bruce 





2016). Media commentators have also drawn attention to the vulnerability of 
accessible data, caused by the lack of a robust funding model; this causes two types 
of exposure. Large providers such as “Facebook” and “Google” are funded by 
advertising revenue, and will try to maximise this revenue by making strong efforts to 
give their advertisers the best-targeted access to users. It is noted that infrastructures 
such as undersea cables are funded as investments by international carriers, who 
obtain revenue directly from consumers but are subject to national regulation 
(including access to users’ information), which may also make the network 
unavailable to a specific user.  
Technological breakthrough. A truly ad-hoc peer-to-peer network protocol, 
with self-discovery of alternative routes. 
Semi-dynamic effects including local storage. Adequate IT provisions for 
the duplication of user files across geographically remote servers is quite practical 
using existing technologies. 
Re-purposable components. Although it cannot be assumed for the 
purposes of this study, it can be noted that many households do have more than one 
device, e.g. a PC and a smart phone that is capable of internet access and basic 
messaging. The progressive reduction in power requirement is allowing more 
communications devices to operate from low-capacity battery systems and to allow 
realistic charging from photovoltaics.  
Standardised independent units and interfaces. Although progress has 
been made towards the standardisation of file formats for word processing, 
spreadsheets, presentations and database files, a more complete standardisation 
would reduce the exposure of all users, and would contribute to the long-term 
accessibility of material. Less than two decades ago, 8 inch floppy disks were used 
by Wan Corporation word-processing stations, audio cassettes were used for data 
storage and punched paper and cards were not uncommon. Equipment to read data 
from such sources would be exceedingly rare today and it cannot be assumed that all 
data have been moved to more modern formats. Even within the last two decades, 
common data formats have become inaccessible. This issue has been mentioned by 
authors, including Cerf (2015), who have proposed the term “digital dark ages” to 
describe situations in which data become inaccessible when the storage method, e.g. 





of this thesis, it is useful to observe that old data storage media such as microfiche 
have very low exposure (as defined in this thesis), and could be read using an 
improvised microscope. An open-format, non-volatile data storage technology would 
make very significant long-term reductions in exposure to data loss; the approach 
proposed by the Longnow Foundation’s (020163) “Rosetta project” concept is 
noteworthy.  
Minimisation of contributory systems. A significant approach to reducing 
exposure is to eliminate the subsystems that contribute huge levels of exposure. 
(c) Proposal of actual hypothetical re-designed systems  
The portion of the internet system that has been defined in Chapter 5 of this 
thesis as a standard subsystem has been considered to include all aspects between 
the outputs of the domestic routers, i.e. communications to city ISP, intra-national 
peering systems, connections to international undersea cable service providers etc. 
Options for a reduction of exposure of this internet subsystem are considered 
separately.  
Backup power for household router. As the household router is generally 
powered from a 230 VAC power pack, it is un-usable if a mains power failure occurs. 
An uninterruptible power supply (UPS) or battery backup reduces one point of 
vulnerability without requiring changes to the remainder of the system. 
Backup power for PC. Household PCs are generally powered from a 
230 VAC supply and, even for PCs with batteries, a PC is commonly un-usable after 
a few hours if a mains power failure occurs. A UPS or significant battery backup 
reduces one point of vulnerability without requiring changes to the remainder of the 
system. 
Online storage. Data storage is a significant locus of exposure for users at 
both ends of this example. A duplicated (RAID) approach to local data storage will 
eliminate the exposure to local hardware failure causing data loss.  
Hardened router. Router operating systems and applications are currently 
exposed to malicious changes, and hardwired “admin” access options have 
occasionally been found. The router applications could be hardened, checked and 
                                               
3 It seems entirely appropriate, for an organisation whose projects include the design of a 





signed. Such a change would effectively eliminate the exposure associated with the 
router software. 
Hardened PC. PCs currently have components including operating systems 
and applications as well as drivers that are potentially remotely alterable, either by 
targeted intrusion or by malware. Whether arising from poor design or oversight, all 
of these incur vulnerabilities to the user. There is no fundamental principle that 
prevents the construction of a secure, un-alterable suite of operating system plus 
system and application software that will ensure that these components will not be 
vulnerable to external threats. The implementation of such a system would eliminate 
the exposure contributions currently noted for PCs.  
Standardised data formats. Data formats for spreadsheets have achieved a 
degree of standardisation, and a significant number of applications allow users to view 
and update spreadsheets. A full adoption of publicly available ODF standards will 
further reduce both current exposure to the possibility of being unable to view and edit 
data and future exposure to an inability to access today’s data, thus avoiding the 
"digital dark ages" issue.  
(d) Summary of effect of hypothesised changes  
 Measure Type Effort Effect 
1 Backup power for household 
router  
TECH_SUB  Minor  Major 
2 Backup power for PC  TECH_SUB  Minor  Major 
3 Online storage  TECH_SUB  Minor  Minor  
4 Hardened router  TECH_SUB  Minor  Major 
5 Hardened PC  TECH_SUB  Minor  Major 
6 Standardised data formats  INDEP’T  Minor  Major 
Table 19: Effect of hypothesised changes to work information system 
7.3.5 Effect of hypothesised modifications to local fuel supply system  
(a) Observations on example analysis  
Although the example is designed to be broadly representative of typical 
systems, real systems vary significantly. Some options for improvement are already 
found occasionally, and it is reasonable to note them and assess their effects. The 





requirements for staff, but with many functions that can be carried out only via the 
automated subsystems. The staff systems, including potable water supply and 
sewage removal, and the EFTPOS transaction system are the main contributors to 
system exposure. The road and vehicle systems required for bulk supply are 
considered to contribute little additional vulnerability because of their high level of 
duplication. Many petrol station forecourt systems include four to six replicated 
systems, but forecourt control systems are not duplicated and contribute to 
vulnerability. For short-term operation, multiple national reserves of bulk fuel reduce 
exposure, but, for longer time-frames, the capability to generate fuel onshore would 
reduce New Zealand’s exposure to multiple vulnerabilities associated with our single 
refinery. 
(b) Review of applicability of types of hypothetical change  
Local storage options can be applied to some of the staff facilities, allowing 
these to be provided on a temporary basis, pending repair, rather than forcing an 
immediate “failure” of the service. This option was covered when the sewage system 
was considered. 
Technological substitution. Alternative technologies for many of the 
functions required by this example, including electrically powered pumps and 
electronic reading of amounts dispensed, can be offered.  
Technological breakthrough. The science required to produce fuels, within 
standard specifications, from macro-algae sources, is close to maturity and is 
potentially practical at city or village scale. The practical availability of such technology 
would affect the exposure of national refining systems and bulk delivery systems. 
Semi-dynamic effects. The example station requires staff and hence is 
inoperable without basic staff facilities including sewage and water systems.  
Re-purposable components. As with many other examples, in this case, the 
human being is the most versatile component; thus, any capability for enabling human 
intervention is likely to reduce the actual vulnerability incurred. 
Standardised independent units and interfaces. Limited opportunities of 
this type have been identified for this example. 
Minimisation of contributory systems. Subsystems that make significant 
contributions to the exposure of the example include the sewage subsystem and the 





(c) Proposal of actual hypothetical re-designed components and 
subsystems  
Staff service options – sewage. All optional changes to the sewage system, 
as proposed under that example, can be considered.  
Staff service options – water. Potable water is also required to enable staff 
occupancy. Rainwater collection to offer a supply for perhaps 3‒7 days’ usage would 
eliminate the exposure to a potable water supply failure. This is an eminently practical 
measure.  
Staff service options – automation. The example has considered a petrol 
station that is fully manned. A fully automated station must be considered. The 
elimination of requirements that are essential for staff presence will allow the exposure 
of those contributory systems to be eliminated. If the provisions for a reduction of the 
exposure of computing systems, financial transaction systems and communications 
systems were also eliminated, exposure would be very substantially reduced.  
Manual operations. Provision for the manual operation of dispensing pumps 
and the manual recording of amounts dispensed would eliminate the exposure to both 
metering and pumping systems and local power supplies for these.  
Financial transaction options. Options for a reduction of exposure to 
financial transaction systems have been considered separately. 
Alternative fuel sources. It is possible to hypothesise a future technological 
option to generate standard-specification fuels from a macro-algae source. A likely 
technological option would also use sewage as part of the nutrition for the macro-
algae, although the energy source is actually solar. This is noted as a “technological 
breakthrough” option; however, the components are at about 6 or 7 on the NASA 
scale of technological maturity (NASA, 2015), and hence this is a technological option 
that could reasonably be contemplated within a 10-year term. Macro-algae strains are 
already capable of achieving over 30% by weight of hydrocarbons. The generation of 
standard-specification fuels from macro-algae is not economically attractive at 
present, but the process engineering and chemical processes are known and 
technically feasible. The existence of multiple national reserves of fuel mean that bulk 
fuel is considered to contribute to user exposure in the shorter term; however, a 





consideration of this exposure, and the potential for reduction by local fuel supply 
synthesis. 
(d) Summary of effect of hypothesised changes  
 Measure Type Effort Effect 
1 Staff service options ‒ sewage  CONTRIB’Y  Minor  Major 
2 Staff service options ‒ water  CONTRIB’Y  Minor  Moderate 
3 Staff service options ‒ automation  TECH_SUB  Minor  Moderate 
4 Manual operations REPURP  Minor  Moderate 
5 Financial transaction options  CONTRIB’Y  Moderate  Major 
6 Alternative fuel source  TECH_NEW  Major  Major 
Table 20: Effect of hypothesised changes to local fuel supply system 
7.3.6 Effect of hypothesised modifications to targeted first-aid system  
(a) Observations on example analysis  
The example differs from the work information example because the service 
delivered to the user is specific information selected from a static information storage 
system. Apart from the integrity of the storage system, the exposure is primarily 
associated with the selection and the transmission of the information, and with the 
systems for searching and identifying the information to be supplied. This example 
therefore offers a range of options for a reduction of exposure. 
(b) Review of applicability of types of hypothetical change  
Technological breakthrough. The need is for a store of medical knowledge 
that can be searched based on symptoms. Although a colonial medical encyclopedia 
achieved this function, carrying such a tome is marginally impractical for the 
representative urban-dwelling user. The use of appropriate software and storage 
facilities in a mobile electronic device is possible and would avoid the exposure 
incurred by the communications system, although retaining the exposure associated 
with the mobile electronic device. Taking the hypothesising process further, it would 
be possible to consider a high-density portable storage system similar to the 
microfiche systems used in the mid‒late 20th century, with a portable reader system 
requiring backlight and lenses only. Several other long-term and dense storage 
technologies have been proposed, including the Longnow Foundation’s “Rosetta” disk 





Many media commentators and notable thinkers, including Cerf (2015), have noted 
that media such as DVDs may have quite short commercial lives and that, if 
proprietary technologies and software are required to read data from them, these 
technologies add to the exposure incurred by those storage media. This particular 
type of exposure illustrates the possibility of a “digital dark age” characterised by a 
lack of capacity to access large stores of information contained on media using 
inaccessible format or encoding systems. Both the Rosetta disk and the durable 
storage approach proposed by Kazansky et al. (2016) reduce this exposure.  
Technological substitution. The use of a paper-based first-aid manual is 
certainly possible and, for simple first-aid issues, would represent a technology with 
negligible exposure. 
Semi-dynamic effects. Limited applicability to this example. 
Re-purposable components. Limited applicability to this example. 
Repair priority. Limited applicability to this example. 
Standardised independent units and interfaces. Although marginally 
applicable to this example, the use of standardised and open-source data formats will 
reduce exposure. 
Minimisation of contributory systems. The approaches described under 
“technological breakthrough” are effectively approaches to avoiding exposure arising 
from contributory systems. 
(c) Proposal of actual hypothetical re-designed systems  
PC hardening. PC hardening has been proposed under the work information 
example and should be considered here, although these proposals now apply only at 
one end of the communications chain. 
PC power, router hardening, router power. These options have been 
considered within the work information example. Proposal details and conclusions are 
identical, although they apply only to one end of the communications system. 
Local electronic storage. Software allowing the diagnosis of first-aid issues 
by the individual user, and showing recommended approaches, based on locally 
stored electronic data and data search, is currently available. Such an approach would 
avoid the exposure associated with internet communications, but the local device and 





Local experts’ options. The example has defined a representative situation 
in which the diagnosis and the proposed approach are obtained via an internet 
communication with an automated diagnostic tool, perhaps making use of an artificial 
intelligence technology. The proposed alternative is a telephone call to a number 
obtained from a hard-copied set of emergency contacts. The telephone hardware 
(POTS) is the only contributor to the user's exposure, provided this is not routed 
through the internet. 
Local hard storage – paper. Paper-based local storage is made practical by 
the static nature of the information. As long as an adequate indexing system is 
available, a local, static information source is quite adequate. A printed first-aid 
manual is hypothesised, and avoids all of the exposure sources within the described 
example. 
Local hard storage ‒ Rosetta. For the storage of static information, a book 
has two disadvantages – its volume-to-weight ratio is high and it has specific 
vulnerabilities, including damage by water, fire, insects and small children. 
Organisations such as the Longnow Foundation (02016) have proposed storage 
media that can be read using simple microscope technology; the information storage 
is minute images on media that are very significantly more robust than paper, 
specifically a metal disk encased in polycarbonate. As the technology for simple lens 
creation has been shown by Lee et al. (2014) to be simple, this hypothesised 
approach is realistic and offers an approach that requires only modest technological 
















(d) Summary of effect of hypothesised changes  
 Measure Type Effort Effect 
1 PC hardening TECH_SUB  Minor  Major 
2 PC power, router hardening, 
router power  
TECH_SUB  Minor  Major 
3 Local electronic storage  TECH_SUB  Minor  Major 
4 Local experts’ options  TECH_SUB  Minor  Major 
5 Local hard storage ‒ paper  TECH_SUB  Minor  Moderate  
6 Local hard storage ‒ Rosetta  TECH_NEW  Moderate  Major 
Table 21: Effect of hypothesised changes to targeted first-aid system 
7.3.7 Effect of hypothesised modifications to perishable food system  
(a) Observations on example analysis  
For public health reasons, pasteurisation is normally required for fresh milk, 
and the process and the process control requirements, particularly for 
homogenisation, which requires heating to a point within a closely defined 
temperature range and then holding for a fixed time followed by rapid chilling, have 
commonly led to a centralised factory approach. Similarly, as supermarket retail 
facilities have become the norm for common foodstuffs, these are assumed in the 
example. Analysis of exposure for the example shows the effects of power and staff 
requirements for the factory operation, the effects of refrigeration, lighting and staff 
facilities for the retail facility and the effects of the financial transaction function. As 
the product is a relatively short-shelf-life and low-value product, it is not possible to 
store significant volumes. 
(b) Review of applicability of types of hypothetical change  
Technological substitution. Alternative technologies for pasteurisation, for 
example UV-C irradiation, have achieved acceptance in some countries and their 
lower power consumption could decrease dependence on centralised factory 
processes if these were assumed to be accepted for the example. Storage of power 
for small consumption items such as cash-transaction tills and EFTPOS terminals is 
possible by substituting UPSs for local low-voltage power supplies. Options for the 





Technological breakthrough. Considering the analysis of exposure, a 
breakthrough technology allowing the achievement of bacteriologically safe milk using 
small-scale and low-energy-use processes would allow consideration of milk sales 
from closer to the point of production, avoiding most of the points of exposure 
associated with the processing factory. Options for financial transactions and 
communications that require technological breakthrough are covered elsewhere. 
Semi-dynamic effects – local storage option. There are currently no 
technologies that allow the storage of electrical energy at MWh levels, and that are 
technologically mature and close to economically viable. Such a capability would have 
a significant effect on the exposure of this example. However, the storage of heat and 
cold (ice banks, eutectic capsules) is technologically mature and capable of useful 
durations of storage. 
Re-purposable components. Although the operation of factory processes 
could be made accessible to unskilled persons (re-purposable units), the contribution 
of specialised staff to the total exposure is initially small. 
Repair priority. No options identified. 
Standardised independent units and interfaces. Although milk tankers are 
designed for a single purpose, the number that are available means that these 
contribute little exposure. The use of containerised systems would allow further 
reduction.  
Minimisation of contributory systems. A significant approach to reducing 
exposure is to eliminate the subsystems that contribute huge levels of exposure, 
specifically financial transaction systems and systems needed to provide staff 
facilities. 
(c) Proposal of actual hypothetical re-designed systems  
Factory operation. Manual operation alternatives for the factory, and 
provisions to allow unskilled operators to carry out functions, will allow reduction of 
specialised staff exposure points. 
Factory power options. Either further duplications of the power source by 
using additional line feeds or fuel-operated generators would reduce the exposure 
associated with the power requirement, but are unlikely to be economically attractive. 
Factory power storage. The capability to store several hours’ power supply 





technologically available but would make a very large reduction in exposure if it were 
possible.  
Factory heat and cold storage. Much energy usage in the factory, except for 
that used in pumping and automation, is related to the supply of heated and chilled 
product. Technologies for the storage of significant heat and cold (ice banks) are 
available and marginally economic. Even if this technology were used, it would offer 
limited reduction in exposure because the heating and chilling services require 
pumping as well as the storage of heat and cold. 
Local pasteurisation. Factory level pasteurisation is used to achieve 
economies of scale, but results in a need for significant power input. It is reasonable 
to hypothesise lower energy pasteurisation approaches (e.g. UV-C) using solar power 
sources, at farm scale. Although milk standardisation would not be practical at farm 
scale, this is of less concern to the user than food safety, which could be achieved. 
The primary functions of the factory and the associated exposure can be avoided. 
Direct sale. Assuming that farm-scale pasteurisation can be achieved, direct 
sales can avoid all of the exposure issues associated with the factory treatment, and 
the wholesale and retail systems. 
Financial transaction options. Options for technological change and 
associated reductions in exposure have been treated elsewhere. 
Local storage options. Product shelf-life limitations preclude significant local 
storage of the foodstuff. Refrigeration is nevertheless the main power use at the retail 
location and ice bank technology effectively allows local storage of “cold”, reducing 
the exposure to power supply continuity. The storage of power for PCs and routers, 
associated with the completion of financial transactions, has been covered elsewhere. 
Staff facilities options – sewage. All the options hypothesised for a reduction 












(d) Summary of effect of hypothesised changes  
 Measure Type Effort Effect 
1 Factory operation  TECH_SUB Minor  Major 
2 Factory power options  TECH_SUB Moderate Minor  
3 Factory power storage  TECH_NEW  Major  Major 
4 Factory heat and cold storage  TECH_NEW  Moderate  Moderate 
5 Local pasteurisation  TECH_NEW  Moderate  Moderate 
6 Direct sale TECH_SUB  Moderate  Moderate 
7 Financial transaction options  CONTRIB’Y  Moderate  Major 
8 Local storage options  TECH_SUB  Minor  Minor 
9 Staff facilities options – sewage  CONTRIB’Y  Moderate  Major 
Table 22: Effect of hypothesised changes to perishable food system 
7.3.8 Effect of hypothesised modifications to essential specific medicine 
system  
(a) Observations on example analysis  
The long shelf life of the raw and intermediate streams in this example allow 
economies of scale to be achieved by a centralised production system. These same 
economies of scale have made possible a highly specialised approach to the delivery 
of the goods to the end-user, which in turn has created a very large number of points 
of exposure. This is a principle that can be observed for many cases, and suggests 
decentralisation as a primary approach for a reduction of exposure. The high value, 
long shelf life and small volume of both the intermediate product and the final product 
suggest a primary option of local storage. Although the synthesis of salbutamol is 
specialised, the processes are well publicised and are within the capabilities of a 
moderate chemical synthesis facility. The broad tolerance of the dosage of salbutamol 
makes local synthesis and distribution possible within safe usage parameters. 
(b) Review of applicability of types of hypothetical change  
Local storage. All of the raw and intermediate streams for this product have 
long shelf lives, i.e. can be stored without degradation for long periods. Local storage 
at the input to and output from any process can therefore reduce the actual 





technological systems. Local storage options are possible for the aluminium strip-
stock, the bar-stock, the salbutamol synthesis feedstocks and reagents, the propellant 
and the packaging components. For the financial transactions (which include internet 
communications), the significance of small-scale power storage using available 
technologies has been covered under the hypothetical improvements for those 
subsystems. For typical industrial processes, there are currently no technologies for 
the storage of power at MWh levels that are technologically mature and close to 
economically viable. Such a capability would have a significant effect on the exposure 
of processes such as this. 
Technological substitution. Within the example system, technologies for 
financial transactions can be substituted. These options are covered under the 
heading of contributory systems. Considering the end-user requirements, it is noted 
that salbutamol can be administered by several means (nebuliser, atomiser and 
intravenously) and that the safe dosage level is quite broad ‒ hence the technological 
option of local synthesis, with relatively simple and/or standardised equipment and 
publicly available formulation and preparation information, is feasible.  
Technological breakthrough. Small-scale, general-purpose chemical 
synthesis approaches have been mooted in the literature, and are possible in 
principle. A well-equipped chemical laboratory would be capable of synthesising 
salbutamol using common equipment. 
Re-purposable components. No obvious options in addition to those stated 
above.  
Standardised independent units and interfaces. Currently a small range of 
MDI canister sizes and configurations are produced; standardisation of these would 
facilitate the use of alternative manufacturing facilities for the canisters. 
Minimisation of contributory systems. A significant approach to reducing 
exposure is to eliminate the subsystems that contribute large levels of exposure; these 
include the financial transaction system used at the retail level. 
(c) Proposal of actual hypothetical re-designed systems  
Financial transaction option. Financial transaction options and associated 
exposure reductions have been explored elsewhere. 
Local storage of empty MDI. As the filling and packaging of MDI canisters is 





achieved by local stockpiling of empty MDI canisters plus metering valves and 
chambers.  
Local storage of diluted salbutamol. As both salbutamol and the diluent 
have long shelf lives, it is possible to reduce the exposure of the complete supply 
system by stockpiling these at the locations at which the canisters are to be filled.  
Standardised MDI manufacture. Currently, several sizes of MDI are made. 
By standardizing these (which might require adjustment of the diluent and dose 
numbers), the exposure from the non-availability of empty canisters, and also from 
incompatibility of the filling lines with available canisters, can be eliminated. 
Local major power storage. For typical industrial processes (MWh levels), 
there are currently no processes for the storage of power that are technologically 
mature and close to being economically viable. Such a capability would have a 
significant effect on the exposure of processes such as this. 
Local creation of salbutamol. Most example intermediate streams (except 
electrical power) have long shelf lives. Canister manufacture and filling facilities are 
also moderately standardised. Nevertheless, the use of a filled MDI to deliver 
salbutamol does involve very many specialised steps. Salbutamol can be effective via 
many different delivery approaches, and human tolerance to a varied dosage is high. 
The exposure associated with the specialised production can therefore be 
significantly reduced by a local creation of pure salbutamol. Although the technology 
for completely generic chemical synthesis is still not mature, proof-of-concept has 
been demonstrated and it is reasonable to examine the effect on exposure of the 
availability of a general-purpose synthesis technology that would allow the production 
of pure salbutamol from readily available feedstocks. Such a process, which is 
dependent only on open-source information and basic feedstocks, would eliminate all 












(d) Summary of effect of hypothesised changes  
 Measure Type Effort Effect 
1 Financial transaction option  CONTRIB’Y  Moderate  Major 
2 Local storage empty MDI  TECH_SUB  Minor  Major 
3 Local storage of diluted 
salbutamol  
TECH_SUB  Minor  Major  
4 Standardised MDI manufacture  INDEP’T  Moderate  Major 
5 Local major power storage  TECH_NEW  Major  Major 
6 Local creation of salbutamol  TECH_NEW Major  Major 
Table 23: Effect of hypothesised changes to essential specific medicine system 
7.3.9 Effect of hypothesised modifications to newspaper vendor model  
The “newspaper vendor” example is included in this thesis purely as an 
illustration of the effect of treating a simple dynamic model using the exposure theory. 
The exposure metric of the original model is shown to be {4, 0, 0}. The E1 value (4) 
reflects the possible failure of the input stream (papers from the newspaper producer), 
failure of fuel or roads to allow transport from the point of bulk supply purchase to the 
point of sale and non-availability of the newspaper vendor. As the model relates to a 
single vendor, selling a single product that is sourced from a single point, there are 
no contributors to E2 or E3 values (there are no combinations of two or three failures, 
where neither failure alone would cause output failure that would cause a service 
failure. The whole newspaper vendor “problem” is an operational research problem of 
optimising a variable (profit) under conditions of uncertain demand and fixed supply 
cost – a semi-dynamic effect. If the vendor could download an electronic copy of the 
paper, and use a local printer to generate papers as required (paying the printer only 
the royalty for each copy sold), the problem of predicting demand would become 
irrelevant, but this technological change would introduce all the technological 
vulnerabilities of the printing process, which include the provision of power, paper and 
communications to the newspaper file supplier, and would probably actually increase 
the exposure of the end-user. It is concluded that, assuming that only cash 
transactions are possible, the newspaper vendor is one of the examples that has the 





a technological solution that has lower exposure. The example almost epitomises a 
case where the end-user is minimally vulnerable to technological failures. 
7.4 Conclusion: exposure reduction from changes to examples 
This chapter has set out the results of the analyses of hypothesised changes 
to the technological systems described in the initial examples. The effectiveness of 
these changes (in terms of vulnerability reductions) will allow conclusions both on the 
options for reducing the vulnerability of specific systems, and also on the most general 
approaches to a reduction of technological vulnerability. This analysis and the 
summary have answered RQ(b): “For goods or services delivered to end-users, what 
reductions of vulnerability can be obtained by changes to the technological approach 






8.1 Vulnerability of end-users to existing technological systems 
8.1.1 Description of vulnerability 
Published definitions of “vulnerability” have been extensively examined in 
Chapter 2 and also Chapter 4 of this work. Significant divergence and lack of clarity 
among published definitions have been noted. The proposed approach to improving 
the precision of these definitions is to constrain the term resilience to describing the 
dynamic response of a functioning system to a specified perturbation. Resilience 
improvement measures, which are not analysed in this thesis, would then take 
account of the instantaneous state of all system components and the magnitude of 
nominated perturbations, and would assume that the system will not actually fail. 
Metrics of resilience would measure the response of a system, starting at a defined 
status, to a defined perturbation.  
Once a level of service output to users is defined for a technological system, 
the capability of a system to deliver or fail to deliver a service can be considered. This 
thesis is concerned with the failure of technological systems to deliver, at identified 
service level, their designed outputs and the thesis scope is thus distinguished from 
a consideration of the resilient, dynamic response of a functional system. A recursive 
application of a defined service level output will also establish the nominal state of all 
streams and processes "upstream" of the final delivery of goods or services. This set 
of states, which corresponds to nominal operating conditions for the defined service 
level, allows a clear definition of a maximum tolerable disturbance for each stream or 
process variable, as the perturbation from the nominal state that will cause failure to 
achieve the service level output. 
Having defined “resilience” in terms of described dynamic and continuous 
responses and having defined the scope of that term, the term "vulnerability" has been 
proposed to describe the combination of risk and exposure. The research question 
upon which this thesis is based, relates to vulnerability and, for the situation where 
risks are considered to have p = 1.0, the “vulnerability” of an urban dweller to the loss 
of a specified service can be equated with the exposure of the technological system 
supplying that service. The work of Chapter 4 has been to show that the proposed 





Under these definitions, exposure is a precise antonym of robustness, noting 
that robustness is commonly associated with the design and configuration of a 
technological system, rather than the margin between design and overload 
performance. These definitions fall within the scope of other published definitions, 
whose scope in some cases is very wide, but the refined definitions allow clear 
distinctions to be made. The clear distinctions demonstrate both the specific 
contribution of this thesis and the alignment of the work of this thesis with other related 
works. 
8.1.2 Distinctive aspects of end-user vulnerabilities and exposures 
End-user vulnerabilities have several distinctive aspects: there are differences 
in the attribute being measured, distinctive scope elements, distinctive types of 
vulnerability and distinctive effects. 
Difference in what is measured. Failure options within an infrastructural 
system could potentially include geographically localised failures, percentage 
reduction in full performance or reduced annual availability. For a supply chain, 
decreased capability, temporary delays in supply or the inaccessibility of an optimal 
route could all be considered to be possible vulnerabilities. The variety of possible 
definitions of infrastructural system and supply chain vulnerabilities leads to a 
corresponding difficulty in defining the level of exposure to failure, or the infrastructural 
system. The end-user’s static vulnerability is distinctively and relatively easily defined 
in terms of the non-availability of goods or services at a specified service level. The 
relatively clear definition of the vulnerability of the individual user also allows the 
development of a clear definition of the actual exposure of that individual to the 
systems providing the vulnerable services. Although many end-users may be served 
by a technological system, all will be subject to the same vulnerability; thus, the 
distinctive end-user vulnerabilities are applicable to the full complement of end-users. 
Difference in scope.  Chapters 5 and 6 of this work argue that typical and 
representative individual end-users are subject to a range of “exposures” in addition 
to those that affect the major infrastructure and typical supply chains. The scope of 
the technological system that supplies the end-user includes not only the "last-mile" 
systems that are outside common definitions of national infrastructure, but also 





Difference in nature. The theoretical basis of analysis has deprecated the 
importance of identifying specific hazards that may cause a non-availability, but has 
drawn attention to the effect of non-availability. The analysis has included the 
observation that “non-availability” can result from causes that are related more to the 
interface to a component than to the technological functionality of a component. In 
specific cases – communications systems and financial systems ‒ it has been 
observed that a system can become practically unavailable to a user, as a result of 
unacceptable terms of use imposed by system owners. Contracts for services 
therefore contribute exposure because the user may be offered terms that are 
unacceptable, in situations where service options with acceptable terms are not 
available.  
Difference in effect. This thesis has argued that the individual’s vulnerability 
is clearer, i.e. more readily defined, than the infrastructural system vulnerability. This 
thesis has also argued that the magnitude of the end-user vulnerability, i.e. the effect 
upon the user if the event to which they are vulnerable comes to pass, is qualitatively 
different from the magnitude of the same vulnerability for the infrastructural system 
owner. The non-availability of a working sewage system will force the apartment 
dweller to relocate, but the non-availability of a single-dwelling sewage connection will 
be of limited consequence to the system owner or operator. This qualitative difference 
justifies the focus of the thesis on the vulnerability of the end-user. 
In summary, it is argued that there are a number of distinctive aspects to the 
end-user's exposure in regard to the supply of specific goods or services. These 
distinctive exposures are described and considered in this thesis. 
8.1.3 Investigation of vulnerability of end-users to selected technological 
systems 
This work has considered the effect of technological systems on an individual 
user, and has justified the consideration of a representative individual user, dwelling 
in an apartment in a city of about 200,000 to 500,000 people. For each of the 
examples studied, it has been shown that the lack of the goods or services supplied 
would force significant changes to the lives and lifestyles of the intended recipients. 
This is sufficient justification to study the examples, as the research question did not 





examples have been selected to demonstrate a broad range of types of goods or 
services.  
For each example studied, the technological system has been justified to be 
typical of that used in cities of the size proposed. As the systems studied are "typical", 
it is inevitable that some actual examples will have already incorporated at least some 
of the hypothesised changes ‒ this does not negate the conclusions from the study of 
the exemplar systems and hypothesised changes. 
Several technological sub-systems were considered to be sufficiently common 
as to warrant separate analysis. This approach also ensured identical treatment for 
each case where these sub-systems contributed to a studied example. Internet 
communications and EFTPOS financial transaction systems were considered to be 
standard contributory subsystems. Road systems, power supply and potable water 
were considered for analysis as standard contributory systems but did not appear to 
be sufficiently standardised across the studied examples. For an end-to-end transfer 
of data over the internet, an exposure metric of {25, 19, 0} was calculated, however, 
some variation is needed for systems that do not involve end-to-end international data 
transfer. Exposure points include "last-mile" communications issues, router and 
national transfer systems and international transfers via undersea cables. The 
commercial issues of acceptable access to ISPs also contribute to this vulnerability. 
An EFTPOS transaction includes interactions between an EFTPOS terminal, three 
banks and several communications paths, generating an exposure of {49, 12, 1}. That 
exposure scope includes the power supply, standard communications and bank 
processes and the commercial acceptances for the parties involved in the transaction. 
Example study #1: sewage system. The sewage evacuation and treatment 
system has been calculated to have an exposure metric of {34, 4, 6}. This level of 
exposure considers the apartment systems, the pipework system connecting to the 
treatment plant, associated power supplies and control systems and the significant 
treatment plant systems. It is noted that the exposure of this system is significantly 
affected by the specification that "service" includes the treatment of sewage to an 
environmentally benign state. 
Example study #2: collaboratively developed work information. The work 





dominated by the internet communications contribution, but also reflecting the 
contribution of the PC hardware, the PC software and power supplies at each end. 
Example study #3: local fuel supply. The supply of fuel at a local petrol 
station is calculated to have an exposure of {98, 20, 12}, which reflects both 
dispensing functions that include pumping, control and metering systems, financial 
transactions, the amenity functions including water provision and sewage evacuation, 
which are required for a staffed facility, and the provision of bulk fuel supplies. 
Example study #4: targeted first-aid. Obtaining a diagnosis and treatment 
instructions in the specific first-aid example is calculated to incur an exposure of {23, 
14, 1}. International internet communications are not required, but local 
communications, a local PC and a search system for information to be returned (first-
aid instructions) contribute to the total exposure. 
Example study #5: perishable food. The supply of perishable food (fresh 
milk) has been calculated to have an exposure of {128, 22, 12}, with contributions 
from a financial transaction (which includes communications), the milk treatment 
factory (including power supply, staff, equipment and fuel), the wholesale processes, 
the retail facilities (including staff amenities (sewage, water and power)) and the user's 
transport and local storage facilities. 
Example study #6: essential specific medicine. The supply of a selected 
specific medicine has been shown to have an exposure metric of {58, 15, 10}. 
Although several specialised processes are involved, these are duplicated and 
moderately standardised. The user must use a financial transaction, and also a 
permission (a doctor's prescription) process in order to access the medication. 
Clearly, these values will be specific to the selected medicine; however, the selected 
example has been justified as being reasonable.  
This section has described the vulnerabilities of the examples studied, and on 
the causes of the vulnerabilities identified. As such, this section has provided 
interpreted answers to the first part of the research question (RQ(a)).  
As all the studied examples represent items whose non-availability would have 
significant effects on the lifestyle of the representative individual, and have been 
selected to illustrate a broad variety of technological systems, the study has 
demonstrated that the representative apartment-dwelling end-user is significantly 





8.1.4 End-user vulnerability to other systems 
Table 6 sets out a selection of examples that could be studied, and makes the 
final selection. Of the candidate examples that were not studied, arguably the 
international travel example includes the largest range of components that are not 
covered in the studied examples. These include international travel permissions, 
several skill sets that cannot be substituted, equipment that is not duplicated, e.g. 
aircraft, and such items as navigation satellites. This example is mentioned as one 
that appears, upon superficial inspection, to incur a very high vulnerability for the end-
user.  
An initial examination of a small selection of other examples, such as water 
supply, power supply and the supply of non-perishable foods, strongly suggests that 
analysis would reveal very similar issues to those found in the selected examples, 
and in many cases the same contributory subsystems are relevant. For these 
reasons, it is considered that the conclusions developed for the selected examples 
can be applied more generally. 
8.1.5 End-user vulnerability conclusion 
The basis for the selection of the example technological systems is presented 
in Section 3.4.1. Although the research question for this thesis only requires the 
examination of selected systems, it is useful to consider the extent to which the 
selected systems are representative of other systems that supply goods or services 
to the target category of end-users. The target category of end-users has been 
described as apartment dwellers in cities of approximately 200,000 to 500,000 
individuals. A broad inventory of the needs of the target group could be generated by 
several approaches; one such approach could involve identifying each service or 
stream of goods that falls within a category in the hierarchy of needs proposed by 
Maslow (1943). Less rigorously, it is possible to simply itemise needs starting with 
shelter, warmth, food, water, sanitation, the means of earning a living, mobility, 
communication, security for possessions and resources, including material and 
financial resources, storage and communication of information.  
The exemplar technological systems studied in this thesis are shown to be 
broadly representative of the categories of needs of the target group. The short-shelf-





such as fresh vegetables, fresh meat and fruit; each will have post-harvest treatment, 
packaging, wholesale and retail functions with financial transactions and the need for 
user transport. The sewage example is expected to be broadly similar to services 
such as water and power supply systems, incorporating centralised bulk supply, with 
progressive change and distribution, e.g. voltage breakdown for the power system, 
and a “last-mile” supply line, without immediate pay-for-service. This thesis has 
intentionally not considered long-life items such as the dwelling itself, clothing or 
vehicles, where the expected lifetime is significantly greater than the time required to 
recreate the technological system for the production of the item.  
Two important conclusions can be drawn: firstly, that the studied examples are 
likely to be representative of other examples of goods or services supplied to the end-
user, and without which the end-user is faced with significant and unwanted life-
changes; secondly, that the vulnerability of the end-user to the technological systems 
(as measured by their exposure) is very high.  
8.2 Contribution of exposure analysis approach 
8.2.1 Contributions to the analysis of vulnerability 
Many published studies and popular media articles include degrees of 
acknowledgement of the vulnerability of individuals to technological systems. Specific 
examples are sometimes quoted, but generalised analyses are rare. The definitions 
of vulnerability that are used in these studies vary considerably. Specific examples 
are sometimes quoted, but generalisations are rare and the term vulnerability has no 
definition that is well accepted, constraining or quantitative. Not only do definitions of 
vulnerability vary, but also the authors who supply definitions of vulnerability do not 
always supply definitions of other terms such as resilience, risk etc. The result is that 
not only are there a variety of published definitions of "vulnerability", but also these 
varied definitions do not align with definitions of other related terms. There is a need 
for a set of definitions of all common terms that preserve internal consistency and are 
related to the field of this thesis topic. 
Section 4.7 of this thesis develops a set of definitions that are internally 
consistent and precise. These are necessary for the development and defense of a 





that resilience may be defined in terms of a system response to a perturbation that is 
below a maximum tolerable level, and hence refers to a system that has not failed. 
This definition allows the field of study of the thesis to be clearly distinguished from 
the study of dynamic responses, which are outside the scope of this thesis. The 
definitions establish that both vulnerability and harm are indexed to a "failure to 
deliver" concept and are not related to the concept of "consequences of failure to 
deliver". The consequences of failure to deliver justify the study of the field. The 
definitions proposed in section 4.7 also establish that "risk" refers to the probability of 
a hazard occurring within a time-frame and that, within the context of this thesis, a 
hazard is any event that can threaten a weakness in a technological system. The 
description and definition of vulnerability and the indexation to an end-user enables a 
quantitative analysis of vulnerability.  
8.2.2 Contribution from the measure of exposure  
The "exposure" metric was developed within a well-defined context. The field, 
linked to the research question, assumes a technological system supplying goods or 
services to a user. A heterogeneous system consideration was essential, because 
the "technological system" included the creation of the goods or services rather than 
just the delivery. The technological system was understood to be a system that 
creates and finally delivers the target service or supply of goods, and hence is clearly 
heterogeneous. A metric relevant to the research question therefore had to be 
applicable to a heterogeneous system. To achieve clarity of the analytical results, it 
was proposed that the delivery of a single, defined service or supply of goods, to a 
single end-user, at a defined rate should be the basis for the analysis metric. This 
approach did not preclude separate analyses at different supply rates but allowed the 
system output to be represented by a simple yes/no variable indicating successful 
supply at the defined rate. The definition of a single output also allowed the scope of 
the technological system under consideration to be unambiguously defined. The 
definition of vulnerability developed in Section 4.7 of this thesis has clarified the scope 
of the research question and distinguishing this from any consideration of the dynamic 
response of the technological system. The research question is therefore also clarified 





the clarification of these contextual principles allows a clear and valid metric to be 
developed. 
Starting from the observation that any hazard is only such if it is aligned with 
a weakness, it has been argued that the number and the types of weaknesses are 
significant and are reasonably described as the "exposure" of a defined technological 
system. It has also been argued that, for either guided hazards or long time-frames, 
the probability of any hazard occurring approaches 1.0; hence, using the definitions 
from Section 4.7, "vulnerability" is measured by the supplying system’s "exposure" 
and this exposure metric is mapped directly from the configuration of processes and 
streams within the technological system. 
The exposure metric is refined in Chapter 4 of this thesis, by categorising 
weaknesses and summing them according to the number of simultaneous failures 
required to cause the system's output to fail. Refinements to clarify the granularity of 
representation are presented, and it is noted that appropriate re-drawing and 
representation of the Boolean expression will allow subsystems (e.g. power supplies) 
that affect more than one part of a technological system to be correctly represented. 
Many practical systems are dependent upon inputs from specialised (sub)systems; 
the basis for calculating the effect on the total exposure, for contributory subsystems, 
is developed. The effect of the contributory systems is shown (in Chapters 6 and 7) 
to have a major effect on the total system exposure. 
Section 4.6 of this thesis considers whether the proposed quantification of 
"exposure" can be claimed as a valid metric to answer the research question. The 
validity is considered by reference to "measurement theory", and it is argued that the 
metric meets criteria proposed by Hand (2004). The theoretical basis for the 
calculation of exposure is shown to reasonably represent the issues raised in the 
research question, and is also shown to achieve the fundamental goals of the 
measurement, i.e. allowing informed decision and allowing comparison of alternative 





8.3 Reduction of vulnerability 
8.3.1 Identification of options 
The description of the example cases, in terms that can be translated into an 
exposure metric, has allowed the identification of the points, e.g. streams and 
processes, within the examples that contribute to the exposure metric. As the metric 
is demonstrably correlated with vulnerability, an inspection of the contributors to the 
metric clearly and quickly identifies the aspects that can most profitably be modified 
to reduce the end-user’s actual vulnerability. A standard set of categories of possible 
exposure reductions has been proposed. These are: "local storage" "technological 
substitution", "technological breakthrough", "re-purposable components", "repair 
priority or inherent difficulty of attack", "standardised independent units and 
interfaces" and "minimisation of exposure contributed by common subsystems". 
These categories are not shown to be exhaustive, and hence other opportunities must 
be considered for the elimination of each identified point of exposure. The categories 
are also not mutually exclusive, and overlap in their definitions. Nevertheless, the use 
of a standardised set of categories is helpful in identifying practical hypothetical 
approaches to the elimination of exposure; of equal importance, the use of 
standardised categories is helpful in identifying generalised conclusions. 
8.3.2 Effectiveness of hypothesised approaches 
This section describes notable findings resulting from the analysis of 
hypothesised changes to the example cases and hence summarises the answer to 
the second part of the research question (RQ(b)). The fresh food (milk) and the 
essential medicine (Ventolin™) examples illustrate the relative effects of local storage 
options for short- and long-shelf-life goods. For high-value, low-volume and long-
shelf-life goods such as Ventolin™ MDIs, local stockpiling at a level that will allow new 
supply options to be identified is shown to allow a substantial reduction in exposure. 
For the first-aid example, the static nature of the information allows a major reduction 
in exposure by using local information storage. Local storage of such reference 
information on a common personal electronic storage device (cell phone) is quite 
practical, and devices allowing optical reading of dense storage, such as microfiche 





to a very low figure for this example. The work information example describes the 
exchange of an editable spreadsheet via the internet and two (remote) PCs. The 
delivery of the "service" actually depends on standardised data formats at several 
levels, i.e. file formats, data packet formats and routing information formats. Exposure 
within this example is contributed by the internet, by each local PC and by the "last-
mile" communication between the PC and a central internet system. For both petrol 
and fresh food, dependence on EFTPOS systems contributes significant exposure to 
the examples as described, and this exposure contribution can be avoided by 
ensuring the acceptability of other legal tender such as cash. For the time-frames 
considered, the raw materials (such as raw milk and bulk petrol) were, perhaps 
surprisingly, shown to have several alternative sources and hence did not contribute 
to high "E" values. 
The analyses have deliberately considered some options for which practical 
implementations are not yet available, or where implementations are at a low level of 
technological maturity. Of particular note is the large reduction in exposure that would 
become available if large-scale storage of electrical power became feasible.  
Significant reductions in exposure could also be achieved (without awaiting 
technological breakthrough) should the internet transition to an anonymously 
accessible network with increased design redundancy for such components as DNS 
servers and router information updating, as well as international transmission paths 
and widespread use of end-to-end strong encryption. 
8.3.3 Development of general principles 
The analysis of hypothesised changes to the example studies allows some 
broad principles for a reduction of end-user vulnerability to be proposed.  
Exposure is contributed by system components close to user. Single 
points of failure (contributors to user E1 value) commonly occur close to the point of 
service delivery. Although this result may be expected, it does focus attention on 
options for exposure reduction, and it also justifies the distinction between end-user 
vulnerability and national infrastructural vulnerability. 
Exposure is contributed by connected subsystems. The study has shown, 
both in theory (Chapter 4) and for particular examples (Chapters 5, 6 and 7), the 





of a large subsystem is required in order to deliver some specific goods or services, 
this will contribute all of its exposure metric to the final exposure. This observation has 
important effects: to reduce exposure and hence end-user vulnerability, it is important 
to avoid creating dependence on large contributory systems, either by ensuring 
options for bypassing these systems or by simply avoiding their connection. There is 
currently much interest in an “internet of things”, which assumes multitudes of internet-
connected sensors and even implanted medical devices; whatever the utility of having 
such devices connected, the connection contributes very large increases in the 
exposure of the delivery of goods and services. Considering the specific case of an 
implanted medical device that is essential for life, connection of the device to the 
internet significantly increases the exposure of the patient to failure or unplanned 
operation of the device.  
Exposure is contributed by dependence on large centralised systems. 
The sophistication of some technological systems, plus opportunities for achieving 
economies of scale, has contributed to a very marked trend for large and sophisticated 
technological systems to be owned and operated by corporates. These drivers may 
or may not still be valid but, in any case, the user seldom has options for selecting 
more robust and less-exposed options. 
For large technological systems owned by either a public or private entity, the 
consequences of a failure for the owners may be orders of magnitude less than the 
consequences for the end-user. A commercial entity that is responsible for a complex 
technological system is quite likely to conclude that a level of loss-of-service for end-
users is an optimal commercial position; the user’s economic resource is limited and 
the cost of the provision of high levels of reliability is high compared with the likely 
financial penalties for service failure. Commercial entities such as banks and petrol 
stations also have no obligation to provide facilities at all and can decide to cease to 
offer services or change terms of offer, on purely commercial grounds.  
Alternative sources of supply of, for example, water, sewage, internet 
connection and power for the user may or may not be available, and are unlikely to 
be readily available. With the exception of civil-defense-type measures, public policy 
seldom considers the capacity of the individual to continue their lifestyle, on a long-
term basis, without current centralised systems. By definition, a large system includes 





system depends on many paying customers – undersea fiber-optic cable is a good 
example); therefore, it is possible to generalise a conclusion that dependence on a 
large and centralised system always results in large exposure for the end-user.  
Exposure tends to be decreased by use of decentralised systems. 
Although many systems are highly centralised, there are notable cases where 
powerful components are sufficiently accessible to allow decentralisation and hence 
decreased exposure of users for specific services. Notable cases include three-
dimensional printers, allowing the fabrication of complex objects by individuals. The 
Royal Society of Chemistry's journal "Lab-on-a-chip" is devoted to disseminating 
developments in the field of highly integrated and portable analysis systems. 
Chemical unit operations are often relatively simple, and the availability of process 
simulation software, public information on compounds and synthesis methods does 
make the synthesis of complex substances possible for individuals, e.g. the synthesis 
of aspirin, salbutamol and Daraprim as reported by the New York Post (2016). More 
versatile (and less technologically mature) options for general chemical synthesis 
have also been proposed, e.g. a “molecular assembler” as envisioned by Drexler 
(2007). Taken to a logical conclusion, this trend will result in fully capable von 
Neumann machines as envisioned by such authors as Freitas and Merkle (2004). 
Although such concepts have been the diet of science fiction literature, they are 
actually close to technological maturity, and allow a very highly decentralised society 
with very low technological exposure to be envisaged. It is therefore entirely 
reasonable to hypothesise systems based on foreseeable technology, which enable 
functionality that was previously confined to national-scale systems to be available at 
household or suburb level. Such hypotheses show the real possibility of significantly 
reduced exposure of not only a representative individual but also potentially ALL such 
representative individuals. 
Practical unavailability contributes exposure. Access to highly centralised 
systems is generally via commercial contract, and users are vulnerable to systems 
being practically unavailable or inaccessible because of unacceptable contractual 
terms. The analysis has, for example, highlighted the reduction in exposure that is 
possible by retaining cash-payment options rather than enforcing dependence on 





Standard and re-purposable components decrease exposure. Many 
useful examples of standardisation, including simple mechanical and electrical 
components, fuel specifications etc. exist; however, the analysis has also drawn 
attention to the high levels of long-term exposure arising from issues such as non-
standardised data storage formats, leading to the threat of a "digital dark age". It could 
be argued that the most versatile component of any system is the human operator, 
and the consideration of re-purposable components has drawn attention to the value 
of including options for human intervention wherever possible in a technological 
system. Because people can re-purpose and re-configure, their capability to intervene 
in a technological system offers a primary approach to decreasing exposure; at almost 
any point, introducing a “person” means that the criterion of “no contribution at the E2 
level” is met. 
Deprecation of importance of specific nature of attacks. This study has 
deprecated the importance of characterising the specific nature of possible attacks 
upon a process or stream within a technological system; it has not even distinguished 
between technological and commercial failure. It is valid to consider that there is a 
very wide range of possible issues that can result in a process becoming effectively 
unavailable to the end-user. In addition to physical failure, strictly non-technological 
issues such as unacceptable terms of business, inevitability of unfriendly surveillance 
and a lack of security may be significant factors in causing the effective non-
availability of a process or subsystem. The “exposure” metric can take account of 
such potential sources of unavailability, which contributes to its validity as a true 
measure of the end-user’s vulnerability. 
Importance of definition of scope. The analysis of the examples and the 
hypothesised changes to each have emphasised the importance of carefully 
describing the boundaries and service levels under consideration. Applying adequate 
definitions of these constraints has allowed hypothesised changes to be investigated; 
less precise definitions would probably result in indeterminate conclusions. It has also 
been shown that consideration of common time-frames is essential for useful results. 
The petrol station example assumes the availability of bulk petrol; however, a longer 
time-frame could lead to consideration of a scenario where this was not necessarily 





8.4 Contributions of the research 
The research contribution is considered under three subheadings: contribution 
to academia, contribution to practice and contribution to society. 
8.4.1 Contribution to academia 
The introduction to this work identified that a large group of persons live in 
urban environments, and are likely to be vulnerable to systems that are commonly 
used to supply essential goods and services. The work has described two distinctions 
between the individuals who are representative of the target group and the owners of 
supply chains and of national infrastructure. These distinctions are described in terms 
of the comparative effects of adverse outcomes, and the specific threats that may be 
relevant to the end-user but not to either the infrastructural owner or the supply chain 
owner or operator. The description of these distinctive features and the identification 
of a defined field of interest is considered to represent a contribution made by this 
work. Having established that a distinct field of study exists, specifically that the 
described representative end-user is vulnerable to the loss of several essential goods 
and services, the introduction has also established that there is a need for an 
analytical method for assessing the vulnerability incurred by current approaches to 
the supply of these services.  
A number of criteria for assessing the technological contribution to end-user 
vulnerability have been identified, and this work has presented a tabulated 
assessment of the capabilities and limitations of (many) techniques appearing in the 
literature. The techniques considered include graph theory, risk analysis and various 
accumulated scoring approaches. The classification has also considered whether the 
techniques offer static or dynamic analyses, and whether these are applicable to 
systems in which a single service is transported, or where a service is progressively 
created from intermediate streams and a range of processes within homogeneous or 
heterogeneous systems. The comparison of assumptions and the fields of 
applicability of a diverse range of published analytical techniques (considerations of 
applicable time-frame, homogeneity of technological system, accuracy of definition, 
classification of hazards, result type and nature of input data) is considered to 
represent a contribution. This work has concluded that the published material has not 





technological systems under consideration. This work has developed a practical 
approach to quantifying the exposure of a technological system and has provided a 
good theoretical basis for concluding that the metric is indeed a valid measure of the 
contribution to end user vulnerability. This is proposed to be a specific contribution to 
the theoretical basis of the field of study.   
It has been noted that, whenever any process or stream is essential for a final 
delivery of goods or services, its presence is a potential locus for a hazard(s); 
conversely, if the necessity of a process or stream is eliminated (for example by the 
elimination of a contributory sub-system), then the hazards previously associated with 
it are no longer valid and it is no longer a potential locus for disruption or denial. This 
work has drawn attention to the significance of a technological system's component, 
process and stream configuration, for the assessment of the end-user's vulnerability. 
Ancient military wisdom noted the dangers associated with long supply chains: 
defining the basis for this observation and applying it to technological systems upon 
which people depend is considered to be a contribution. 
Risk analyses commonly assess the probability of a particular hazard 
occurring, and sometimes identify a time-frame for that occurrence. This work has 
argued that, for either guided (i.e. intentionally generated) hazards or long time-
frames, it is more realistic to assume that a hazard will occur, and therefore a 
probability of 1.0 is the reasonable value to be applied to the probability of occurrence. 
It is noted that there is no specific limit on the number of possible hazards that could 
be associated with an essential process or intermediate stream. When the probability 
of at least one hazard having a probability of 1.0 is assumed, then the existence of a 
critical locus for the hazard becomes the factor that actually determines the final 
vulnerability of the user. 
A number of published definitions of vulnerability have been analysed; these 
vary considerably. Although all contain recognisable elements, there is no definition 
that either would be accepted as authoritative or would provide the rigour of a 
definition required for a quantitative analysis of a technological system.  
This work has proposed that a service level be defined for each service or 
supply of goods to be studied. Such a definition allows a rigorous study, and does not 
preclude studies of more than one service level (e.g. "normal supply" and "emergency 





quantified as "true" or "false". For many services, e.g. the supply of electrical power, 
a Boolean representation of the state of supply is obvious. However, a Boolean 
representation can also be applied to any nominated service level.  
A technological system supplying goods or services will require inputs, and 
the achievement of a service level output will also require the supply of service level 
inputs. By applying the "service level" criteria recursively, this work has illustrated that 
it is possible to describe a complete technological system by a Boolean representation 
of all the processes and streams. The correlation between the inputs and outputs of 
a Boolean expression (describing an actual system) can be described and 
demonstrated by a "truth table" that shows the correlation between any combination 
of input conditions, i.e. the status of processes and input streams. The nature of the 
exposure metric, including the business rules such as dealing with streams that are 
essential at more than one location, has been defined and justified. This, together with 
the practical experience of application to examples, is evidence that the definition is 
both practical and adequately complete. 
The theoretical background for this work has been developed in Chapter 4, 
and describes a metric of "exposure", detailing not only the rationale for the metric but 
also the proposed method of calculation, and the justification for using the "exposure" 
descriptor. It is not claimed that this approach supersedes other approaches, but it is 
claimed that, as it is well founded and allows the demonstration of valuable results, 
this represents a contribution to academia. 
Starting from the assertion that end-user vulnerability is an "attribute of 
interest", the discipline of measurement theory has been applied to the proposed 
"exposure" metric, and this application has shown that the proposed metric is indeed 
a valid metric representing the attribute of interest. Several other theories or concepts 
related to personal vulnerability have been published; these include "normal accident 
theory" applied to complex and interlinked systems having large potential 
consequences, as noted by Perrow (1984), chaos and complexity theories linking 
small perturbations to large changes in output conditions and utilitarian theory applied 
to populations rather than individuals. Some less academic approaches have been 
proposed in specific fields ‒ e.g. the "bus hit factor" applied to software development 
teams. The relationships between these approaches and the exposure analysis 





importance, the relationships between terms such as “robustness”, “survivability”, 
“resilience”, “fragility” and “exposure” have been explored. Although the lack of fully 
accepted and adequate definitions of terms precludes an unambiguous analysis, it is 
particularly proposed that robustness is synonymous with low levels of exposure and 
that a reduction in exposure can be stated to imply an increase in robustness. This in 
itself is considered to be a useful contribution.  
8.4.2 Contribution to practice  
The topic of this work is applicable to public policy, technological system 
design and application, and public interest. "Practitioners" can therefore be claimed 
to include policymakers concerned with the vulnerability of citizens and the use of 
public monies to decrease that vulnerability, persons engaged in the design of 
systems, e.g. those designing implanted medical devices and those considering the 
application of IoT devices, and members of the public concerned for their own 
vulnerability and wishing to make effective changes to it.  
A "contribution to practice" will therefore assist those who "practice" in one of 
these fields, i.e. policymakers, designers and members of the public. The actual 
contribution to practice is similar for all these categories of "practitioner". It is the 
additional insights available, and specifically those arising from the more complete 
identification of the nature and numbers of contributions to vulnerability, and the 
analysis of the effectiveness of hypothesised changes. In the course of the 
investigation, a classical risk analysis was commissioned for a system identical to the 
exemplar sewage disposal system. Care was taken to ensure that the scope of the 
risk analysis was identical to the representative system, and was carried out by a 
professional engineer. The risk analysis did, as argued, proceed via a brainstorming 
of hazards without initially clarifying the nature and the interdependencies of the 
processes and intermediate streams that were necessary to deliver the service. The 
results of the analysis failed to identify specific processes whose disruption would 
have caused the service delivery to fail. The exercise of comparing the practice of a 
classical risk analysis with an analysis of exposure has demonstrated the practical 
gains achievable from representing the complete technological system in terms of 
processes, intermediate streams and interconnections and the quantification of 





define a technological system and to ensure its completeness within defined 
boundaries, and hence to define the processes and streams contributing to the 
provision of the defined services or goods. Practitioners of each type share a concern 
at the possibility of failures caused by hazards to un-identified vulnerabilities, despite 
expenditure to reduce vulnerability associated with previously identified hazards and 
points of exposure. A detailed consideration of exposure for the system will generate 
some confidence that all significant points of exposure have been identified. 
The evaluation of hypothesised changes to exemplar systems (Chapter 7 of 
this work) has shown that changes that effect significant reductions in actual end-user 
vulnerability are often simple and should be relatively inexpensive. The detailed 
evaluation of cost was not in the scope of this study but the observation suggests a 
need for detailed evaluation by the practitioner. The exemplar systems analysed are 
representative of real systems, and hence the analyses of these specific systems do 
provide guidance for practitioners. As the exemplar systems also address subsystems 
that will be common to the systems that supply many other goods and services, the 
results from the analysis of hypothesised changes will have a wider validity. 
The analysis of representative systems has demonstrated clearly that the 
vulnerability of end-users is greatly reduced by attention to the single-source-of-failure 
loci that are commonly found close to the point of consumption ‒ and hence beyond 
the scope of more conventional analyses of infrastructural or supply chain systems. 
The analysis of representative systems has also drawn attention to the exposure that 
a technological system accrues from contributory systems. Whenever a subsystem is 
made essential to the function of a system, the exposure of the system is 
incrementally increased by the exposure metric of the contributory subsystem; this 
accrual can be defined mathematically. The accrual actuality can, and should, 
contribute to the practitioner's design process. As a primary example, the creation of 
an internet-connected essential input to any process will essentially and inevitably 
cause the exposure of the host system to be increased by the exposure of the internet. 
For technological systems delivering goods or services to an end-user, the 
practitioner’s leaning should be that contributory systems need to be non-mandatory 
in every case and no more than informative. The process of hypothesising changes 
to the representative example systems has also proposed a set of categories of types 





reduction of exposure of the exemplar systems. As such, these categories of 
hypothetical change are proposed for practitioners.  
8.4.3 Contribution to society 
This work has considered the vulnerability of end-users, noting that this group 
has concerns and vulnerabilities that are different in nature and personal impact from 
those of the authorities controlling national infrastructure and the owners of supply 
chains or large systems. This work has further considered the particular group of end-
users who live in cities, and has given particular attention to those living in apartments. 
The proportion of the world’s population living in an urban context increased to over 
50% in 2016 and is predicted to reach 75% by 2030. The total number, and the total 
proportion, of users whose vulnerability is represented by this study is therefore both 
large and increasing. The issues contributing to the vulnerability of the end-user have 
been distinguished from those affecting the owners or operators of national 
infrastructure, and from the owners or operators of supply chains. These distinctions 
are primarily the large difference between the consequences of supply failure and the 
specific hazards that apply distinctively to the end-user. The end-user is vulnerable to 
significantly different consequences from the failure of a technological system 
supplying services: an inoperable sewage system will make an apartment 
uninhabitable, whereas the same failure will probably cause no direct consequences 
to the city authorities who are responsible for the installation and operation of the 
sewage system. A user who is, for whatever reason, unable to make electronic 
financial transactions is effectively confined to a mode of life that is very significantly 
different from that of others. The individual user actually has few advocates: 
corporates focus on profitability (revenue-to-expenditure ratio); public policy focuses 
on utilitarian principles (greatest good for greatest number) and assumes a 
continuation of major systems. With the exception of civil-defense-type measures, 
public policy seldom considers the capacity of individuals to continue their lifestyle, on 
a long-term basis, without current centralised systems. For the representative 
individual, there is nevertheless a significant suite of needs that, if not supplied, will 
require immediate, major and unwanted lifestyle changes. The user can therefore 





Sophisticated technological systems have commonly become centralised and 
of large scale, driven by the economies of scale available from mass production (the 
per-unit costs of production, which decrease with plant capacity) and the related 
technological impracticality of small-scale operation. A high-bandwidth undersea 
fibre-optic cable illustrates the issue well: the capital cost of such a cable can be 
justified only when spread across many users for many years ‒ and there is no 
technology for single-user bandwidth with a pro-rata cost. Although this has been a 
trend since the start of the industrial age, there are significant reasons to explore 
options to reverse this trend: the consideration of end-user vulnerability studied in this 
work, is one such reason. Chapter 7 of this work has considered hypothetical changes 
to the example studies.  
Those analyses have specifically examined change options that involve either 
technological breakthrough or technological substitution, and the consideration of 
options under these categories has shown that there are currently many examples of 
technological decentralisation. Manufacturing that would have required a 
sophisticated factory can be achieved with a garage-scope three-dimensional printer; 
household-scale solar power options are rapidly maturing. Other capabilities such as 
on-demand chemical synthesis are less mature but are under active investigation, 
and the analysis of the specific medicine example has illustrated the effect on the 
vulnerability of drug users of such capabilities. No approach to small-scale fabrication 
of computing components is realistic at present, and technological substitution or 
technological breakthrough approaches to reducing dependence on very-large-scale 
facilities for the production of CPU, memory etc. devices are not available. As 
computing elements are moderately standardised components, the very widespread 
availability of mass-produced units and their longevity have however reduced that 
associated exposure.  
Within the category of technological breakthrough, the analysis of the fuel 
supply example has examined the option of creating in-specification motor fuel from 
macro-algae, at a "suburb or village" scale. This approach is technically feasible at 
present (i.e. the required technology exists but the fuel can be assumed to be 
significantly more expensive per litre than that from current supply systems). It is not 
within the scope of this work to examine the relationship between vulnerability 





sales of household-scale photovoltaic cells have increased markedly in New Zealand 
and Australia since about 2014, the full price of power from a photovoltaic system is 
judged to be significantly higher than that from the grid, for the foreseeable future. 
The analysis of actual vulnerability incurred, and the reductions available from 
options, should usefully inform the social question of price versus vulnerability. A 
facility that serves many end-users also is likely to be financed and operated by a 
corporate entity whose function will be to maximise ongoing financial return for that 
entity and hence ensuring both ongoing permission to operate with high availability. 
These dual requirements almost inevitably lead to the assignation of low priority to 
each individual user’s needs. 
This work has drawn attention to the distinction between guided and random 
hazards. The entity who purposely determines to disable a technological system will 
search out processes or streams and will create hazard(s) ‒ i.e. probability 1.0 ‒ to 
target those weaknesses. This phenomenon is qualitatively different from an extreme 
weather event. Whether the motivation is terrorism, vandalism, or civil disobedience 
does not change the essential difference between a (mis)guided hazard and a random 
hazard. It can be observed that, for very large and near-monopolistic systems 
(national power, telecommunications and finance), the potential effect of disruption is 
very high; hence, these will be perceived as high-value targets by any contemplating 
disruption. This observation must be distinguished from the "normal accident theory" 
proposed by Perrow (1984) because it is not simply the complexity of the large system 
per se that is responsible for an incurred vulnerability but the attractiveness of the 
"target" that leads ill-wishers to expend effort on identifying weaknesses.  
This work has also highlighted the issue of potential "practical non-availability", 
which is relevant for individual users of near-monopolistic systems. Particular fields of 
concern are financial and communications systems. In addition to profit-to-loss 
considerations, owners or operators of such systems are themselves vulnerable to 
statutory requirements (good or bad) and hence are likely to impose non-negotiable 
terms of access upon individual users. If those terms of access are unacceptable to 
the individual user, the service becomes practically non-available or inaccessible, and 
there is no certainty that an alternative system with different conditions will be 
available. Highlighting this issue is considered to be valuable, because such systems 





two main EFTPOS clearing systems, there are only two undersea fibre-optic cables 
and there is almost monopolistic ownership of power and "last-mile" communications 
systems). Within a city, there is generally a single owner for sewage systems. A 
“practical non-availability" might occur as a result of unacceptable terms, inevitability 
of surveillance or lack of security. It is significant that the “exposure” metric measure 
is applicable regardless of the cause of the unavailability, and hence is a valid 
measure for the end-user.  
The analysis of the example systems has shown that local power supplies and 
local communications systems contribute significantly to the end-user's vulnerability. 
Perhaps the most significant observation from the analysis of the example studies is 
the significant vulnerability incurred by the electronic financial transaction system, and 
the marked reductions in exposure that can be achieved by simple retention of cash-
based systems or other systems that do not force major "contributory system" 
exposure values. A more general conclusion, which has been clarified by the analysis, 
is the end-user's vulnerability to the simple availability of services provided on a strictly 
commercial, rather than statutory, basis. A number of trans-national banks and 
national petrol retailers have recently withdrawn services from rural towns; such 
actions have occasioned much public outcry but have starkly clarified the fact that the 
banks and the petrol retailers have only one duty, which is to maximise the profit of 
their shareholders ‒ they have neither obligations to communities nor even a legal 
"duty of care" to make services available, regardless of the consequences for end-
users.  
The analyses in this work have also shown many cases where an exposure 
point is created by the use of a single specific-purpose component such as a person 
with particular skills. It has been noted that, in many of these cases, simple design 
changes will ensure that multi-purpose components can be used, eliminating a single 
point of failure. For examples that include intermediate or final products that can be 
stockpiled, the analysis has noted both the previous work of stockpile effects on 
supply chain vulnerability and also the previous work by Robertson (2010). The 
analyses have also drawn attention to the significant cases where stockpiling is not 
currently technologically feasible, e.g. MWh storage of electrical power or long 





There has been a great deal of effort on the theoretical and practical 
approaches to minimising natural disaster effects. That work has noted that natural 
disasters are characterised by the disruption of multiple services that have key 
components within a defined geographical area. The focus of this work has been on 
functionally connected systems regardless of geographical proximity. Those who 
prepare for either natural or politico-economic disasters do anticipate the cessation of 
many services that are considered to be essential to their lifestyles; to this extent, the 
interests of the "preppers" do somewhat overlap with the concerns that have 
motivated this work. In contrast, this work does not assume geographically multiple 
failures, and has illustrated the vulnerabilities that are not strictly geographically 
bounded as for natural disasters.  
This work has explored mathematically the relationship between the exposure 
values of a contributory subsystem and the exposure of the individual end-user. This 
conclusion has significant effects for the design of all systems that are essential to the 
life and lifestyle of the individual, and is of particular concern to such issues as the 
“Internet of Things”, implantable medical devices etc. This analysis has particularly 
drawn attention to the effects upon the end-user's exposure of "internet-connected" 
services. Explaining this example simply, in each case where a service to an end-
user is made to be dependent on an internet-supplied input, the end-user's service 
becomes exposed to each and every locus of vulnerability on the connected internet. 
Attention has been drawn to cases where an individual user may effectively be unable 
to access a service because of quasi-technological issues (e.g. a service that routinely 
makes private information available to inimical users). For near-monopoly services, 
e.g. internet use and international banking, this could generate a situation where large 
numbers of users are affected, yet where it is unlikely that a pure "market forces" 
approach will encourage the development of an acceptable service. Current debates 
over the acceptability of strong end-to end encryption are closely related to this issue. 
The capability of national governments to technologically prevent citizens from 
accessing selected internet services is another clear example of this issue. 
A review of the hypothesised options for reduction of exposure has 
demonstrated that there is no longer any absolute need to equate sophistication of 
services with a high degree of centralisation and exposure. Household-scale 





foreseeable. A sophisticated and highly reconfigurable capability also offers the 
possibility of von Neumann machines having the capability to self-replicate, and 
completely obviates the economy-of-scale issues that have driven our current 
centralisation of services. The banking system or, more accurately, the systems for 
holding financial reserves and carrying out electronic (EFTPOS, online banking) 
transactions have been shown to contribute a very large level of vulnerability to the 
end-user. The study has shown the value of retaining provision for a cash- or bullion-
based transaction system, specifically offering a huge decrease in exposure, and for 
a system such as bitcoin, which is decentralised and independent of a centralised 
provider. The "internet" has become essential to so many normal functions that there 
have been serious proposals, e.g. by La Rou (2011), to include "internet access" 
within a list of basic human rights; however, the capability of state and other bodies 
to either technologically deny access to services or to create practical unavailability 
by ubiquitous surveillance causes significant exposure to all user-systems reliant on 
the internet.  
Much information used by individuals is actually relatively static. The analysis 
of the first-aid example illustrated a case where exposure could be realistically 
reduced by exchanging an online information option for a local reference source. Such 
an option is technologically feasible, and it is likely to be economically practical to 
store large volumes of non-transient information in robust formats that are directly 
accessible to users. Such an approach is contrary to the current trend to move all 
information online, and illustrates both the exposure incurred by online information 
sources and the reduction in exposure that is possible by local storage.  
By hypothesising changes that are reliant on major technological 
breakthroughs, this study has also highlighted specific advances that would allow 
major reductions in the exposure of technological systems and the resultant end-user 
vulnerability. The specific examples include large-scale (MWh) electrical power 
storage capability, general-purpose chemical synthesis capability, general-purpose or 
re-purposable chemical processing capability and ad-hoc point-to-point network 





8.5 Future work 
Much valuable work is beyond the scope of this thesis; this includes further 
development of the theoretical basis and further application of the theories. This 
section describes the further work that can currently be envisaged. The definition of 
the exposure metric means that E1, E2 etc. values impose limits on each other. If a 
system has n processes plus inputs and E1 = m, then ∑(E2..En) ≤ 2^(n ‒m). It can also 
be observed that, if En = 1, then E1..E(n ‒ 1) = 0. These rules could be further developed. 
An algorithm to examine each line item of a truth table and to generate the exposure 
values could be developed. For the real studies examined, this was not considered to 
be necessary. Similarly, a computerised approach to generating exposure values for 
a parent system, from an arbitrary combination of contributory systems, could be 
developed. This was also not considered to be necessary for the real studies 
examined. This thesis has examined the exposure of a (representative) end-user. 
However, in many cases (e.g. the fresh food example), the same systems supply 
many users and it would be possible to extend the concepts to reflect this. 
Authors such as Alderson and Doyle (2010) refer p, 849 to the "new sciences 
of complex networks (NSCN)" and refer extensively to the learnings that technological 
system might derive from complex biological systems. Noting the long-term survival 
of biological system despite complexity and multiple threats, this must indeed be 
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